Robertson v. Monroe County

Citation79 So. 184,118 Miss. 520
Decision Date17 June 1918
Docket Number20229
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
PartiesROBERTSON, STATE REVENUE AGENT, v. MONROE COUNTY

APPEAL from the chancery court of Monroe county, HON. A. J MCINTYRE, Chancellor.

Bill by Strokes V. Robertson, state revenue agent, for the use of the state of Mississippi, against Monroe County. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Demurrer overruled.

D. W Houston, Sr., & Jr., for appellant.

We believe it will be better and more orderly to discuss first the second and third grounds of the demurrer which challenges the right of the state of Mississippi, as well as the state revenue agent, to bring this suit.

The law of 1904, chapter 247, page 275, referred to in our bill, is as follows: "An act to authorize the board of supervisors of Monroe county to borrow the funds arising from the sixteenth section lands, and other purposes. Monroe county board of supervisors may borrow sixteenth section funds.

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that the board of supervisors of the county of Monroe are authorized to borrow the funds in their hands, or to come into their hands, arising from the rents, issues and profits of the sixteenth sections of lands known as school lands lying in Monroe county.

"Section 2. That upon the borrowing of said funds by said county of Monroe, the same shall be done by resolution entered on their minutes, and they shall pay six per cent. interest per annum on same, and the county treasurer shall carry on his books as a charge against the county the amounts of said funds, and to what funds the same has been used.

"Section 3. That this act shall be in force from and after its passage.

"Approved March 16, 1904."

In the case of Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss. 777 and 800, this court held (quoting from the syllibi): "That the state of Georgia, not the United States, is the donor of these school lands; that the United States took no title except in trust for the states to be created, and that, after a survey of the sections and on the admission of Mississippi as a state, the title and control of these sections vested in the state, in trust for the inhabitants of the several townships. Hester v. Crisler, 36 Miss. 618, and cases following it, overruled."

"Accordingly for the purpose of administering the trust, the state, not the United States, has control of sixteenth section school lands," etc.

In the case of Jeff Davis County v. Simrall Lumber Co., 94 Miss. 530, it was again held (quoting from the syllibi): "The title to the sixteenth sections school lands is in the state, in trust for the support of the public school of the township in which the same are respectively situate."

And the same is held in the case of Moos Point Lbr. Co. v. Harrison County, 89 Miss. 448 and 371-2, where Judge WHITFIELD refers to these sixteenth section school funds as sacred trust funds to be properly and perpetually maintained for the education of the various children in the different townships, and that the state, acting in its governmental capacity, has accepted this sacred trust according to its terms and in harmony with the spirit which created it. So it seems to be well settled that the title and control, of these sixteenth section school lands and the funds and rents, issues and profits of same is vested in the state of Mississippi in trust for the inhabitants of the several townships; and certainly it would necessarily follow that the state of Mississippi had a right to institute the present suit.

Now, before the passage by the state, through its legislature, of the Law of 1906, page 275, Monroe county had no power or authority to borrow these funds arising from the rents, issues and profits of the sixteenth section school lands in said county; and recognizing this, it secured the passage of said law in order to enable it, through its board of supervisors, to borrow the same.

This was a special enabling act, by which the state authorized said county to do what it could not do before--borrow said funds; and the state, through its legislature, had a perfect right to stipulate the terms and conditions upon which said county could borrow said funds; and, in section 2 of said act, did stipulate the terms and conditions upon which said county could borrow said funds, including the rate of interest and when said interest should be paid providing (quoting said section 2), "that upon the borrowing of said funds by said county of Monroe, the same shall be done by resolutions entered on their minutes, and they shall pay six per cent. interest per annum on same," etc., that is, not that the county should only be required to pay six per cent. interest on said funds, but that it should be required to pay this interest per annum each year.

Our bill alleges that, although said Monroe county has under said Laws of 1904, borrowed the sixteenth section school funds at various times, beginning as early as June, 1905, and extending up to the filing of this bill, that it has failed to pay said six per cent. annually on the various amounts or any interest whatever on any of said funds; and also that it rejected and disallowed all claims filed with it for same at its December term, 1916; and has improperly dealt with said trust funds and committed a breach of trust, and made itself liable.

The following language of this court in the case of Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Harrison County, 89 Miss. 531, when speaking of a lease of sixteenth section school lands is particularly applicable here, to wit: "When the legislature authorized this lease, they had the right to stipulate the terms and conditions upon which they would lease the land. Those provisions in the law which requires the lessee to pay taxes and give him the right to bring suit were placed there for the purposes which the legislature deemed good, and are perfectly consistent with the lease. No person was bound to lease the land, but if he did, it was bound to borrow with such burdens and such rights as was granted by the legislature. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the state certainly had the right to bring this suit; and if the state had the right to do so, then the state revenue agent, not only had the right and power to bring the suit, not is was his duty to do so for the use of said state.

Under chapter 131, Code 1906, state revenue agent we find section 4738, saying: "Powers. The state revenue agent may appoint a sufficient number of deputies. He shall have power and it shall be his duty to proceed by suit in the proper court, (1st.) against all officers, county contractors, persons, corporations, companies and associations of persons for all past due and unpaid taxes of any kind whatever; (2nd) for all penalties or forfeitures; (3rd) for all past due obligations and indebtedness of any character whatever owing to the state or any county, municipality or levee board; and (4th) for damages growing out of the violation of any contract with the state or any county, municipality, or levee board, and shall have the right of action and may sue at law or in equity in all such cases where the state or any county, municipality, or levee board has the right of action or may sue."

Could language be broader, wider or clearer? Yet, in the face of this language and that used in sections 4739 and 4743 of the same chapter (which we will refer to later), counsel contends that the state revenue agent cannot bring this suit.

Although said section 4738 specifically provides that "he" (the revenue agent) shall have power and it shall be his duty to proceed by suit in the proper court against all officers, county contractors, persons, corporations," "for all past due obligations and indebtedness of any character whatever owing to the state or any county, municipality or levee board" and "shall have a right of action and may sue at law or in equity in all such cases where the state or any county, municipality, or levee board has the right of action or may sue."

We understand that counsel will contend that neither the words "persons" nor "corporations" would include a county although the statute expressly says: "All persons or corporations."

Not deeming it necessary to deal at length upon this, we merely call the court's attention to section 1590, Code 1906, defining what the word persons means, to wit: "Persons--the term persons when used in any statute shall apply to artificial as well as natural persons. Also public and private corporations as well as individuals."

"Certainly, this language taken in connection with the language of said section 4738, seems broad enough to include a county. If not, what language could be employed that would be broad enough?

Certainly, we submit that the various sums of interest which Monroe county is here sued for were and are "past due obligations and indebtedness of any" (some) "kind whatever owing to the state as trustee for the inhabitants of the several townships, and that the state has a right of action and can sue for same. This being true, it necessarily follows from the very language of section 4738 itself, that said state revenue agent has "a right of action and may sue at law or in equity," for it explicitly provides that said revenue agent shall have a right of action and may sue at law or in equity in all such cases where the state or any county, municipality, or levee board has a right of action and may sue."

And, in addition to all of this, section 4739, provides: "It is the duty of the state revenue agent to investigate the books accounts, and vouchers of all fiscal officers of the state, and of every county, municipality and levee board and to sue...

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