Robertson v. Pickrell
Decision Date | 17 December 1883 |
Citation | 3 S.Ct. 407,27 L.Ed. 1049,109 U.S. 608 |
Parties | ROBERTSON and others v. PICKRELL and others |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
J. G. Bigelow, for plaintiffs in error.
Saml. B. Paul and F. W. Jones, for defendants in error.
This was an action of ejectment for a parcel of land in the city of Washington, District of Columbia. On the trial the plaintiffs gave in evidence a conveyance of the premises from the United States to one Robert Moore, executed in June, 1800; and then endeavored to trace title from the grantee through a devise in his last will and testament, bearing date in July, 1803. For this purpose they produced and offered a transcript of proceedings in the hustings court of Petersburg, in the state of Virginia, containing a copy of the will, and of its probate in that court in December, 1804. By the law of Virginia then in force that court was authorized to take the probate of wills, as well of real as of personal estate; and when a will was exhibited to be proved, it could proceed immediately to receive proofs, and to grant a certificate of its probate. Within seven years afterwards its validity was open to contestation in chancery by any person interested; but, if not contested w thin that period, the probate was to be deemed conclusive, except as to parties laboring at the time under certain disabilities, who were to have a like period to contest its validity after the removal of their disabilities. The transcript was offered, not merely as an exemplified copy of the record of the last will and testament of Robert Moore, and of its probate in the hustings court, but also as conclusive proof of the validity of the will, and of all matters involved in its probate. Upon objection of the defendants' counsel, it was excluded, and an exception was taken to the exclusion. This ruling of the court constitutes the principal error assigned for a reversal of the judgment. We think the ruling was correct. Looking at the transcript presented, we find that it shows only that a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased was admitted to record upon proof that the instrument and the signature to it were in his handwriting. No witnesses to its execution were called, no proof was offered of the genuineness of the signatures of the parties whose names are attached to it as witnesses, and no notice was given to parties interested of the proceedings in the hustings court. As a record it furnishes no proof of an instrument executed as a last will and testament in a form to pass real estate in the District of Columbia. The execution of such a will must be attested by at least three witnesses. It matters not how effective the instrument may be to pass real property in Virginia, it must be executed in the manner prescribed by the law in force in the district to pass real property situated there, and its validity must be established in the manner required by that law. It is familiar doctrine that the law of the place governs as to the formalities necessary to the transfer of real property, whether testamentary or inter vivos. In most of the states of the Union a will of real property must be admitted to probate in some one of their courts before it can be received elsewhere as a conveyance of such property. But by the law of Maryland, which governs in the District of Columbia, wills, so far as real property is concerned, are not admitted to such probate. The common-law rule prevails on that subject. The orphans' court there may, it is true, take the probate of wills, though they affect lands, provided they affect chattels also; but the probate is evidence of the validity of the will only so far as the personal property is concerned.
As an instrument conveying real property the probate is not evidence of its execution. That must be shown by a production of the instrument itself, and proof by the subscribing witnesses; or, if they be not living, by proof of their handwriting.
So it matters not that the same effect is to be given in the courts of this district to the record of the hustings court, which, by the law of Virginia, can be given to it there; that is, that it is to be received as sufficient to pass the title to real property situated in that state.
The question still remains, is the instrument sufficient to pass title to real property in the District of Columbia? If so, it should have been produced and proved in the manner mentioned. If, as stated by counsel, it is on file in the hustings court, and by the law of Virginia cannot be removed, then it should have been proved under a commission, as other instruments out of the state are proved, when it is impossible to compel their production in court.
The act of congress declaring the effect to be given in any court within the United States to the records and judicial proceedings of the several states, does not require that they shall have any greater force and efficacy in other courts than in the courts of the states from which they are taken, but only such faith and credit as by law or usage they have there. Any other rule would be repugnant to all principle, and, as we said on a former occasion, would contravene the policy of the provi ions of the constitution and laws of the United States on that subject. Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 529.
It does not appear that the validity of the will of Moore, as probated in 1804 in the hustings court of Petersburg, was ever afterwards contested in a court of chancery in Virginia. Its probate must therefore be deemed conclusive, so far as that state is concerned, and the will held sufficient to pass all property which can be there transferred by a valid instrument of that kind. But no greater effect can be given out of Virginia to the proceedings in the hustings court. The probate establishes nothing beyond the validity of the will there. It does not take the place of provisions necessary to its validity as a will of real property in other states, if they are wanting. Its validity as such will, in other states, depends on its execution in conformity with their laws; and if probate there be also required, such probate must be had before it can be received as evidence.
Authority for these views is found in the cases of McCormick v. Sullivant and of Darby v. Mayer, both reported in 10 Wheat. 192, 465. In the first of them it appeared that by the law of Ohio, before a will devising real property can be considered as valid, it must be presented to the court of common pleas of the county where the land lies for probate, and be proved by at least two of the subscribing witnesses, unless it has been proved and recorded in another state according to its laws; in which case an authenticated copy can be offered for probate without proof by the witnesses. A will devising real property in that state was admitted to probate in the state of Pennsylvania, and this court held that such probate gave no validity to the will in respect to the real property in Ohio, as to which the deceased was to be considered as having died intestate. 10 Wheat. 202, 203. In the second case, which was an action of ejectment for land in Tennes- see, the defendant endeavored to trace title to the premises through the will of one Kitts. For that purpose a copy and probate of the will devising the property were produced in evidence, certified from the orphans' court of Baltimore county, Maryland, and admitted against the objection of the plaintiff. This court held that record inadmissible, and in its opinion explained the common law doctrine as to what was legal evidence in an action of ejectment to establish a devise of real property. It stated that the ordinary's probate was no evidence of the execution of the will in ejectment; that where the will itself was in existence and could be produced, it was necessary to produce it; and that when the will was lost or could not be produced, secondary evidence was necessarily resorted to; but that, whatever the proof, it was required to be made before the court which tried the cause, the proof before the ordinary being ex parte, the heir at law having no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, and the same solemnities not being required to admit the will to probate, which are indispensable to give it validity as a devise of real property. And the court added that the law of Maryland, with regard to the evidence of a devise in ejectment, was the common law of England, and had been so...
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