Robertson v. Preston
| Citation | 97 Va. 296,33 S.E. 618 |
| Parties | ROBERTSON. v. PRESTON, Treasurer. |
| Decision Date | 29 June 1899 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
TAXATION FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES—RATE— COUNTIES—STATUTES—PARTIAL INVALIDITY.
1. So much of Acts 1881-82, p. 212, § 6, as authorizes the town of Abingdon to levy a capitation tax of not less than 50 cents for school purposes contravenes Const, art. 10, § 5, providing that the general assembly may levy a capitation tax not to exceed $1 per annum for school purposes, and that counties and corporations may impose a capitation tax not exceeding 50 cents for all purposes.
2. Const, art. 8, § 8, conferring on each county the right to levy a tax for school purposes, is violated by so much of Acts 1881-82, p. 212, § 6, as exempts the school district therein provided for from the county school tax in consideration of a tax to be levied by the district.
3. Acts 1881-82, p. 212, provides that the town of Abingdon and certain surrounding territory should constitute a separate school district, in case a majority of the voters of the surrounding territory should so declare, and that the town should provide for the support of the schools by taxation of property, and in excess of the rates authorized by the general law, if necessary, but that the district should be exempt from county school taxation. Held, the act having been accepted, that so much of it as authorized taxation was rendered void as to property without the limits of the town by the unconstitutionality of the exemption from county school taxation.
Appeal from circuit court, Washington county.
Bill by P. S. Robertson against D. A. Preston, treasurer. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals. Reversed.
Honaker & Hutton and White & Penn, for appellant.
Daniel Trigg and Fulkerson, Page & Hurt, for appellee.
The question involved in this case is the validity of sections 6 and 7 of an act approved March 3, 1882, entitled "An act to constitute the town of Abingdon and a certain portion of the surrounding county, a separate school district." Acts 1881-82, p. 212.
By section 1 of the act it is provided that the town of Abingdon, and so much of the surrounding county as the trustees of the town and Cave City school district shall agree upon, shall constitute a separate school district, to be governed by the general law on the subject, except so far as modified by the provisions of the act.
Section 2 provides for submitting to the qualified voters residing within the proposed school district, but without the corporate limits of the town, the question of agreeing to the provisions of the act.
Section 3 provides that, if a majority of the votes be against agreeing to it, its provisions shall be null and void as to the surrounding county, but valid as to the town; but, if such majority be in favor of it, then the town and the surrounding county shall constitute a separate school district, to be known as "Cave City School District, " and be subject to the following provisions of the act:
Sections 4 and 5 provide how the school trustees are to be selected, and what their powers and duties shall be.
Section 8 provides that the state school fund, to which the district is entitled, shall be turned over to the treasurer of the town of Abingdon.
Sections 6 and 7, the constitutionality of which is denied by the appellant, are as follows:
Under the provisions of section 6, the town council imposed upon the real and personal property within the district a tax of 30 cents on every $100 thereof. Among the property thus assessed with tax was that of the appellant, which Is within the school district, but outside of the corporate limits of the town. He refused to pay the tax, filed his bill, and obtained an injunction to prevent the sale of property which had been leviedupon by the tax collector and advertised for sale for its payment, upon the ground that the tax was unconstitutional and illegal. The circuit court dismissed his bill upon demurrer, and from that decree this appeal was allowed.
The first error assigned, and the only one it will be necesssary for us to consider in the view we take of the case, Is that sections 6 and 7 of that act are unconstitutional and void so far as they authorize the town council of Abingdon to levy a tax on the property of citizens of Washington county outside of the corporate limits of the town, and within the limits of Cave City school district.
Section 6 provides that the town of Abingdon may levy for the support of the schools of that school district a capitation tax of not less than 50 cents, and a property tax of not less than 10 nor more than 30 cents on every $100 of the assessed value thereof, and that the district shall be exempt from county school tax.
So much of that section as provides that a capitation tax may be levied by the town for district school purposes, and declares that the school district shall be exempt from county school tax, Is clearly beyond the power of the general assembly.
By section 5, art. 10, of the constitution, It is provided that the general assembly may levy a tax not exceeding one dollar per annum on every male citizen who has attained the age of 21 years, which shall be applied exclusively in aid of public free schools; and counties and corporations (that is, cities which have separate governments, and are not taxed for county purposes) shall have power to impose a capitation tax not exceeding 50 cents per annum for all purposes. That provision of the constitution limits the amount of capitation tax which may be levied annually to $1.50 for all purposes. The general assembly has no power to authorize the towns and subdivisions of the counties and cities to levy a capitation tax. If it had, it could do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly, and there would be no limit to the capitation tax which might be imposed.
By section 8, art. 8, of the constitution, it is provided that the general assembly shall apply the annual interest on the literary fund, the capitation tax provided for by the constitution for public free school purposes, and an annual tax upon the property of the state of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hopkins v. City Of Richmond
...of the remaining sections. Black v. Trower, 79 Va. 123, 127; Trimble v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 819, 821, 32 S. E. 786; Robertson v. Preston, 97 Va. 296, 300, 301, 33 S. E. 618; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 54, 55, 29 Sup. Ct 33, 53 L. Ed. 81. Nor can we see chat the power of the c......
-
Town Of Narrows v. Bd. Of Sup'rs Of Giles County
...of the charter, and that such residue is complete in itself, and in no wise dependent upon the part to be stricken out. In Robertson v. Preston, 97 Va. 296, 33 S. B. 618, it was held that where a part of an act of assembly is unconstitutional, that fact alone does not authorize the courts t......
-
City Of Danville v. Hatcher
...to which is valid, and, under the authorities, may be sustained. Trimble v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 818, 32 S. E. 786; Robertson v. Preston, 97 Va. 296, 33 S. E. 618. Upon tbe whole case the court is of opinion that the ordinances the validity of which is drawn in question are within the chart......
-
Brecken Bridge Co. v. School B'd.
...insertion the statute would not have been enacted. Where this is true, the maxim utile per inutile non vitiatur is applied. Robertson Preston, 97 Va. 296, 33 S.E. 618. In Strawberry Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 77, 97 S.E. 362, 364, it is said: "In this case the trial court held unconstitutional s......