Robertson v. Robertson

• Decision Date: 04 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. E2000-01698-SC-R11-CV.,E2000-01698-SC-R11-CV.
• Parties: Gary Wayne ROBERTSON v. Lori Vanhooser ROBERTSON.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

76 S.W.3d 337

Gary Wayne ROBERTSON v. Lori Vanhooser ROBERTSON.

No. E2000-01698-SC-R11-CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

April 4, 2002.

Selma Cash Paty and Sherry Bailey Paty, Chattanooga, for the appellant, Gary Wayne Robertson.

Leroy Phillips, Jr., Chattanooga, for the appellee, Lori Vanhooser Robertson.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, Jr., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

We granted this appeal to address the means for determining whether a disadvantaged spouse can be "rehabilitated" under § 36-5-101(d)(1) of the Tennessee Code Annotated. We hold that a trial court must consider all relevant factors in § 36-5-101(d)(1) to determine whether an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated. Because the trial court properly applied the relevant statutory factors, we affirm the trial court's award of alimony, as modified, in this case.

Gary Wayne Robertson and Lori Vanhooser Robertson were married for twenty-two years before the parties filed for divorce in late 1996. On June 2, 1997, the trial court awarded Ms. Robertson a divorce on grounds of adultery. The court awarded Ms. Robertson net marital assets in the amount of $5,511.51. Mr. Robertson was awarded net assets of $8,624.17.¹ The trial court awarded joint custody of the parties' sixteen-year-old son, Josh, and awarded child support to Ms. Robertson.

The trial court found that Mr. Robertson's monthly expenses, after the division of liabilities, would exceed his monthly income by $227.42. Beginning in September 1997, when Ms. Robertson's new teaching position began, her monthly expenses would exceed her monthly income by $709.44. Ms. Robertson's only assured income before September 1997 would be the $658 monthly child support payments. The trial court therefore ordered Mr. Robertson to pay, as rehabilitative alimony, the monthly mortgage payment and Toyota car payment, totaling $1,013.90, and an additional $500 per month. The trial court ordered the reduction of rehabilitative alimony to $250 per month for a twelve-month period following the commencement of Ms. Robertson's teaching job. The court also ordered the parties to pay their own attorneys' fees.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's division of marital property and modified the trial court's judgment to reflect that primary residential custody of Josh would be with Ms. Robertson. The court also held that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support based upon the parties' relative earnings and further erred in the manner in which Mr. Robertson's future overtime earnings were used for computation. The Court of Appeals calculated Mr. Robertson's income, including overtime, at $60,346. The court therefore modified the award of child support to $761, based upon the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeals similarly modified the trial court's award of alimony, awarding Ms. Robertson alimony in futuro in the amount of $250 per month to be increased to $600 per month when Mr. Robertson's child support obligation ceased. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Ms. Robertson attorney's fees. Mr. Robertson filed an application for permission to appeal.

Subsequently, on April 24, 2000, this Court issued its opinion in Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn.2000). We ordered the Court of Appeals to reconsider its holding in this case in light of Crabtree. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that Ms. Robertson could not be rehabilitated to a reasonable standard of living, viewed in the context of her pre-divorce standard of living. The court therefore adhered to its original opinion awarding Ms. Robertson alimony in futuro. We granted review.

ANALYSIS

Section 36-5-101(d)(1) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that "[i]t is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse who is economically disadvantaged, relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance." Tenn Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). If rehabilitation is not feasible and long-term support is necessary, then the trial court may grant an award of alimony in futuro. Id.; Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 359.

In Crabtree, this Court addressed whether a trial court may order successive awards of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in futuro in the initial divorce decree. We held that the legislature has demonstrated a preference for an award of rehabilitative alimony and held that alimony in futuro should be awarded only when rehabilitation is not feasible. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 358-59. As a result, we held that a concurrent award of both types of alimony is inconsistent. Id. at 360.

This Court then reviewed the facts of the case to determine whether Ms. Crabtree could be rehabilitated. We reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals that rehabilitative alimony would not place Ms. Crabtree on "equal footing with" Mr. Crabtree or allow her to "continue living in the manner in which she had become accustomed" during the marriage. Id. at 359. We noted that the Court of Appeals' holding relied on language from Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn.1995), stating that the award of alimony in futuro would not return the wife to her economic position before divorce but would provide her with "closing in" money. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 359. This Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' reliance on Aaron because the statement in Aaron was "intended neither to provide a new standard for awarding alimony nor to suggest that every spouse should be entitled to be placed in the same financial condition occupied prior to the divorce." Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 359-60. Instead, this Court reviewed the facts to determine whether alimony in futuro was necessary to "further the legislative purpose of encouraging divorced spouses to become self-sufficient." Id. at 360. Noting that both parties had ample education to compete in the workforce, this Court concluded that Ms. Crabtree's rehabilitation was feasible. Id. Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony for a period of five years and reversed the award of alimony in futuro. Id.

The marital standard of living is one of several factors enumerated by the legislature for consideration in awarding alimony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(I). We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this sole factor is the standard by which a court must determine whether an economically disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated. Instead, a trial court must consider every relevant factor in § 36-5-101(d)(1) to determine the nature and extent of support, which includes the decision to award rehabilitative alimony. The prior concept of alimony as lifelong support enabling the disadvantaged spouse to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage has been superseded by the legislature's establishment of a preference for rehabilitative alimony. See id. at 359; Self v. Self, 861 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Tenn.1993); see also Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 413, 423 (1994). The parties' incomes and assets will not always be sufficient for them to achieve the same standard of living after divorce that they enjoyed during the marriage. See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 359-60. However, rehabilitative alimony may assist the disadvantaged spouse in obtaining further education or training. See Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Tenn.1991); see also In re Marriage of Grauer, 478 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa Ct.App.1991) ("Rehabilitative alimony serves to support an economically dependent spouse `through a limited period of re-education or retraining following divorce, thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become self-supporting.'"). It may also provide temporary income to support the disadvantaged spouse during the post-divorce economic adjustment. See, e.g., Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 360-61.

All relevant factors, including those set out in § 36-5-101(d)(1), must be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine the nature and extent of support. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1).² Factor (H) requires the trial court to consider the division of marital property when awarding alimony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1)(H). The division of marital property involves the distribution of both marital assets and marital debts. See Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); Mondelli v. Howard, 780 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). We encourage trial courts to use the division of marital property to assist in meeting the disadvantaged spouse's financial needs when feasible. See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 361 n. 4 ("In cases in which there is a disparity between the relative earning capacities of the parties, a trial court also may consider adjusting the award of marital assets to assist the disadvantaged spouse."); see also Renfro v. Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993) (establishing a preference for meeting the parties' needs with the division of marital property, rather than with alimony). Section 36-4-121 of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not require an equal division of marital property but an equitable division. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); see Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn.1988). When practical, therefore, a trial court should consider awarding more assets to an economically disadvantaged spouse to provide future support, rather than relying solely upon an award of alimony. When there are few marital assets but a considerable amount of marital debt, a trial court should similarly consider awarding a disadvantaged spouse a lesser amount of marital debt. Careful distribution of the marital property may assist the disadvantaged spouse in achieving rehabilitation in furtherance of the...