Robertson v. State
Decision Date | 10 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-890.,SC01-890. |
Citation | 829 So.2d 901 |
Parties | Floyd Thomas ROBERTSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Criminal Appeals, Bureau Chief, and Margaret A. Brenan, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Robertson v. State, 780 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (en banc), a decision from the Third District Court of Appeal that misapplies this Court's holding in Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla.1999), and is in conflict with the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in State Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Rochell v. Morris, 736 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), regarding when an appellate court may uphold a lower court ruling on an alternative ground not considered by the lower court. The Third District's decision also misapplies this Court's opinions in Jordan v. State, 107 Fla. 333, 144 So. 669, 669-70 (1932), and Foy v. State, 115 Fla. 245, 155 So. 657, 658 (1934), regarding the permissible scope of impeachment of a testifying defendant. Based on the conflict created by these misapplications, we have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution. See Florida Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So.2d 101, 103 (Fla.2001)
(citing Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Fla.2000)). For the reasons that follow, we quash the Third District's decision and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On September 16, 1996, Officer Dominguez was dispatched to an apartment to investigate a shooting. In the bedroom of the apartment shared by Robertson and the victim, Maria Nelson, Officer Dominguez observed Nelson lying on the bed. Nelson was conscious and breathing, but was not communicating. On the floor, about five feet from the bed, was a .40 caliber Ruger handgun with a bullet clip next to it. Officer Dominguez found an entrance wound in Nelson's chest and an exit wound in the middle of her back. Nelson ultimately died from the gunshot wound, and Robertson was charged with second-degree murder. Robertson's theory of defense was that the gun accidentally misfired while he was trying to clean it. The State's theory of the case was that Robertson intentionally shot Nelson during a domestic dispute.
At trial, the defense called Robertson to testify on his own behalf, and during the State's cross-examination of Robertson the following exchange took place:
Defense counsel immediately objected on the basis that the question was "irrelevant" and "outside the scope of direct." The trial court overruled the objection and the State thereafter inquired:
Defense counsel again objected on the ground that this question was "totally outside the scope" of direct. The trial court again overruled the objection and the following exchange ensued:
The State argued that based on Robertson's negative response to these questions, Robertson's ex-wife should be allowed to testify on rebuttal that Robertson had threatened her with an AK-47 six years earlier. The trial court, over defense objection, concluded that in light of Robertson's answers to the State's questions during its cross-examination, the rebuttal testimony constituted proper impeachment. Robertson's ex-wife thereafter testified to an alleged incident in which she claimed Robertson threatened her with an AK-47. She testified that Robertson became enraged and pointed the AK-47 at her as she was running away, causing her to fear that she would be shot in the back. The incident was neither reported to the police nor investigated.
In closing argument, the State emphasized the significance of the rebuttal testimony:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The jury returned a verdict finding Robertson guilty of second-degree murder. Robertson appealed his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, claiming as error the trial court's first permitting questions on cross-examination regarding prior alleged threats with the AK-47, and second allowing as impeachment Robertson's ex-wife's rebuttal testimony regarding the prior threat with the AK-47. The Third District initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding both that the prosecutor's questions regarding the alleged prior crime were improper and that Robertson's ex-wife's testimony was improper impeachment. See Robertson v. State, 780 So.2d 94, 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
. However, the Third District reviewed the case en banc and, on rehearing, affirmed the trial court's admission of Robertson's ex-wife's testimony. See Robertson, 780 So.2d at 113. The majority held that the evidence was admissible as Williams1 rule evidence, see Robertson, 780 So.2d at 113, a determination never made by the trial court and never asserted by the State on appeal.
The Third District's plurality opinion, in which four judges concurred, stated that the evidence was admissible as both impeachment and Williams rule evidence. See id. The remaining four judges dissented, explaining why Robertson's ex-wife's testimony was not admissible either as impeachment or under the Williams rule. See id. at 123-24 (Sorondo, J., dissenting).
The first issue we address in this case is whether the Third District majority, in concluding that the evidence that Robertson threatened his ex-wife with an AK-47 constituted permissible Williams rule evidence, erred in affirming the trial court on grounds neither raised by the State nor considered by the trial court. The State concedes that at no time, either before trial or on appeal, did it argue that the evidence that Robertson threatened his ex-wife with an AK-47 six years earlier was admissible under the Williams rule. The State's sole argument was that Robertson's ex-wife's testimony constituted proper impeachment because of the answers that Robertson gave in response to the questions the State asked him on cross-examination.
We start with the proposition that "[g]enerally, if a claim is not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal." Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d at 644. However, notwithstanding this principle "[i]n some circumstances, even though a trial court's ruling is based on improper reasoning, the ruling will be upheld if there is any theory or principle of law in the record which would support the ruling." Id. (emphasis supplied).
This longstanding principle of appellate law, sometimes referred to as the "tipsy coachman" doctrine, allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that "reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons" so long as "there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record." Id. at 644-45.2 As we explained in Radio Station WQBA, this Court has adhered to this principle on many other occasions. See id. () ); see also Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 359 (Fla.2001)
().
The key to the application of this doctrine of appellate efficiency is that there must have been support for the alternative theory or principle of law in the record before the trial court. Thus, following Radio Station WQBA, the First District in Morris, 736 So.2d at 42, correctly refused to affirm on an alternative ground not argued to the trial court, reasoning that "the record does not reflect an evidentiary basis sufficient to permit us to make a determination as to whether these defenses are...
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