Robertson v. United States
| Decision Date | 05 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 25099.,25099. |
| Citation | 404 F.2d 1141 |
| Parties | Julita David ROBERTSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Stephen D. Susman, Houston, Tex., for appellant.
Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., E. Donald Strange, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for appellee.
Before WISDOM and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges, and RUBIN, District Judge.
Appealing from his conviction for failure to report for civilian work as a conscientious objector pursuant to an order of his Selective Service Board,1 Julita David Robertson asserts that the Board improperly refused to grant him a ministerial exemption. He urges that the Board's actions violate the Selective Service Regulations, and he contends, additionally, that the procedural provisions of the Selective Service Act and Regulations violate the Constitution.
The Board dealt considerately with Robertson, and it apparently relied upon the advice of State Headquarters in determining that he was not a minister. But, notwithstanding this, it failed to follow the procedures required by the Selective Service Regulations, and it applied an improper legal standard in reaching this determination. Robertson's conviction must therefore be reversed.2
Robertson, a Jehovah's Witness, was classified as a conscientious objector. He contended, however, that he was a minister, and, after he had asserted this claim to his local board several times, the Board arranged for him to meet with Colonel Weeks, a State Selective Service official. When Robertson went to see the Colonel with his father and two other members of his faith, Colonel Weeks told him that he could not be classified as a minister unless he had a Regular Pioneer certificate from his church.3 Apparently, Colonel Weeks considered such an affidavit essential, no matter what duties Robertson was actually performing and without regard to his relationship to members of his faith.
After this meeting, the local board clerk wrote Robertson requesting that he offer to perform one of three types of approved civilian work within ten days. Instead, Robertson sent or delivered various letters to the local board stating that he was sincerely preparing himself for the full-time ministry, including a letter from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society appointing him a Vacation Pioneer retroactively for the last two weeks in August.
Thereafter, at the advice of a Selective Service official, the Board wrote Robertson requesting that he meet with it on October 14, 1965 "to reach an agreement upon a type of civilian work." The letter did not indicate that the Board would consider his claim to a ministerial exemption. However, the Board's minutes reflect that at the meeting the Board "again reviewed the file concerning the registrant's preaching activities." They report that the Board "asked the registrant if he felt he was qualified for a IV-D ministerial classification under the criteria of Selective Service Regulations," and that the registrant "not only replied in the negative, but stated that he did not qualify for a full-time minister as required by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society." Robertson's conclusions were, of course, based on the information he had received from Colonel Weeks. The Board then "declined to reopen Robertson's classification and classify him anew." Robertson was never notified in writing of this decision.
On October 18, Robertson notified the Board that his Vacation Pioneer appointment had been extended from September 1, 1965 through January 31, 1966. Under this appointment, he was required to devote at least 100 hours per month to the full time ministry. The letter appointing Robertson encouraged him to apply for a Regular Pioneer appointment thirty days before his Vacation Pioneer appointment expired.
The evidence submitted by Robertson on October 18 was never reviewed by his local board. His classification was not reopened, and he was given no further notification on the subject.
On November 2, the Board ordered Robertson to report for civilian work in thirteen days. He failed to obey this order and prosecution followed.
Because the scope of judicial review of local board action is the "narrowest known to the law"4 and a classification made by a local board can be altered only if it has "no basis in fact,"5 it is imperative that the Selective Service system faithfully follow its own procedures.
The basic tenet of the Regulation is, "No classification is permanent."6 The Regulations do not merely permit, they require each classified registrant to report to the local board in writing, within ten days after it occurs, "any fact that might result in his being placed in a different classification such as, but not limited to, any change in his occupational * * * status * * *"7 Upon the written request of any registrant, "The local board may reopen and consider anew" his classification "if such request is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification."8
Registrants may change their status in many ways from the time they register at age 18 until they either serve in the armed forces or cease to be eligible:9 they may become or cease to be students, they may begin or change employment, and they may acquire or lose dependents. When a change in status is reported to it, the local board must decide whether or not to reopen the registrant's classification on the basis of the evidence submitted. If it decides to reopen, it must next decide whether the registrant should be reclassified. In the event the registrant's classification is reopened but is not thereafter changed, he has the right to a personal appearance before the local board and an appeal de novo to a State Appeal Board.10
If the local board decides not to reopen a registrant's classification, the Regulations provide, "The local board, by letter, shall advise the person filing the request that the information submitted does not warrant the reopening of the registrant's classification and shall place a copy of the letter in the registrant's file."11 This serves to inform the registrant that the facts he submitted did not justify reopening his classification and that he must present additional facts to the Board in order to obtain reopening and be considered for reclassification. Although it appears from the minutes of the October 14th meeting of the local board that a decision was made not to reopen Robertson's case, no letter was ever sent to him notifying him of this action.12 In addition, there is no evidence that the Board reviewed the letters Robertson submitted on October 18 certifying that his Vacation Pioneer appointment had been extended through January and requiring him to devote a minimum of 100 hours per month to full time ministerial functions.
"Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government."13 But the government in dealing with its citizens owes them an equal obligation to right its angles. Since the scope of judicial review is so narrowly restricted in Selective Service cases,14 we said in Olvera v. United States:15
"* * * It is of the essence of the validity of board orders and of the crime of disobeying them that all procedural requirements be strictly and faithfully followed, and * * * a showing of failure to follow them with such strictness and fidelity will invalidate the order of the board and a conviction based thereon."
While the Regulations provide only that the Board "may" reopen a classification upon the receipt of new evidence,16 we pointed out in Olvera17 that the local board may not exercise its discretion not to reopen a registrant's case in an "arbitrary" and "unreasonable" manner.18 The Board must have a "basis in fact" in order to deny a request for reopening a classification.19 If the registrant submits new information "not considered when the registrant was (originally) classified, which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification,"20 (i. e., if he presents a prima facie case for reclassification) the Board has a duty to reopen his case.21
By November 2, 1965, Robertson had presented evidence that he was working 100 hours per month as a full time minister, albeit his church category was Vacation Pioneer. There was also evidence that the Jehovah's Witnesses consider some Vacation Pioneers to be regular ministers. This was sufficient to require the reopening of his case.22
Whether or not a registrant is ultimately reclassified, the decision by the local board to reopen or not to reopen his classification is a separate determination of independent procedural significance.23 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Miller v. United States, 1967, 388 F.2d 973, the Regulations do not permit the Board to evaluate a request for reclassification on its merits until it first determines whether the information submitted by the registrant requires reopening. The Board may not consider "the situation upon its merits, and then * * * accord to its classification result the status of a denial merely of the claimant's motion to reopen."24 In this case, the Board did not reopen Robertson's classification and deny reclassification on the merits. Instead, it considered whether or not he should be reclassified, and, having decided that he should not be, refused to reopen his classification. This decision in itself denied Robertson important avenues of appeal within the Selective Service system.
Our opinion is entirely congruent with the decision reached by another panel of this Court in McCoy v. United States, 5 Cir., Nov. 12, 1968, 403 F.2d 896. In that case, the local board in effect reopened the registrant's classification and received evidence concerning his...
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