Robertson v. Wittenmyer
Decision Date | 19 October 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 67A05-0006-CV-248.,67A05-0006-CV-248. |
Citation | 736 N.E.2d 804 |
Parties | David ROBERTSON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Christopher WITTENMYER, Appellee-Defendant. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James A. McGlone, McGlone Law Offices, Terre Haute, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Michael G. Getty, Rori L. Goldman, Hill Fulwider McDowell Funk & Matthews, Garrett V. Conover, Kopka Landau & Pinkus, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
David Robertson appeals from the trial court's order disqualifying his counsel, raising one issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying his counsel because of a conflict of interest.
We affirm.
On August 16, 1998, David Robertson was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Christopher Wittenmyer. Wittenmyer's vehicle was involved in a three-vehicle chain reaction collision in which it rear-ended a bus and was hit from behind by a station wagon, although the evidence was unclear about which happened first. Both men suffered head injuries and had no memory of the accident. James McGlone represented both Wittenmyer and Robertson against the driver and owner of the station wagon and obtained a settlement for both clients. Robertson's medical expenses greatly exceeded the amount of his settlement, however, so McGlone continued to investigate other means of recovery for him. In doing so, he uncovered evidence that suggested that Wittenmyer may have been at fault as well. After obtaining Wittenmyer's consent, McGlone filed suit on behalf of Robertson against Wittenmyer in October 1999.
On February 9, 2000, Wittenmyer filed a motion to disqualify McGlone from representing Robertson in this action. After a hearing, the trial court agreed that McGlone should be disqualified. He now appeals.
Robertson contends that the trial court erred in determining that McGlone had a disqualifying conflict of interest. Although the standard for reviewing a motion to disqualify in Indiana has never been specifically articulated, the cases apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Hanna v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (Ind.Ct.App.1999),trans. denied (not an abuse of discretion); Angleton v. Estate of Angleton, 671 N.E.2d 921, 928 (Ind.Ct. App.1996),trans. denied (1997) (trial court did not err). Thus, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wittenmyer's motion to disqualify. Compare Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) ( ).
A trial court may disqualify an attorney for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that arises from the attorney's representation before the court. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind.1999). The trial court's authority has been described as necessary to prevent insult and gross violations of decorum, and that authority is limited to attorneys appearing before the court. Id. (quoting McQueen v. State, 272 Ind. 229, 231, 396 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1979)).
Our supreme court has held that a lawyer must be disqualified from a pending case if that case is substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client. Angleton, 671 N.E.2d at 928 (quoting Corn v. State, 659 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ind.1995)). This test must be applied to the facts of each case to determine whether the issues in the prior and present cases are essentially the same or are closely interwoven therewith. Id. The public trust in the integrity of the judicial process requires that any serious doubt be resolved in favor of disqualification. Id.
Here, in spite of the fact that the same matter is at issue, not merely a substantially related one, Robertson argues that McGlone's continued representation of him does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.1 Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client that the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. However, Prof. Cond. R. 1.7(a) states:
Thus, the rule provides an exception to this general prohibition if two requirements are met: the attorney procures the consent of both clients, and the attorney reasonably believes that the attorney-client relationship will not be affected by the adverse representation. Here, both elements are in question. The evidence shows that McGlone notified Wittenmyer's insurer that Robertson was claiming against Wittenmyer in February 1999. The only evidence of consent in the record was Wittenmyer's written consent, which was signed in October 1999. Thus, it appears that although the consent preceded the filing of suit, it did not precede the onset of the adverse representation, which occurred prior to February 1999. Further, there is no evidence at all of Robertson's consent after full disclosure of the potential conflict of interest. Thus, McGlone's failure to obtain both consents prior to undertaking the representation adverse to Wittenmyer is a sufficient basis to disqualify him from representing Robertson in this action. Further, Prof. Cond. R. 1.7 also requires that the attorney have a reasonable belief that the representation will not affect the lawyer-client relationship. Here, we conclude that such a standard cannot be met. Thus, even a properly procured consent would not have complied with the rule. One commentator has explained:
Prof. Cond. R. 1.7 cmt. Thus, some situations, such as this, are nonconsentable because the attorney-client relationship of the client is inevitably affected.
In Florida Bar v. Mastrilli, 614 So.2d 1081 (Fla.1993), the supreme court of Florida disciplined an attorney for violating this rule. In that case, an attorney undertook representation of two women injured in an accident in which one was the driver and the other was her passenger. Later, the attorney issued a demand letter to the driver's liability carrier on behalf of the passenger for an amount in excess of the policy limit. When the insurer refused to pay, the attorney filed suit against the driver. The driver terminated her relationship with the attorney, and the suit was eventually settled within policy limits. The court held that the attorney violated the conflict of interest rule by suing his own client, thereby exposing her to personal liability, and suspended him from the practice of law for six months. Id. at 1082.
In this case, McGlone could have had no reasonable belief that filing suit against Wittenmyer would not affect their attorney-client relationship. We note that Robertson's medical expenses exceeded Wittenmyer's policy limits. Thus, Wittenmyer was potentially personally liable on any judgment in excess of his policy limits, and McGlone would have been responsible for securing that judgment. It defies logic to say that an individual's relationship with his attorney would not be affected by that attorney securing a large money judgment against him. Thus, McGlone's continued representation of Robertson violated Rule 1.7(a). See also Florida Bar v. Wilson, 714 So.2d 381 (Fla.1998) ( ); Junger Utility & Paving Co. v. Myers, 578 So.2d 1117 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989) ( ); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ratzel, 218 Wis.2d 423, 578 N.W.2d...
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