Robeson v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 06 August 1908 |
| Citation | 70 A. 685,74 N.J.E. 745 |
| Parties | ROBESON et ux. v. DUNCAN. |
| Court | New Jersey Court of Chancery |
Bill for specific performance by John E. Robeson and wife against Stephen H. Duncan. Heard on demurrer to bill. Demurrer sustained.
Fergus A. Dennis and John T. Bird, for complainants.
John A. Hartpence, for defendant.
The bill is filed for the specific performance of a contract to convey lands in the borough of Princeton, and alleges that the complainants, John E. Robeson and Hattie Mi Robeson, his wife, being seised or well entitled to the premises in question in fee simple on June 6, 1907, entered into an agreement in writing with the defendant, Stephen H. Duncan, for the sale of the premises to him for $2,500, the sum of $300 being paid on the execution of the agreement, and the balance to be paid and secured at a time stipulated; that Duncan, after paying the $300, notified the complainants that he refused to perform or carry out the agreement on his part, assigning as a reason that the complainants could not make a good and marketable title to the premises, he having, upon examination, discovered that they had sold and conveyed the premises to "Jennie Hardison and to the heirs of her body" upon conditions contained in their deed of conveyance to her, as follows: Afterwards, and on April 26, 1907, Jennie Hardison by deed of quitclaim sold and conveyed the premises to the complainant, John E. Robeson. Both deeds were acknowledged, delivered, and recorded.
The complainants' contention is that by their deed to Jennie Hardison a perfect title in fee was conveyed, but that, in case the conditions in that deed have any binding force or effect, they are in favor of the complainants or one of them, and no one else, and that a conveyance by them, according to their agreement with the defendant, will effectually estop them or their heirs from claiming any title in the premises, and will secure to Duncan a good and sufficient title to the same. The prayer is that Duncan may be compelled to specifically perform the agreement on his part, and pay to the complainant John E. Robeson the remainder of the purchase money of $1,000 in cash, and execute a mortgage for $1,200 on the same premises to secure the balance, according to the agreement; the complainants offering to perform on their part.
The defendant demurs to the bill for want of equity, and the question that arises is: Has Mr. Robeson an estate of inheritance in fee simple absolute in the premises, or is there an estate tail, or some other estate, in Jennie Hardison, which was not divested by her quitclaim deed to Mr. Robeson for want of power in her to make a conveyance of any greater Interest in the premises than an estate for her life, in which case the title is defective and the complainants cannot be relieved? The estate conveyed to Jennie Hardison by Mr. Robeson was an estate of freehold, but not in possession, for by the first condition in the deed he reserved to himself during the joint lives of himself and wife the possession and enjoyment of the premises and the usufruct thereof. This condition need not be further noticed, as it is in the second condition that the limitation of the estate is to...
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Gehlbach v. Briegel
...Case does not apply where the remainder is contingent. Bails v. Davis, 241 Ill. 536, 89 N. E. 706,29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 937;Robeson v. Duncan, 74 N. J. Eq. 745, 70 A. 685;Cotten v. Moseley, 159 N. C. 1, 74 S. E. 454,40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 768;Westcott v. Meeker, 144 Iowa, 311, 122 N. W. 964,29 L......
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...was there in question, but the rules laid down and the reasons there set forth are equally applicable here. Robeson v. Duncan, 74 N.J.Eq. 745, 70 A. 685 (Ch.1908). Hannon v. Christopher poses the question, 'Do the recitals of this deed create an estoppel * * *?' and answers the query 'There......
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Eisenhardt v. Schmidt
...gift of a parcel of real estate, the delivery of the deed to which was to be made only upon the donor's death. In Robeson v. Duncan, 74 N.J.Eq. 745, 70 A. 685, 687 (Ch.1908), the court stated, in the following language, the principle of the invalidity of a testamentary disposition other tha......
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