Robidoux v. Kitchel

• Decision Date: 13 February 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5:91-CV-114.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
• Parties: Julie ROBIDOUX, Kathleen Rock, and Margaret Bevins, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. Jane KITCHEL, Individually and in her capacity as Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare, and Veronica Celani.

876 F. Supp. 575

Julie ROBIDOUX, Kathleen Rock, and Margaret Bevins, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. Jane KITCHEL, Individually and in her capacity as Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare, and Veronica Celani.

Civ. A. No. 5:91-CV-114.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

February 13, 1995.

Thomas F. Garrett, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington VT, for plaintiffs.

Wendy Morgan, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., St. Johnsbury VT, for Kathleen Rock.

Michael Owen McShane, Vermont Atty. General's Office, Waterbury VT, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BILLINGS, Senior District Judge.

This is a class action initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983¹ on behalf of all persons who have, since the date of commencement of this action, applied for, or may in the future apply for, assistance from the Vermont Department of Social Welfare ("DSW") under either the Food. Stamp or Aid to Families with Needy Children ("ANFC") programs.² Defendants are Jane Kitchel and Veronica Celani, the current and former Commissioners of the DSW, respectively. Plaintiffs assert that the DSW's failure to process applications for Food Stamps and/or ANFC benefits within the time specified by federal law violates the rights secured to them by federal law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.³ Plaintiffs' class action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for Defendants' violation of the deadlines for these eligibility determinations.⁴

On August 5, 1994, Defendants moved for summary judgment. On November 2, 1994, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendants' Motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. On December 2, 1994, Defendants filed their response to Plaintiffs' cross-motion.

Factual Background

ANFC⁵ is a federally created public assistance program designed to help "needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living." 42 U.S.C. § 601. The federal Food Stamp program was created to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in low income households. 7 U.S.C. § 2011.

Federal law sets maximum time limits within which the Vermont DSW must act on ANFC and Food Stamp applications.⁶ With respect to ANFC, an assistance check or a notification of denial must be mailed within a "reasonable" time prescribed by state regulations but no later than forty-five days from the date of application. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3). Vermont has prescribed thirty days as a time limit. Vermont Welfare Assistance Manual § 2210. As for Food Stamps, state agencies must provide benefits or notification of denial within thirty days from the date of application for most applicants. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3);⁷ 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(g)⁸. In Vermont, these programs are administered by the Commissioner of the DSW. 33 V.S.A. §§ 1101-1103.

In late 1990, during the national recession, the number of applications for public assistance in the State of Vermont rose significantly. For example, between May and November 1990, a DSW internal study determined that the number of requests for assistance made to its Vermont district offices rose from 3,671 to 5,071, an increase of 38%.⁹ (See Ex. 5 to Pls.' Mot., "An Analysis of Burlington's Overdue Pending Rates," at 1). The increase in the number of overdue applications state-wide, however, rose disproportionately. Overdue ANFC applications rose from 6% in May to 14% in November. (Id. at 2).¹⁰ Overdue Food Stamp applications increased from 10% in May to 15% in November. (Id. at 3). The bulk of these public assistance applications were apparently filed in October and November of 1990, at which time, the applications became "overwhelming" to the DSW. (Id. at 4).

Defendant Kitchel did not agree with the study's conclusion that the DSW was "overwhelmed" in its capacity to process applications and thus implemented no measures to "avert a repetition" of this experience. (See Ex. 6 to Pls.' Mot., Def. Jane Kitchel's Answers to Pls.' Interrogs. of Sept. 1, 1994, at 4). Nevertheless, DSW staff has indicated that the Department was "inundated" with applications during the time the study was done. (See Ex. 7 to Pls.' Mot., Dep. of Bea Smith, at 34). The Director of Burlington's DSW Office indicated that in February, 1991, she was receiving complaints from DSW workers about the size of their case loads. (See Ex. 8 to Pls.' Mot., Dep. of Judy Higgins, at 11). Shortly thereafter, the DSW switched its work force from category specific to generic workers. This appeared to alleviate some of the workers' overloading. (Higgins Dep. at 11; Smith Dep. at 17).

Notwithstanding the staffing change, however, delays in processing public assistance applications continued into 1994. From December, 1993 until March, 1994, an average of 10% of ANFC and 9% of Food Stamp applications were processed outside of the legal time limit. (See Ex. A to Defs.' Mot., "Days to Action Raw Data with Time Processing Calculations"). In May, 1994, roughly 8% of ANFC applications and 6.5% of Food Stamp applications were processed outside of the time limit. (Id.) Despite this evidence, Defendant Kitchel is of the opinion that "in Vermont, applications that have been delayed beyond the 30 day limit represent a small percentage of the total applications processed. In the Department's view, this small percentage represents a standard of compliance which is fully consistent with the intent of the statutes and regulations that govern the programs its sic administers." (See Ex. 6 to Pls.' Mot., Def. Jane Kitchel's Answers to Pls.' Interrogs. of Sept. 1, 1994, at 5).

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who may not rest on its pleading but must present "significant probative evidence" demonstrating that a factual dispute exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must view these materials and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.

In the instant case, the Court concludes that no issue exists as to any material fact. The sole issue of relevant fact in this case involves the number and percentage of cases that have been decided in an untimely fashion. The parties agree as to these statistics. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate. The Court will address the parties' motions for summary judgment seriatim.

II. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs point to a line of federal case law requiring states to comply with federal regulations in processing Food Stamp and ANFC applications. In Robertson v. Jackson, for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the Commonwealth of Virginia's failure to meet the thirty day Food Stamp application processing deadline. 766 F.Supp. 470, 476 (E.D.Va.1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir.1992). The court stated:

the Court rejects the Virginia Department of Social Service's contention that it need only bring Virginia's Food Stamp Program into `substantial compliance' with the federal timeliness requirements. The law requires full compliance absent what is hoped will be minimum human error. Lack of staff or funds is not legally excusable, and this Court will not consider these hurdles in formulating a decree that mandates full compliance with federal law.

Id. The Court crafted a remedy limiting Virginia to a 0% delay of processing applications, with an error margin of 3%, within seven months. Id. at 479.

The Robertson decision is consistent with the conclusion reached by a number of other federal courts. See Alexander v. Hill, 549 F.Supp. 1355, 1359 (W.D.N.C.1982) ("the law requires that all AFDC and Medicaid applications — not merely a substantial percentage of them — be processed within the relevant time limits") (emphasis in original), aff'd, 707 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom Syria v. Alexander, 464 U.S. 874, 104 S.Ct. 206, 78 L.Ed.2d 183 (1983); Hess v. Hughes, 500 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.Md.1980) (enjoining Maryland Department of Human Resources from failing to issue Food Stamps to eligible applicants within the 30 day deadline); Tyson v. Norton, 390 F.Supp. 545, 569 (D.Conn.) ("the regulation requires that each Food Stamp application shall be processed within 30 days and to the extent that there are cases in which this is not being done, the defendants are acting in derogation of the regulatory mandate") (emphasis in original), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 523 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.1975).

In opposition, however, Defendants seek to distinguish the instant case from those cited above by noting that the certified class involved here includes all applicants for benefits, not just those who are found to be entitled.¹¹ The Defendants assert that if the Court looks solely to the assistance applications granted, only 3% of both ANFC and Food Stamp applications are granted out of time. (See Ex. A to Defs.' Mot., "Days to Action Raw Data with Time Processing Calculations, April 1991 — June 1994"). Acceptance of this distinction, however, would require the Court to ignore the law.

The distinction urged by Defendants is inconsistent with the plain reading of the federal regulations governing the deadlines for processing ANFC and Food Stamp applications. These regulations, which provide a deadline that specifically includes grants and denials of benefits, define the federal...