Robin Construction Company v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 14846.,14846.
• Citation: 345 F.2d 610
• Parties: ROBIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Corporation of New Jersey, Richard D. Masia and Judith Masia, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

345 F.2d 610 (1965)

ROBIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Corporation of New Jersey, Richard D. Masia and Judith Masia, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America.

No. 14846.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued December 10, 1964.

Decided May 14, 1965.

Kenneth R. Stein, Stein & Stein, Newark, N. J., for appellant.

David L. Rose, Dept. of Justice, Appellate Section, Civil Division, Washington, D. C. (John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., David N. Satz, Jr., U. S. Atty., Morton Hollander, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GANEY, SMITH and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.

FREEDMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant under Rule 56.

Plaintiffs, the owners of a house and tract of land in Summit, New Jersey, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Their complaint alleged that "agents, servants or employees of the United States acting within the scope of their office or employment" entered and trespassed upon plaintiffs' property on October 1, 1961, and destroyed and damaged trees and other growths on it. The answer denied the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs then resorted to interrogatories. One interrogatory read as follows: "State whether any agents, servants or employees of the defendant, or persons acting for or on behalf of the defendant or at the direction of the defendant, entered upon any portion of the premises * * * on or about October 1, 1961." To this interrogatory the defendant answered "yes". Another interrogatory inquired for the names and addresses of the persons who entered on the premises. The answer designated them as Angelo F. Paolella and Salvatore A. Zisa, and gave their military status and base in the National Guard and their home addresses. The answers to interrogatories also stated that the two men who had entered the premises were enlisted members of the National Guard and "were present at the Nike installation for training incident to a weekend multiple drill." The purpose of the entry on the premises was stated in the answers to interrogatories to be to clear a 10 foot wide path by using a bulldozer to remove several small trees and underbrush along the outside of a fence enclosing the installation for the purpose of security.

Another interrogatory asked whether "any agents, servants or employees of the defendant, or persons acting for or on behalf of the defendant or at the direction of the defendant" were engaged in clearing the growth. The answer to this was that the two individuals named above were operating a bulldozer on the Nike installation for the purpose of constructing a parking lot. It was stated again that this "weekend operation was undertaken by the two persons named during their National Guard training while present at the Nike site for a weekend multiple drill" and that they were enlisted members of the National Guard. The answers to the interrogatories disclosed also that the United States had taken an easement on the portion of the plaintiffs' land adjoining the Nike site for use as a safety area around the missile station. The answers to interrogatories also stated that in addition to the two persons who were identified as having entered on the premises, a Lt. (now Captain) Tietjen, a former Pvt. Higham and a former Capt. DeLucia were also familiar with the incident.

On November 12, 1963, a year and a half after the action was commenced, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was a certificate of the Department of the Army that Paolella, Zisa and Lt. Tietjen were members of the New Jersey Army National Guard, but were not in active Federal service on October 1, 1961, and that the unit to which they were assigned was not in active Federal service at that time. The motion was also accompanied by an affidavit of Tietjen that the unit was not in active Federal service at the time involved and that "As Commandant of the National Guard unit" he ordered Paolella and Zisa to clear the path around the missile station to which the unit was assigned.

The specific answer "Yes" to the general interrogatory "whether any agents, servants or employees of the defendant, or persons acting for or on behalf of the defendant or at the direction of the defendant" entered on plaintiffs' premises is not enough to raise a factual issue or to ward off summary judgment. In the first place the question was so broad that it may well have required an affirmative answer for, as appellee points out, it is at least true in one sense that all of the forces engaged in defending the United States, including the missile battalions of the National Guard are "acting * * * on behalf of" the United States. Moreover, the generality of this must yield to the more detailed answer to a further interrogatory which specified that these persons were two enlisted men, Paolella and Zisa, members of the New Jersey National Guard.

To the direct averments of the answers to interrogatories, the affidavit and the certificate which show that the men who entered on the plaintiffs' premises were members of the New Jersey National Guard who had been ordered to do so by their Commandant, and that the National Guard was not in active Federal service at the time, the plaintiffs responded by two affidavits. One was an affidavit by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Stein. It averred that plaintiffs were "unable to present by affidavits certain facts essential to justify plaintiffs' opposition to the motion for summary judgment. * * * The facts which the plaintiffs desire to present concern the control and direction of the federal government over, and relationship * * * to the individuals who committed the tort. * * * These facts and the various government regulations, directives and procedures which may be involved are not within the knowledge of the plaintiffs."

The other affidavit, by Mr. Masia, one of the individual plaintiffs, alleged: "* * * I was present on the premises on numerous occasions during portions of the year 1962. During that time I observed that Lt. Tietjen was very often on the Nike Station premises. * * * The nature of his presence leads me to believe that Lt. Tietjen was permanently assigned to this Nike Station and his presence there was for the purpose of taking care of the premises. * * *"

The plaintiffs in this case had the burden of proof of their claim. They have been met by answers to interrogatories and an affidavit presenting specific averments of fact which, if unchallenged, leave no genuine issue of fact and raise questions of law as the sole determinants of decision. Plaintiffs' essential reliance is on subdivision (f) of Rule 56, which provides: "Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." It is to be noticed that the plaintiffs have not asked for a continuance to permit them to take depositions or to engage in other forms of discovery. We are led then to the reasons which justify the statement in the affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel that the facts which they admittedly must show to succeed at trial are not within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. These facts, as we have already pointed out, relate to the identity and status of the men who entered on the plaintiffs' premises and of their superior who ordered them to do so.

The relationship between a unit of the New Jersey National Guard and the United States and the status of a member of the New Jersey National Guard are not matters within the exclusive knowledge of the United States. They are obviously equally within the knowledge of the New Jersey National Guard and also of the individual members of the unit who are involved. In the present case once the United States revealed the identity and status of the individuals who entered on plaintiffs' premises and of the individual who ordered them to do so, and of others familiar with the facts, the secrecy which otherwise might have placed the plaintiffs at a disadvantage was gone. With this information the plaintiffs have had full opportunity to examine by pretrial depositions all of the persons whose identity has been disclosed and who are the persons upon whom the Government's case must rest. They have neither availed themselves of this opportunity nor have they indicated any desire to do so, although this is expressly granted to them by subdivision (f) upon which they rely.

In Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club, 265 F.2d 196 (3 Cir. 1959), we affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant where plaintiffs failed to challenge the defendant's affidavits except to say that they "expect to prove facts" showing the existence of an agreement which they did not produce and that they had "a well-founded supposition" to support their claim. We quoted from the opinion of Clark, J., in Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 473 (2 Cir. 1943), that a party who resists summary judgment cannot hold back his evidence until the time of trial: "* * * We have often held that mere formal denials or general allegations which do not show the facts in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent the award of summary judgment."

The purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if a party who has obtained by discovery and from affidavits information which he should seek to amplify or test by further discovery, merely rests on a statement of ignorance of the facts. Indeed, subdivision (f) of Rule 56, by affording an opportunity for continuance of an application for summary judgment so as to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, indicates that...