Robinett v. The Haskell Co.
| Citation | 12 P.3d 411,270 Kan. 95 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 83,739.,83,739. |
| Parties | MICHAEL D. ROBINETT, Appellant, v. THE HASKELL COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Craig J. Altenhofen, of Harper, Hornbaker, Altenhofen & Opat, Chartered Lawyers, of Junction City, was on the brief for appellant.
Lawton M. Nuss, of Clark, Mize & Linville, Chartered, of Salina, argued the cause, and Mickey W. Mosier, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellee.
Donald W. Vasos, of Law Offices of Donald W. Vasos, of Fairway, argued the cause and David A. Hoffman, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Trial Lawyers Association.
Michael J. McDaniel, of Hall, Levy, DeVore, Bell, Ott & Kritz, of Coffeyville, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Association of Defense Counsel.
Donald A. McKinney and Donald Andersen, of Andersen & McKinney, of Wichita; Michael L. Snider and J. Joseph Seiwert, of Snider & Seiwert, of Wichita; and Bradley J. Prochaska and Timothy A. Emerson, of Law Offices of Prochaska, Scott & Craig, of Wichita, were on the brief for amicus curiae DeBruce Elevator Explosion Victims.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiff, Michael Robinett, was injured while performing work under a subcontract between his employer, Stanley Jones Corporation (Stanley Jones), and the defendant, The Haskell Company (Haskell). Under the terms of the contract between Stanley Jones and Haskell, Stanley Jones provided workers compensation coverage for its employees and paid such compensation to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued Haskell in tort for injuries sustained. The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment ruling that Haskell was the statutory employer of the plaintiff, barring his tort action under the exclusive remedy rule. The question we must resolve is whether the provisions of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(g), which relieve a principal contractor of responsibility for providing workers compensation where the subcontractor has secured such coverage, opens the principal contractor to third-party tort actions by employees of the subcontractor.
The undisputed facts establish that Armour Swift-Eckrich employed Haskell as its principal contractor for the construction of a new facility in Geary County. Haskell is a design/build firm that provides architectural, engineering, construction, and real estate services. Haskell subcontracted with the plaintiff's employer, Stanley Jones, for installation of heating, air conditioning, and mechanical work on the new project.
On November 13, 1996, the plaintiff was injured on the job site when he stepped into an uncovered floor drain, causing serious injury to his right foot, right leg, and back. The plaintiff claimed that this injury was the direct result of the wrongful and negligent act of an employee of Haskell, for which Haskell would be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Stanley Jones provided worker compensation coverage for all its employees through Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance. After recovering worker compensation benefits, the plaintiff filed a tort action against Haskell for damages. Haskell filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it qualified as the plaintiff's statutory employer under K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(a) and was therefore immune from suit under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act's exclusive remedy rule contained in K.S.A. 44-501(b). In his response and now on appeal, the plaintiff argues that K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(g) which exempts general contractors from providing workers compensation benefits for the employees of subcontractors where the subcontractor provides such benefits, renders Haskell liable.
In granting Haskell summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff's tort action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of K.S.A. 44-501(b), thereby rejecting the plaintiffs contention that K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(g) authorized his tort action. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. We transferred the appeal on our own motion pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).
The plaintiff's argument rests upon a 1994 amendment to 44-503 of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act adding subsection (g), which relieves the principal contractor of its obligation to provide workers compensation coverage for employees of a subcontractor where such coverage is secured by the subcontractor. Before discussing the amendment and its effect, the following background and context is helpful in framing the question we must resolve.
K.S.A. 44-501(b) contains the exclusive remedy provision upon which the trial court based its decision for Haskell. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
"Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer."
Thus, under K.S.A. 44-501(b), an employer is not liable in tort for any injury in which compensation is recoverable under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The remedy provided in the Kansas Workers Compensation Act is exclusive and a worker may not maintain a common-law action for damages founded upon negligence against a party from whom he or she could have recovered compensation from that employer under the Act. Woods v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 220 Kan. 479, 482, 553 P.2d 900 (1976).
Subcontracting under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act is addressed by the provisions of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(a) provides:
"Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute any work which is a part of the principal's trade or business or which the principal has contracted to perform and contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the execution of the work any compensation under the workers compensation act which the principal would have been liable to pay if that worker had been immediately employed by the principal; and where compensation is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the principal, then in the application of the workers compensation act, references to the principal shall be substituted for references to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the worker under the employer by whom the worker is immediately employed."
K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(a) has been a part of Kansas workers compensation law in essentially the same form since its enactment in 1927. See L. 1927, ch. 232, § 3. The statute extends the application of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act to certain individuals or entities who are not the immediate employers of the injured workers, but rather are "statutory employers." Bright v. Cargill, Inc., 251 Kan. 387, 393, 837 P.2d 348 (1992). The impact of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503 is to allow an employee of a contractor to recover workers compensation benefits from either his immediate employer or the principal contractor, so long as the work being done by the employee is either an integral part of the principal's trade or business or is work that would ordinarily have been done by an employee of the principal. See Cobble v. Williams, 177 Kan. 743, 750-51, 282 P.2d 425 (1955). The purpose for this statute is Zehring v. Wickham, 232 Kan. 704, 707, 658 P.2d 1004 (1983). A statutory employer is immune from a common-law suit for damages due to the exclusive remedy provision even when the injured employee chooses to receive workers compensation benefits from his or her immediate employer rather than the statutory employer because the employee could have recovered compensation from the statutory employer. See Bright v. Cargill, Inc., 251 Kan. at 392-393; Zehring v. Wickham, 232 Kan. at 707.
Prior to 1994, the law in this area would have been clear. The trial court found, and neither party seriously disputes, that Haskell, as the principal contractor, would qualify as the plaintiff's "statutory employer" under K.S.A. 44-503(a). The trial court found that work done by subcontractor Stanley Jones was part of Haskell's trade or business and, further, that the work was part of a contract that Haskell had contracted to do for a third party, Armour Swift-Eckrich. On appeal, the plaintiff does not argue that this finding was incorrect.
Thus, under the law as it existed before 1994, Haskell would have been liable to pay workers compensation benefits to the plaintiff as if the plaintiff were a direct employee. See K.S.A. 44-503(a). The plaintiff could have claimed benefits from either Haskell or his direct employer, Stanley Jones, assuming Stanley Jones provided such benefits. K.S.A. 44-503(a), (c). Conversely, both Haskell, as a statutory employer, and Stanley Jones, as the direct employer, would be immune from a negligence suit under the exclusive remedy provision as the plaintiff could have recovered compensation from either one under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. See Woods v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 220 Kan. at 482.
In 1994, K.S.A. 44-503 was amended with the addition of subsection (g). L. 1994, ch. 288, § 1. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 44-503(g) provides:
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