Robinson Lytle and Lydia His Wife, Nathan Cloyes, and Others, Plaintiffs In Error v. the State of Arkansas, Charles Bertrand, and Others

• Citation: 16 L.Ed. 306,22 How. 193,63 U.S. 193
• Parties: ROBINSON LYTLE AND LYDIA L. HIS WIFE, NATHAN H. CLOYES, AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, CHARLES B. BERTRAND, AND OTHERS
• Decision Date: 01 December 1859
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

63 U.S. 193

22 How. 193

16 L.Ed. 306

ROBINSON LYTLE AND LYDIA L. HIS WIFE, NATHAN H. CLOYES, AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, CHARLES B. BERTRAND, AND OTHERS.

December Term, 1859

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. It was a chancery case, but correctly brought up by writ of error. See preceding case of Verden v. Coleman.

It was before this court at a preceding term, and is reported in 9 Howard, 314. It will be perceived, by referring to that case, that this court decided that the pre-emption act of 1830 conferred certain rights upon settlers upon public lands, upon proof of settlement or improvement being made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver, agreeably to the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. And their decision must be considered final, unless impeached on the ground of fraud or unfairness. 9 Howard, 333. The principal point now decided was, that the entry then recognised was obtained by false affidavits as to residence and cultivation.

The cause, as decided in 9 Howard, having gone back to Arkansas, the bill was amended, and various new parties, both complainants and defendants, were introduced. Most of the defendants answered; decrees were taken against some of those who did not answer, and the bills dismissed as to other.

The State court decided many questions upon which their decision was final, and not subject to be reviewed by this court under the 25th section of the judiciary act. The principal one before this court was, whether or not Cloyes imposed on the register and receiver by false affidavits as to cultivation and residence.

The case was argued in this court by Mr. Bradley, upon a brief filed by Mr. Stilwell and himself, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Watkins and Mr. Pike for the defendants in error, upon which side there was also filed a written argument by Mr. Hempstead.

The arguments which were filed were very voluminous, and the record contained nearly a thousand printed pages. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas was, that, from the proof in the cause, the pre-emption claim set up in the bill was and is fraudulent in fact and in law; and this was the judgment sought to be reversed by this court. The evidence upon the question constituted a large part of the record. The opinion of this court refers to a portion of it, and the residue of it the reporter does not intend to touch. The counsel for the plaintiff in error contended that the decree of the land officers, whilst it stands, is conclusive as to the title of the pre-emptioner and those claiming under him; that it could not be impeached collaterally, but could be impeached for fraud only in a direct proceeding, by either an original or cross bill; and that, as the defendants had not so impeached or attempted to impeach it, they cannot be permitted to speak about fraud as a mere matter of defence.

18 Howard, 43, and authorities there cited.

The views of the counsel on both sides, upon the question of the jurisdiction of this court in this case, were as follows:

The counsel for the plaintiff in error said:

It may be insisted that this court has no jurisdiction of the case.

Had the Supreme Court of Arkansas simply affirmed the decree of the court of original jurisdiction, there would appear more plausibility in this; though, then, we think the jurisdiction clear.

The right set up by the plaintiffs in error arises under an act of Congress, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas was against that right; consequently, this court has jurisdiction of the case, without regard to the particular ground upon which the decree of the State court is based.

14 Howard's Rep., 389.

Cunningham v. Ashley et al., ib., 98.

1 Howard's Rep., City of Mobile v. Emanuel.

The right grows out of an act of Congress, and is sanctioned against all laws and judicial decisions of the States.

5 Cranch's Rep., 344, Owings v. Norwood's Lessee.

5 Peters's Rep., 257, Fisher's Lessor v. Cockerell.

It is sufficient that the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under the authority of the United States, was drawn in question, and the decision was against their validity.

1 Wheaton's Rep., 304, 322, 352, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, et seq.

3 Condensed R., 474. Same case.

The evidence for the defence was admitted, for the purpose of impeaching the right claimed under the act of Congress, and granted to them by the land officers acting under it consequently, the decision of the State court, upon the effect of such evidence, may be fully considered here, and the decree reversed or affirmed.

4 Howard's Rep., 447, Mackay v. Dillon.

The power to revise and reverse a decision of a State court, depriving a party of his right to transfer his case from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States for trial, has been exercised.

14 Howard's Rep., 103, Gordon v. Longest.

In Neilson v. Lagow, 7 Howard's Rep., 775, the plaintiff claimed the land under an authority exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury in behalf of the United States, and the decision was against the validity of the authority thus exercised; and on motion to dismiss, Chief Justice TANEY said: 'We think it is evidently one of the cases prescribed for in the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789.'

In this case, the decision was against an authority exercised by the register and receiver, subordinates of the Secretary of the Treasury, but under the same authority.

The jurisdiction exists wherever the laws of Congress and the acts of officers executing them in perfecting titles to public lands have been drawn in question and construed by the Supreme Court of a State, and the decision is against the title set up under the laws of Congress and the authority exercised under them.

19 Howard's Rep., 207, Cousin v. Blanc's Executors.

In McDonogh v. Millaudon, 19 Howard's Rep., 704, Mr. Justice CATRON said: 'Did this final judgment draw in question the construction of a treaty or statute of the United States, or of an authority exercised under the same, and was the decision against the validity of either or against the title or right set up under either? If these questions are answered in the negative, it follows that we have no jurisdiction to re-examine or reverse the judgment under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.'

Hence, it must follow, necessarily, if answered affirmatively any one of them, the court would have jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this case claim under the authority exercised under a statute of the United States, and a right set up under it, and the decision was against them.

Wynn v. Garland was similar to this in every respect, and the question was passed over without notice.

20 Howard's Rep., 7.

In order to give jurisdiction, it is sufficient, if the record shows, that it is clear from the facts stated, by just and necessary inference, that the question was made, and that the State court must, in order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have decided that question as indispensable to that judgment.

10 Peters Rep., 392, Crowell v. Randell.

1 id. Rep., 250, Wilson et al. v. the Blackbird C. M. Company.

1 Wheaton's Rep., 355, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.

4 id. Rep., 311, Miller v. Nichols.

12 id. Rep., 117, Williams v. Norris.

The jurisdiction must be determined by reference to the record. And in doing so, the court will refer to the opinion of the State court, where it is made a part of the record by the laws of the State.

19 Howard's Rep., 207, Cousin v. Blanc's Executors.

In this case, there is no necessity, in the first instance, of looking behind the decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, to determine the ground of the decision; but, if need be, we may look back to the decision of the chancellor, whose decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and shall find that he overruled all the defences set up, except the invalidity of the pre-emption claim of Cloyes. (His opinion is made a part of the record—see Gould's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, p. 242, sec. 17.) Certainly the fact that the Supreme Court decided against the right of the plaintiffs, upon the ground that it was fraudulent, cannot oust the jurisdiction. If that court had refused the relief because the proof showed that Cloyes never occupied or cultivated the land, the case would be the same; because the want of possession and cultivation, in the eyes of that court, constituted the fraud. The idea of fraud cannot be disconnected from the act of Congress. If there was any fraud, it was a fraud upon the law, and upon the United States through her land officers.

The decision being against the right, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to re-examine the case, and determine, not whether the decision was right upon the particular ground, but whether the right was properly denied. The decree of the State court would not have been what it is, if there had not been a decision against the right set up by the plaintiffs; and this is all sufficient.

12 Howard Rep., 124, Williams v. Oliver et al.

3 Peters Rep., 292, 302.

And the decision of the State court need not be confined exclusively and especially to the construction of the treaty act of Congress, &c., in order to give jurisdiction.

12 Howard Rep., 124, Williams v. Oliver.

Points may arise, growing out of and connected with the general question, and so blended with it as not to be separated, and therefore falling equally within the decision contemplated by the twenty-fifth section. The case of Smith v. the State of Maryland, 6 Cranch, 281, and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 305, 355, afford illustrations of this principle.

Here the record shows affirmatively that the decision was against the right set up and the authority of the land officers, excluding the idea that the...