Robinson v. Affinia Grp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 3:10–cv–398–W.,3:10–cv–398–W.
• Citation: 18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 263,815 F.Supp.2d 935
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: Thomas ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. AFFINIA GROUP, INC. d/b/a Wix Filtration Products Division, and Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, Defendants.

18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 263

815 F.Supp.2d 935

Thomas ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

v.AFFINIA GROUP, INC. d/b/a Wix Filtration Products Division, and Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, Defendants.

No. 3:10–cv–398–W.

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina,Charlotte Division.

Sept. 2, 2011.

Charles A. Everage, Charlotte, NC, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey D. Keister, McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

ORDER

GRAHAM C. MULLEN, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before this Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20). This motion has been fully briefed by the parties (Docs. Nos.22, 23) and is now ripe for consideration. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this matter against Defendants as his former employers alleging wrongful termination in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and North Carolina public policy. This is the third suit Plaintiff has filed in this court against Defendants concerning his employment. See Robinson v. Spicer, 3:04–cv–469 (W.D.N.C.) (“ Robinson I ”); Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., LLC., 3:07–cv–414 (W.D.N.C.) (“ Robinson II ”). Earlier in the case, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the instant case was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court set forth the procedural background of this case, including the facts concerning two prior related suits involving these parties. See Doc. No. 13. The facts as set forth in that order are hereby incorporated by reference and adopted as if fully set forth herein. Ultimately, in that order, the Court noted the limited purpose for which this case could proceed. Specifically, Plaintiff could only raise claims based on “new activities arising after the second suit, namely, that Plaintiff carried out a legally protected activity by filing the second suit, and that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in that behavior....” (Doc. No. 13, p. 6).

Although Plaintiff's brief relies largely on allegations already decided in his prior lawsuits, only the facts occurring after the second lawsuit are relevant to the instant motion. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the Court's prior ruling, the Court briefly summarizes the facts as a whole to provide context for the issues raised by Defendants' motion.

Beginning in approximately 1981, Defendant Wix Filtration Corp, LLC, employed Plaintiff as a telephone technician. On September 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed suit ( Robinson I ). against “Dana–Spicer, Inc., d/b/a Wix Filtration Corporation” alleging claims under FLSA for failure to pay overtime. The parties settled that lawsuit in July 2005. Wix subsequently entered into a Master Service Agreement with Electronic Data Systems Corporation (“EDS”) to outsource certain technology and communication jobs. Plaintiff's job function was specifically addressed in an addendum to the Master Services Agreement and provided a yearly service request for telephone support that Defendants reviewed and renewed annually. Defendants' outsourcing of Plaintiff's position became effective August 31, 2005. Plaintiff contends he remained jointly employed by both Defendants and EDS after the outsourcing occurred. Defendants disagree and assert that the outsourcing contract entered into with EDS resulted in Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees being hired as at-will employees by EDS such that Defendants no longer employed Plaintiff. ( See Affidavit of Kay Teixeira, Doc. No. 20–3, p. 2).

In 2007, Plaintiff filed a second suit ( Robinson II ). against “Wix Filtration Corporation;” “Dana–Spicer, Inc., d/b/a Wix Filtration Products Division;” and “Affinia Group, Inc., d/b/a Wix Filtration Products Division” alleging Defendants decided to outsource his position, which he asserted resulted in the termination of his employment, in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of the first suit— Robinson I. The court granted summary judgment for Defendants in that case, in part based on uncontroverted facts after Plaintiff filed no opposition to the motion for summary judgment,¹ (see Doc. No. 20, 3:07–cv–414), and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for Defendants in a published decision, Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., LLC, 599 F.3d 403 (4th Cir.2010) (affirming trial court's decision denying Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment). Contrary to Plaintiff's overly-thorough discussion in his brief of the facts surrounding the decision to outsource his job, Defendants' determination to outsource certain positions, including Plaintiff's, is not an issue before this Court at bar, as these arguments were, in substance, rejected by the court in Robinson II.

In early 2009, almost one and a half years after Plaintiff filed Robinson II, Defendants decided to not renew part of their outsourcing contract with EDS, specifically the addendum that included, among others, Plaintiff's position. Defendants contend this decision was made at the corporate level due to a change in telephone systems, which eliminated the need for certain telecommunication services through EDS. Doc. No. 20–3, p. 4. Subsequently, EDS terminated Plaintiff's employment. Other employees who had been employed with EDS but had previously worked with Defendants were also terminated after Defendants did not renew the outsourcing contract. Some of those employees reapplied for positions with and were hired by Defendants.

Plaintiff received a separation package from EDS following his termination. (Doc. No. 20–6). As part of that agreement, Plaintiff received a lump sum of money in exchange for a release of claims against EDS and other conditions.

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against these Defendants,² alleging wrongful termination under both federal and state law based on the assertion that Defendants' decision to terminate the outsourcing contract for certain telecommunications positions occurred in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of the second suit. Defendants have moved for summary judgment.

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(2011). A material fact is one that could lead to judgment in favor of one party or another. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When the movant supports its motion for summary judgment by affidavits, the adverse party's response must be supported by affidavits or as otherwise provided by Rule 56 and must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Courts, in considering motions for summary judgment, view the facts and take all the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is thus proper where “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party....” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff's complaint sets forth two causes of action: (1) retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor and Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); and (2) wrongful termination in violation of North Carolina public policy, including the state's Wage and Hour Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. Defendants move for summary judgment on both counts.

A. Retaliation under FLSA

Under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), it is unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding....” A plaintiff asserting a claim for retaliation under this statute has two methods to establish his case. A plaintiff may utilize the “mixed-motive” approach by presenting “direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor ... motivated the employer's adverse employment decision.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.2005) (summarizing status of case law concerning “mixed-motive” method of proof in light of both Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion), and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003)). “Alternatively, a plaintiff may ‘proceed under [the McDonnell Douglas] “pretext” framework, under which the employee, after establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates that the employer's proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination.’ ” Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318 (alteration in original)(quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285(4th Cir.2004) (en banc)).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide either direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that his termination, which occurred after Defendants decided to not renew their contract with EDS, was motived by an impermissible factor such as retaliation. Plaintiff has not identified any statements made by decision-makers regarding his termination in 2009 to establish evidence of retaliation as a result of his filing of the second suit. Plaintiff's reference to a handful of comments that occurred in 2004 prior to Defendants' outsourcing of Plaintiff's job and...