Robinson v. Backes

• Decision Date: 21 February 1917
• Citation: Robinson v. Backes, 91 Conn. 457, 99 A. 1057 (Conn. 1917)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROBINSON v. BACKES.

99 A. 1057

91 Conn. 457

ROBINSON

v. BACKES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 21, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Joseph P. Tuttle, Judge.

Action by Norman J. Robinson, administrator, against Henry R. Backes.There was verdict for defendant, which was set aside, and defendant appeals.Case remanded for error, with direction to enter judgment for defendant in accordance with the verdict.

On November 6, 1915, the plaintiff's decedent, Adelbert Robinson, a foreman in charge of a gang which was repairing the highway between North Haven and Wallingford, was struck and killed by a seven-passenger motor car owned by the defendant and then being driven by the defendant at a rate of from 20 to 25 miles an hour.There was much travel on the highway on that day, and the road was smooth, hard, dry, and straight for a considerable distance north and south of the place of the accident.There was a single trolley track on the extreme east side of the traveled way; in the middle a macadamized surface 18 feet wide offering the natural path for motor vehicles, and west of that a strip of softer roadway 5 feet wide.About 9 feet in width of the easterly side of the macadamized part of the road was occupied by a large dump cart used by the repair gang with its two horses headed northerly.Shortly before the accident, one Palmer, driving a motor delivery wagon from the north, spoke to the decedent, who was then at work south of and behind the dump cart, and stopped his delivery wagon on the extreme west side of the road, at a point variously estimated as from 30 to 100 feet beyond the dump cart, partly on the grass outside of the traveled way and partly on the 5-foot strip of comparatively soft roadway.Then he looked back for an instant and saw the decedent coming diagonally towards him and about at the middle of the road.This was the last that any witness saw of the accident, except the defendant and his sister, who sat with the defendant on the front seat of the car.Their evidence is that as they approached the place they were traveling on the right-hand side of the macadamized part of the roadway going toward North Haven; that they saw the dump cart on the left and the Palmer delivery wagon on the right, and, as the defendant says, another man on the right, in the rear of the delivery wagon.They say that Edward Backes, the defendant's brother, was driving his car in the same direction and some 300 feet ahead of them; that they observed the brother's car pass between the dump cart and the delivery wagon, turning slightly toward the middle of the macadam to give clearance to the delivery wagon; that they sounded their horn and followed the same path; and that when they were about opposite the dump cart the decedent came out from behind the car, walking, with his head down and his back towards them, diagonally across the road.They testified that in the effort to avoid the decedent the defendant swerved his car violently to the left, and that the right-hand lamp of the defendant's car struck the decedent.Shortly after the accident, one Wheeler, a state policeman, arrived on the spot, made a number of measurements, and observed wheel tracks made by an automobile.These measurements and observations are relied on to contradict or modify the evidence of the defendant and his sister in certain material respects.Other facts are stated in the opinion.

Jacob P. Goodhart and Samuel A. Persky, both of New Haven, for appellant.Harrison Hewitt and Charles E. Clark, both of New Haven, for appellee.

BEACH, J.(after stating the facts as above).There is only one question of law in this case: How far a trial court may go in setting aside the verdict of a jury as against the evidence.The rule itself is plain, although it may sometimes be hard to say whether it has been properly applied to a given case.

"It is the duty of the trial court in its relation to the jury to protect the parties by setting aside a verdict, where its manifest injustice is so plain as to clearly indicate that the jury has disregarded the rules of law applicable to the case, or were influenced by prejudice, corruption, or partiality in reaching a decision."McKone v. Schott, 82 Conn. 71, 72, 72...