Robinson v. Brickton Village Association, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20 CV 30 MR WCM |
| Parties | MELVIN RICHARD ROBINSON, III, Plaintiff v. BRICKTON VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and LM PROPERTY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's “Motion to Amend Due to Case Dismissed” (the “First Motion to Amend, ” Doc. 24) and Second “Motion to Amend Due to Case Dismissed” (the “Second Motion to Amend, ” Doc. 32) (collectively, the “Motions”) which have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. The Motions which are substantively the same, are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.[1]
On January 31, 2020, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed his Complaint, which appeared to name “Brickton Village HOA (Lauren Koons)” and “LM Property” as the defendants. Doc. 1; see also Doc. 3. The Original Complaint indicated that Plaintiff was attempting to assert claim(s) for violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) based on Defendants' failure to provide reasonable accommodations and on Defendants' discrimination against Plaintiff. A subsequently filed exhibit additionally indicated that Plaintiff was asserting that his “HOA [had] been giving [him] a difficult time, ” had “put [him] down and discriminated against [him], ” and that “[t]he lien they put on [his] house is not even the correct amount.” Doc. 3 at 1.
On April 14, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 10.
On September 25, 2020, and following briefing by the parties, the undersigned issued a Memorandum and Recommendation that recommended the Motion to Dismiss be granted. Doc. 18.
On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation and, in the same document, requested that counsel be appointed for him. Doc. 19.
On December 30, 2020, the District Court overruled Plaintiff's objections, granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and denied Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel. Doc. 22. Judgment was entered the same day. Doc. 23.
On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Motion to Amend, as well as a Notice of Appeal. Docs. 24 and 25.
On January 28, 2021, the undersigned entered an Order advising the parties that the Court would consider Plaintiff's First Motion to Amend notwithstanding his Notice of Appeal. Doc. 29.
Defendants responded to the First Motion to Amend on February 5, 2021. Doc. 31.
Plaintiff filed the Second Motion to Amend on February 9, 2021. Doc. 32.
Defendants responded to the Second Motion to Amend on February 16, 2021. Doc. 34.
On April 15, 2021, after extensions of time were allowed, Plaintiff filed his reply relative to both Motions. Plaintiff's filing included numerous pages of exhibits, including materials from the North Carolina Human Relations Commission regarding Plaintiff's claims under North Carolina state law. Doc. 39.
Before discussing the merits of Plaintiff's Motions, it is necessary to address a predicate issue raised by Defendants' briefing-whether the Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's requests in the first instance. Plaintiff has not addressed this issue.
The filing of a notice of appeal ordinarily divests a district court of jurisdiction over matters related to the appeal; however, this rule does not extend to deficient notices of appeal, such as notices that attempt to appeal a non-appealable order. In such a circumstance, a district court may disregard the purported notice of appeal. Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. v. Garcia, 467 F.Supp.3d 385, 395 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 823 Fed.Appx. 174 (4th Cir. 2020), reh'g denied (Oct. 27, 2020); see also Doc. 29.
In this case, Plaintiff's notice of appeal indicates that Plaintiff is only attempting to appeal the District Court's denial of Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel, not the granting of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 25. The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that orders regarding a party's request for the appointment of counsel “do not constitute final orders, appealable interlocutory orders, or appealable collateral orders.” Id. (collecting cases).
Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the instant Motions remains with the District Court.
“[A] district court may not deny [a motion to amend] simply because it has entered judgment against the plaintiff-be it a judgment of dismissal, a summary judgment, or a judgment after a trial on the merits.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (). “Instead, a post-judgment motion to amend is evaluated under the same legal standard as a similar motion filed before judgment was entered-for prejudice, bad faith, or futility.” Id; see also Katyle v. Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).
“There is one difference between a pre- and a post-judgment motion to amend: the district court may not grant the post-judgment motion unless the judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).” Laber, 438 F.3d at 427.[2] Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471; see also United States v. Shabazz, 509 Fed.Appx. 265, 266-67 (4th Cir.2013); Magers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12CV49, 2013 WL 6385942, at *3 (W.D.W.Va. Dec. 6, 2013) ( ).
Finally, when considering the Motions here, the undersigned is cognizant that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Federal courts extend latitude to the pleadings of pro se litigants. See e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 52021 (1972) (). However, “a pro se complaint must still contain sufficient facts ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Adams v. Sw. Virginia Reg'l Jail Auth., 524 Fed.Appx. 899, 900 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570). Further, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992), cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim, and does not act as a pro se plaintiff's advocate or develop claims that a plaintiff fails to raise. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) ( ); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) ().
As noted above, a complaint may be amended after the entry of judgment only if the judgment is vacated. Here, Plaintiff has not filed a motion under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 seeking that relief. Some authorities indicate that a court has the discretion to consider a post-judgment motion to amend as also being a motion to vacate a judgment, though is not required to do so. See Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995) () (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1112 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1758, 84 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)); Browning v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc., No. 1:12cv00009, 2012 WL 5465560, at *1 ().
In this case, even if such discretion exists and is exercised here, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned is not persuaded that leave to amend should be granted.
Defendants do not argue that allowing the Motions would be prejudicial or that Plaintiff has acted in bad faith. Instead, Defendants assert that the Motions are futile because Plaintiff's proposed amendments[3] do “nothing more than restate [Plaintiff's] previously dismissed claims.” Doc. 31 at 8.
Plaintiff's materials indicate that he seeks to assert claims of discrimination under the FHA, failure to accommodate under the FHA, and/or negligence arising out of Defendants' (1) failure to ensure that a handicapped parking space is level free of debris, and appropriately marked; (2) failure to “investigate[] [his] disability complaint;” or engage “in the interactive process”; and (3) actions relating to the HOA placing a lien on his home. See Doc. 24 at 1-4. Additionally, Plaintiff appears to wish to assert a claim for breach of contract and, in his Reply, references for...
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