Robinson v. Bunch

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ELDRIDGE.
• Citation: Robinson v. Bunch, 788 A.2d 636, 367 Md. 432 (Md. 2002)
• Decision Date: 11 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 111,111
• Parties: Bishop L. ROBINSON, v. Edward R. BUNCH, III, et al.

788 A.2d 636

367 Md. 432

Bishop L. ROBINSON, v. Edward R. BUNCH, III, et al.

No. 111, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

January 11, 2002.

Andrew H. Baida, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland and Michele J. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Espo (Brown, Goldstein & Levy, LLP, on brief), Baltimore, for respondents. Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY ¹, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

This is an action by employees and a former employee of the Division of Parole and Probation, which is part of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, against the Secretary of the Department, for monetary damages based on the plaintiffs' allegations that they were not paid for overtime work in excess of forty hours per week. The plaintiffs assert that the failure to pay them for overtime work violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 through 219.

Although other issues have previously been raised in this case, the dispositive issues are whether Maryland law provides a remedy or remedies for adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims and, if so, whether the present action was an authorized remedy. We shall hold that Maryland law does provide a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy for adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims and that the remedy is exclusive. We shall further hold that, because the present lawsuit is not encompassed by the exclusive statutory administrative and judicial review remedy, the Circuit Court correctly dismissed the action.

I.

The plaintiffs-respondents Henry Boulware and Charles Woods are parole and probation officers employed by the Division of Parole and Probation. The plaintiff-respondent Edward Bunch was formerly employed by the Division. In 1995, Bunch, Boulware, and Woods filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Bishop L. Robinson, then the Secretary of the Department, for alleged violations of the FLSA. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought monetary relief against Secretary Robinson, alleging that the Secretary had not paid them overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours per week.² The United States District Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), which held that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits of this type in federal courts.

Thereafter, in 1997, Bunch, Boulware, and Woods instituted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City the present action against the Secretary, seeking monetary damages for the alleged violations of the overtime provisions of the federal FLSA. In addition, Bunch sought damages for "wrongful termination" of his employment, asserting that the termination of his employment was because of his overtime claim under the FLSA. The plaintiffs' complaint stated that their action was authorized by two provisions of the FLSA, namely 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3) and 216(b).³ The plaintiffs alternatively contended that their action was authorized by Maryland law.

The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the State's sovereign immunity barred the federal causes of action under 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3) and 216(b), and that Congress had no authority to abrogate that immunity by authorizing suits of this nature against a state official in state courts. With regard to any possible causes of action under Maryland law, the Secretary maintained that such actions were precluded by the plaintiffs' failure to invoke and exhaust their administrative and judicial review remedies provided by the statutory provisions concerning state employee grievances. The Secretary also argued that Bunch's claim was prohibited by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

The Circuit Court, agreeing with the Secretary's arguments based on sovereign immunity, the lack of Congressional authority, and the failure to invoke and exhaust state law administrative and judicial review remedies, granted the motion to dismiss. The Circuit Court did not reach the issue of whether the plaintiff Bunch's claim was barred by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed, Bunch v. Robinson, 122 Md.App. 437, 712 A.2d 585 (1998). The intermediate appellate court initially held that the substantive overtime provisions of the FLSA were applicable to the plaintiffs under the language of the FLSA and the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the subject, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). The Garcia opinion held that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause⁴ to make the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA applicable to state government employees. The Court of Special Appeals in the present case went on to hold that the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit applied only to federal court actions and had no application to state court actions. Bunch v. Robinson, supra, 122 Md.App. at 455-460, 712 A.2d at 593-596. Finally, the Court of Special Appeals held that the right to bring a state court action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), "preempted" the Maryland statutory administrative and judicial review remedy. Bunch, 122 Md.App. at 461,712 A.2d at 596-597.

The Secretary filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting only a single question as follows:

"Does Congress, acting under Commerce Clause authority insufficient to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity, possess sufficient power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court?"

This Court granted the petition and issued a writ of certiorari, Robinson v. Bunch, 351 Md. 285, 718 A.2d 234 (1998).

Thereafter, the parties filed in this Court a joint motion to postpone briefing and argument until the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case then pending before it, Alden v. Maine, which involved the same issue that was presented in the Secretary's certiorari petition. We granted the motion and postponed briefing and argument. Subsequently, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246, 144 L.Ed.2d 636, 652 (1999), holding as follows:

"We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts. We decide as well that the State of Maine has not consented to suits for overtime pay and liquidated damages under the FLSA. On these premises we affirm the judgment sustaining dismissal of the suit."

After the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v. Maine, the Secretary filed in this Court a motion to "summarily reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals." The plaintiffs did not oppose this motion. Nevertheless, this Court denied the motion, amended the order granting the certiorari petition by adding issues of Maryland law, and scheduled the case for briefing and argument. The issues added by this Court concerned the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action under the Maryland Constitution, particularly in light of Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights as well as several of our cases, and, alternatively, the right to bring such an action pursuant to various Maryland statutory provisions.⁵

II.

There are two issues raised in this case which can be disposed of quite briefly.

First, it is clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v. Maine, supra, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636, requires that we overrule the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain this action under the remedial provisions of the FLSA invoked by the plaintiffs. The Alden case made it clear that the FLSA could not constitutionally authorize an action such as the one here involved. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court made it clear in Alden, 527 U.S. at 755, 119 S.Ct. at 2267, 144 L.Ed.2d at 678-679, that state law could authorize such actions.

Second, the Secretary argues that this Court should not consider the additional Maryland law issues, set forth in our order which amended the earlier order granting the certiorari petition, because those issues were not raised in this Court by any party. The Secretary maintains that, particularly in light of the plaintiffs' "lack of opposition in this Court to the Secretary's motion for summary reversal, those issues should not be reached in this case." (Petitioner's brief at 13).

The Secretary's argument lacks merit. Maryland Rule 8-131(b) provides that this Court "ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review...." (Emphasis added). In addition to the qualification inherent in the word "ordinarily," the above portion of the rule is prefaced by the further qualification, "[u]nless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari...."⁶

This Court has consistently taken the position, under Rule 8-131(b) and under our certiorari practice prior to the adoption of a rule on the subject, that in our order granting certiorari, or in a later order having the effect of amending the order granting certiorari, we may either limit the issues or add issues which the parties have not presented in certiorari petitions or cross-petitions. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 711, 785 A.2d 726, 738 (2001) ("Our order granting the certiorari petition neither limited nor expanded the issues for review by this Court"); State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 597, 640 A.2d...