Robinson v. Cain

Decision Date24 October 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 15-1551 SECTION: "E"(5)
PartiesDARREN ROBINSON v. N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Procedural History

Petitioner, Darren Robinson, is a state inmate incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. He was charged with possession of cocaine in excess of 200 grams but less than 400 grams and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1Following a two-day trial, on March 11, 2010, a jury found him guilty as charged.2 On March 16, 2010, he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor for cocaine possession and 15 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for the firearm charge, with additional monetary fines imposed on each, to run concurrently.3 The State subsequently filed two multiple-offender bills of information.4 On March 25, 2010, following a multiple-offender adjudication, his original sentences were vacated and he was sentenced for cocaine possession as a quadruple offender to 60 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, the first 10 years also to be served without benefit of parole, and for firearm possession as a second-felony offender to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, the first 15 years also to be served without benefit of parole, to run concurrently.5

On direct appeal, Robinson raised the following assignments of errors: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the bill of information immediately before trial; (4) the trial court erred in denying the motion to continue trial; (5) the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence; (6) the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial and motion for a new trial; (7) the trial court erred in allowing improper joinder of offenses; (8) the sentences were excessive and (9) the trial court erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence. On December 29, 2011, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences.6 His motion for a rehearing was subsequently denied. On June 15, 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his application for a writ of certiorari.7

On June 13, 2013, Robinson's counsel of record filed an application for post-conviction relief on his behalf with the state district court.8 In that application, he asserted: (1) the State withheld material, exculpatory and impeaching evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That motionwas denied on January 7, 2014.9 On February 6, 2014, counsel filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory writs. The state district court ordered a return date (within 30 days of the ruling) of February 7, 2014. On February 7, 2014, counsel filed a motion for extension of the return date and was granted until March 7, 2014 to file a supervisory writ application. On March 12, 2014, counsel filed a related supervisory writ application with the court of appeal.10 That application raised only ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On May 1, 2014, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal denied relief, finding that the writ application was not timely filed and also denying the claim as meritless.11 On May 27, 2014, he filed a pro se writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court challenging the intermediate court's ruling.12 That writ was denied without stated reasons on April 2, 2015.13

While those proceedings were pending, on June 20, 2014, Robinson also filed a pro semotion to vacate an illegal habitual-offender sentence with the state district court.14 That motion was denied on July 28, 2014.15 In response to a traverse filed by Robinson on or about August 4, 2014, the district court issued another ruling stating that the motion was already denied by order dated July 28, 2014. On August 7, 2014, Robinson filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory writs from the ruling denying his motion to vacate. He also sought an extension of time and was granted until September 16, 2014 to file his writ application with the court of appeal. On September 10, 2014, Robinson filed a related writ application with the Louisiana Fifth Circuit.16 On December 4, 2014, the court of appeal denied relief.17 He did not seek supervisory review of the judgment with the Louisiana Supreme Court.

On May 4, 2015, Robinson filed his federal application for habeas corpus relief.18 In his petition, Robinson claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress hisstatement; (2) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the bill of information immediately before trial; (4) the trial court erred in denying the motion to continue trial; (5) the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence; (6) the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial and motion for a new trial; (7) the trial court erred in allowing improper joinder of offenses; (8) the sentences were excessive; (9) the trial court erred in denying the motion to reconsider sentence and (10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview and call witnesses. The State concedes that Robinson has exhausted state-court remedies as to all of the claims raised, but argues that his federal application is untimely. In response to this Court's order, the State provided a supplemental memorandum in which it contends some of the claims have been procedurally defaulted and the remainder fail on the merits.19 Robinson filed a traverse to the State's supplemental response.20

For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects the State's timeliness argument and proceeds to a review of the claims.

Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., governs the filing date for this action because Robinson filed his habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). The AEDPA generally requires that a petitioner bring his Section 2254 claims within one (1) year of the date on which his underlying criminal judgment becomes "final." 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).21 With regard to finality, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

The statute of limitations for bringing a federal habeas petition challenging a state conviction begins to run on "the date on which the [state] judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). When a habeas petitioner has pursued relief on direct appeal through his state's highest court, his conviction becomes final ninety days after the highest court's judgment is entered, upon the expiration of time for filing an application for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir.2003). However, "[i]f the defendant stops the appeal process before that point," ... "the conviction becomes final when the time for seeking further direct review in the state court expires." Id. at 694; see also Foreman v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir.2004) (Section 2244(d)(1)(A) gives alternative routes for finalizing a conviction: either direct review is completed or the time to pursue direct review expires).
Although federal, not state, law determines when a judgment is final for federal habeas purposes, a necessary part of the finality inquiry is determining whether the petitioner is still able to seek further direct review. See Foreman, 383 F.3d at 338-39. As a result, this court looks to state law in determining how long a prisoner has to file a direct appeal. See Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir.2006); Roberts, 319 F.3d at 693.

Butler v. Cain, 533 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir.2008).

The limitations period is subject to statutory tolling for the time during which "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect tothe pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In order for a state application to be considered "properly filed" for purposes of § 2244(d)(2), the delivery and acceptance of the application must be in compliance with the applicable state laws and rules governing filings. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413-14, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005), citing Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 364 (2000). These rules usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 8 (footnote omitted). A state application is "pending" both while it is before a state court for review and also during the interval after a state court's disposition, while the petitioner is authorized to proceed to review at the next level of state consideration. See Grillette v. Warden, Winn Correctional Center, 372 F.3d 765, 769-71 (5th Cir. 2004) (a state application ceases to be pending when the time...

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