Robinson v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 24 February 1818
• Citation: 3 Wheat. 212,4 L.Ed. 372,16 U.S. 212
• Parties: ROBINSON v. CAMPBELL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

16 U.S. 212

4 L.Ed. 372

3 Wheat. 212

ROBINSON v. CAMPBELL.

Feb. 24, 1818

[213]

ERROR to the district court of East Tennessee.

This was an action of ejectment brought by the defendant in error, (the plaintiff's lessor in the court below,) against the present plaintiff, and S. Martin, on the 4th of February, 1807, in the district court for the district of East Tennessee, which possessed circuit court powers. The defendant in that court pleaded separately the general issue, as to 400 acres, and disclaimed all right to the residue of the tract specified

in the declaration. A verdict was given for the plaintiff in October term, 1812. From the statement contained in the bill of exceptions, taken at the trial of the cause, it appears that the land for which the action was brought, is situated between two lines, run in 1779 by Walker and Henderson, as the boundary lines of Virginia and North Carolina. The former state claimed jurisdiction to the line run by Walker, and the latter to the line run by Henderson. After the separation of Tennessee from North Carolina, the controversy between Virginia and Tennessee, as to boundary, was settled in 1802, by running a line equidistant from the former lines. The land in dispute fell within the state of Tennessee. Both the litigant parties claimed under grants issued by the state of Virginia, the titles to lands derived from the said state having been protected by the act of Tennessee, passed in 1803 for the settlement of the boundary line.

The plaintiff rested his title on a grant, (founded on a treasury warrant) to John Jones, dated August the 1st, 1787, for 3,000 acres; 1,500 acres of which were conveyed to the lessor by Jones, on the 14th of April 1788; and proved possession in the defendant when the suit was commenced.

The defendant, to support his title to the said 400 acres, offered in evidence a grant for the same to Joseph Martin, dated January 1st, 1788, founded on a settlement-right, and intermediate conveyances to himself. He also offered in evidence, that a settlement was made on said land, in 1778, by William Fitzgerald, who assigned his settlement-right to the said Joseph Martin; that a certificate in right of settlement was issued to Martin by the commissioners for adjusting titles to unpatented lands; on which certificate, and on the payment of the composition money, the above grant was issued. This evidence was rejected by the court below. The defendant also offered in evidence a deed of conveyance from the plaintiff's lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, dated January 2d, 1810, for the land in dispute; but the same was also rejected. He also claimed the benefit of the statute of limitations of the state of Tennessee, on the ground that he, and those under whom he claims, had been in continued and peaceable possession of the 400 acres since the year 1788.

The court decided that the statute did not apply. The cause was then brought before this court by writ of error.

Feb. 24th.

Mr. Law for the plaintiff in error, argued, 1. That the defendant below ought to have been permitted to give evidence showing that his grant had preference in equity over the plaintiff's grant. By the law, as settled in Tennessee, the prior settlement right of the defendant, though an equitable title, might be set up as a sufficient title in an action at law. The opinion of the judge below proceeds on the idea that the Virginia practice must prevail, under which such a title could only be asserted in equity. The acts for carrying into effect the compact settling the boundary, declare that the claims and titles derived from Virginia shall not be affected or prejudiced by the change of jurisdiction. But are the claims and titles less secure, if the forms of legal proceedings of Tennessee be adopted? Is there any difference whether the plaintiff's grant be vacated on the equity side of the court, or rendered inoperative in an action of ejectment? It is admitted, that as to the nature, validity, and construction of contracts, the lex loci must prevail. But the tribunals of one country have never carried their courtesy to other countries so far as to change the form of action, and the course of judicial proceedings, or the time within which the action must be commenced.¹ 2. The deed from the plaintiff's lessor, pending the suit, showed an outstanding title in another, and ought to have prevented the plaintiff from recovering.² 3. It is a universal principle that the statute of limitations of the place where the suit is brought is to govern in determining the time within which a suit must be commenced.³ 4. New exceptions to the operation of the statute of limitations as to real property cannot be constructively established by the courts.⁴ The statute of limitations of Tennessee ought to be applied to suits commenced in the courts of Tennessee for lands which were always within the jurisdiction of that state as claimed by her, and which fell within her territory upon the final settlement of the boundary. The title to such lands may be determinable only by the law of Virginia but the mode of pursuing the remedy on that title must depend upon the lex fori.

The Attorney-General, contra, insisted, that by the compact between the two states, the law of Virginia, was made the law of the titles to these lands. By the settled practice of that state, as well as the established doctrine of the common law, the legal title must prevail in a court of law. The case of real property is an exception to the general rule, as to applying the statute of limitations according to the lex fori, and not according to the lex loci. Generally speaking, suits for such property must be commenced in the courts of the country where the land lies, and, consequently, both the right and the remedy are to be determined by one and the same law. But this is an anomalous case depending upon the peculiar nature and provisions of the compact of 1802, between the two states. The statute of limitations of Tennessee could not operate upon these lands until they were ascertained to lie in Tennessee; and the peculiar rule established by the courts of Tennessee, permitting an equitable title to be asserted in an action at law, would not apply to a controversy concerning titles wholly depending on the law of Virginia. The proceedings in ejectment are fictitious in form, but for all the purposes of substantial justice they are considered as real. If the term expire pending the action, the court will permit it to be enlarged, and no conveyance by the lessor of the plaintiffs while the suit is going on can operate to extinguish the prior lease. The court be- low, therefore, committed no error in refusing to permit the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff's lessor to be give in evidence in order to establish the existence of an outstanding title.

Feb. 24th.

Mr. Justice TODD delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the facts, proceeded as follows:

The first question is, whether the circuit court were right in rejecting the evidence offered by the defendant to establish a title in himself under the grant of Joseph Martin, that grant being posterior in date to the grant under which the plaintiff claimed; and this depends upon the consideration, whether a prior settlement right, which would, in equity, give the party a title to the land, can be asserted also, as a sufficient title in an action of ejectment.

By the compact settling the boundary line between Virginia and Tennessee, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, it is declared, that all claims and titles to lands derived from the governments of Virginia, or North-Carolina, or Tennessee, which have fallen into the respective states, shall remain as secure to he owners thereof, as if derived from the government within whose line they have fallen, and shall not be in any wise prejudiced or affected in consequence of the establishment of the said line. The title, both of the plaintiff and defendant in this case, were derived under grants from Virginia; and the argument is, that as in Virginia no equitable claims or rights antecedent to the grants could be asserted in a court of law in an ejectment, but were matters cognizable in equity only, that the rule must, under the compact between the two states, apply to all the suits in the courts in Tennessee, respecting the lands included in those grants.

The general rule is, that remedies in respect to real estates are to be pursued according to the law of the place where the estate is situate.⁵ Nor do the court perceive any reason to suppose that it was the intention of the legislature of either state, in the acts before us, to vary the application of the rule in cases within the compact. Those acts are satisfied by construing them to give the same validity and effect to the titles acquired in the disputed territory, as they had, or would have, in the state by which they were granted, leaving the remedies to enforce such titles to be regulated by the lex fori.

The question then is, whether in the circuit courts of the United States, a merely equitable title can be set up as a defence in an action of ejectment. It is understood that the state courts of Tennessee have decided that under their statutes, declaring an elder grant founded on a younger entry, to be void, the priority of entries is examinable at law; and that a junior patent founded on a prior entry, shall prevail in an action of ejectment against a senior patent founded on a junior entry. But this doctrine has never been extended beyond the cases which have been construed to be within the express purview of the statutes of Tennessee. The present case stands upon grants of Virginia, and is not within the purview of the statutes of Tennessee; the titles have all their validity from the laws of Virginia, and are confirmed by the stipulations of the compact. Assuming, therefore, that in the case of entries under the laws of Tennessee, the priority of such entries...