Robinson v. City of Baton Rouge
| Decision Date | 22 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-375-JWD-RLB |
| Parties | GEORGE W. ROBINSON, JR., ET AL. v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Filed by City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (Doc. 62) submitted by the Defendants, the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge ("City/Parish") and the Planning and Zoning Commission for the City of Baton Rouge/East Baton Rouge Parish ("Planning Commission") (collectively, the "Defendants"). The Plaintiffs George W. Robinson, Jr., and Demetra Parson Robinson (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion. (Doc. 73.) Oral argument is not necessary.
Having carefully considered the law, facts in the record, and arguments of the parties, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Plaintiffs are real estate developers who attempted to develop a subdivision within the City/Parish. Pursuant to state and local law, they submitted a preliminary plat for approval to the City/Parish's Planning Commission. The Planning Commission denied approval. This suit ensued.
The Plaintiffs claim they suffered a number of violations of their federal and state constitutional rights. Specifically, the Plaintiffs assert (1) an inverse condemnation claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) an unconstitutional taking claim under Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution; (3) a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) a claim for denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). The Defendants seek to have each of these claims dismissed.
The Court has carefully reviewed the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties as well as the applicable law. Having done so, the Court makes the following rulings:
The Court grants the Defendants' motion with respect to the substantive due process claim. The Court finds that all reasonable jurors would conclude that the reasons for the Planning Commission denying approval of the preliminary plat were the commissioners' concerns about issues like fill mitigation/elevation, flooding, and drainage. The Court further finds that, as a matter of law, these reasons were rationally related to legitimate governmental interests like public health, safety, and the general welfare. As a result, the Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim fails.
The Court also grants the Defendants' motion with respect to the procedural due process claim. The key issue here is whether, as a matter of state law, the Plaintiffs' had a legitimate claim of entitlement to approval of their preliminary plat. This question turns on whether the Planning Commission had discretion, which turns on whether it was very likely or certain the Plaintiffs would receive approval. State law recognizes that the Planning Commission has discretion if it does not act arbitrarily and capriciously and bases its decision on legitimate reasons. Since this Court has determined that the Planning Commission did not act arbitrarily and capaciously and did in fact base its decision on legitimate reasons, the Planning Commissionhad discretion to deny approval. That is, as a matter of state law, it was not certain or very likely the Plaintiffs would receive approval, so they had no legitimate claim to entitlement. Consequently, the Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their procedural due process claim.
The takings claims are ripe. A takings claim is not ripe (1) until the relevant governmental unit has reached a final decision as to what will be done with the property, and (2) until the plaintiff has sought compensation through whatever adequate procedures the state provides. As to the first requirement, the Planning Commission reviewed the Plaintiffs' preliminary plat, sought additional information, was provided same, and then rendered a final decision denying approval. The Defendants have not identified an avenue (be it through regulation or law) that the Plaintiffs should have pursued but did not. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs should have sought judicial review, but the Plaintiffs did in fact seek a mandamus, which this Court denied. Thus, The Plaintiffs obtained a final decision from the Planning Commission. As to the second ripeness requirement, the Defendants have waived any objection to it by removing the Plaintiffs' state court inverse condemnation proceeding to this Court. Accordingly, the Defendants' ripeness arguments are rejected.
However, the Court grants the Defendants' motion with respect to the Plaintiffs' categorical takings (Lucas) claim. To prevail, the Plaintiffs must show that they lost all value in the property. In short, they did not. The Plaintiffs sold their property for over one million dollars. No reasonable juror would find that they lost all value. Further, even if the relevant question was whether the Plaintiffs had any economic use of their property, their claim would still fail. It is undisputed they obtained preliminary plat approval to build a subdivision on part of the property at issue. Thus, under either standard, the Plaintiffs' claim fails.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' as applied takings claim. The viability of this claim depends on the factors set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), which include (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. The Plaintiffs have submitted evidence such that a reasonable juror could find that the first two factors weigh in their favor. While the third factor weighs in favor of the Defendants, this merely demonstrates how this fact-intensive question is best decided by a jury.
The Court also denies the Defendants' motion with respect to the Monell claim. Under Fifth Circuit case law, a plaintiff may establish a policy based on an isolated decision if the decision was made by an authorized policymaker in whom final authority rested regarding the action ordered. Here, the Planning Commission was a policymaker for § 1983 purposes, and its decision to reject that Plaintiffs' preliminary plat constituted a policy under the above standard. Further, this action was the driving force of the surviving alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Monell claim survives.
Lastly, the Court denies summary judgment as to the state law takings claim. Under Louisiana law, a regulatory taking occurs when a regulation destroys a major portion of the property's value or eliminates the practical economic uses of the property. Here, the Plaintiffs have submitted evidence demonstrating that their property lost about $1.3 million worth of value. A reasonable juror could conclude, even with the sale of most of the property, that the Plaintiffs were denied a major portion of the property's value.
Plaintiffs George W. Robinson, Jr., and Demetra Parson Robinson are real estate developers who have developed numerous subdivisions in East Baton Rouge Parish and the surrounding parishes over the past thirty-five years. (See Doc. 73-10 at 1.) The Plaintiffs owned a 101.96 acre tract of land within the City/Parish. (See id. at 2.)
The Defendant Planning Commission is an entity created pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 33:101 et seq. (Doc. 62-2 at 1; Doc. 73-1 at 1.) The Planning Commission is charged with, among other things, the responsibility to review and approve of subdivision plats. (Doc. 62-2 at 1; Doc. 73-1 at 1.)
In 1996, the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, which is the governing authority for the City/Parish, adopted the Unified Development Code ("UDC"), which consolidated into one volume all existing regulations related to land development within the Parish of East Baton Rouge. (Doc. 62-2 at 1; Doc. 73-1 at 1—2.) While not facts per se, the Court finds that an overview of the UDC will be useful in framing the issues of this ruling.
The UDC provides in its opening paragraph:
In accordance with the provisions of R.S. 33:101 et seq., and particularly R.S. 33:112, and in order to promote the health, safety, convenience, morals, and general welfare of the community, to ensure orderly development of property; provide for the proper arrangement, width, naming of streets in relation to otherexisting or planned streets that provide adequate and convenient traffic circulation including access for emergency vehicles; and ensure the adequacy of vehicular parking, utilities, and open space and recreation facilities, the following regulations are adopted by the Planning Commission.
(UDC § 1.1, Doc. 73-2 at 1, also available at https://brgov.com/dept/planning/udc/pdf/UDC_2016.pdf). The UDC further provides:
no subdivision . . . which is in conflict with the Master Plan or the Unified Development Code shall be constructed or authorized by the appropriate department of the City Parish government, until and unless the locations and extent thereof shall have been submitted to and approved by the Planning Commission and where appropriate, Zoning Commission.
Section 4.102 of the UDC is entitled "Subdivision Review and Procedures." (Doc. 73-2 at 9.) Under this regulation, an applicant first presents prints of a proposal to staff at a pre-application conference, and the staff "informs the applicant of procedures and...
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