Robinson v. City of Geneseo
| Decision Date | 15 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 66--40 |
| Citation | 222 N.E.2d 331,77 Ill.App.2d 308 |
| Parties | John E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF GENESEO, Illinois, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Stewart R. Winstein, Rock Island, Dorothea O'Dean, Rock Island, for appellant.
Andrews & Andrews, Kewanee, for appellee.
This cause is before us on appeal by plaintiff John E. Robinson from an order entered by the Circuit Court of Henry County granting the motion of City of Geneseo, Illinois, to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to serve as chief of police of the City of Geneseo until November 14, 1966, in accordance with a contract dated December 26, 1963, for a three year term and for other relief. The order entered in the trial court from which this appeal is taken, ordered specifically that the complaint be stricken and further ordered that plaintiff have leave to amend his complaint within 20 days.
Defendant has filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such order was not a final order from which an appeal can be taken.
As we have said in another case determined at this time, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing appeals from final judgments of the trial courts except in those specific cases where appeals from interlocutory orders are permitted by Supreme Court Rule. The judgment or order must terminate the litigation between the parties so that, if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of the judgment (Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371). As we indicated, the purpose of the rule is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and piecemeal appeals. We concluded that trial orders which simply dismiss or strike the complaint, which if affirmed might result in a filing by plaintiff of a new suit or an amended complaint arising from the same transaction, are not deemed to be final and appealable basically because they have not terminated the litigation between the parties. We pointed out that if a plaintiff desires to stand by his complaint after its dismissal he should so indicate to the trial court so that words indicating the finality of the judgment can be entered for the defendant. Such judgment, if affirmed, can be used in bar of future suits by plaintiff as against defendant arising out of the same transaction (Aetna Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Robineau...
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...and not a final judgment. (Tondre v. Pontiac School Dist. No. 105 (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 838, 342 N.E.2d 290; Robinson v. City of Geneseo (1966), 77 Ill.App.2d 308, 222 N.E.2d 331.) If plaintiff Hassett had decided to stand on its chancery complaint after dismissal, it would have had to so i......
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...We note that "the purpose of the rule is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and piecemeal appeals." Robinson v. City of Geneseo (1966), 77 Ill.App.2d 308, 310, 222 N.E.2d 331, 332. The appealability of an order is determined by the substance as opposed to the form of the order. (Gutenkauf; ......
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...to the precedent of Ariola v. Nigro (1958), 13 Ill.2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787, and the subsequent decision of Robinson v. City of Geneseo (1966), 77 Ill.App.2d 308, 222 N.E.2d 331, we deem it desirable to dismiss this appeal with the specific declaration that if the trial court, upon applicatio......
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Findley v. Posway
...We point out that "the purpose of the rule is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and piecemeal appeals." Robinson v. City of Geneseo (1966), 77 Ill.App.2d 308, 310, 222 N.E.2d 331. Jurisdiction of this court to hear an appeal is confined to reviewing appeals from final judgments unless it c......