Robinson v. City of Detroit

Citation613 N.W.2d 307,462 Mich. 439
Decision Date18 July 2000
Docket NumberDocket No. 110360,Docket No. Calendar,Docket No. 2.,Docket No. 1,Docket No. 107421
PartiesDebra ROBINSON, as Personal Representative, of the estate of Courtney Henderson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Craig Kailimai, Badge 2194, and Michael Cily, Badge 1034, Defendant-Appellees. Brenda Cooper, for herself and as next friend of Marlon Cooper, a minor, and Toni Morris, for herself and as next friend of Martell Morris, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lonnie Wade, Arthur Gulley, and City of Detroit, Jointly and Severally, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Patricia Collins, Personal Representative of the Estate of Damian Collins, Deceased, Third-Party Defendant.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Pearlman & Pianin (by Michael Pianin and Sheryl R. Lederman), Southfield, for the plaintiff-appellant in Henderson.

Frederic M. Rosen, Detroit, for plaintiffs Cooper.

Bendure & Thomas (by Mark R. Bendure), Detroit, for plaintiffs Morris.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Mary Massaron Ross and Laurel F. McGiffert), Detroit, for the defendants-appellees in Henderson.

Garan, Lucow, Miller & Seward, P.C. (by Rosalind Rochkind), Detroit, amici curiae, for Michigan Municipal League Legal Defense Fund and Michigan Municipal Liability and Property Pool.

Opinion

TAYLOR, J.

In these consolidated cases we are required yet again to consider the parameters of civil liability for governmental agencies and police officers when a police chase results in injuries or death to a person other than the driver of the fleeing vehicle. More specifically, the question in these cases is whether the city of Detroit or individual police officers face civil liability for injuries sustained by passengers in vehicles fleeing from the police when the fleeing car caused an accident. As explained below, we hold that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

First, we hold that the police owe a duty to innocent passengers, but owe no duty to passengers who are themselves wrongdoers whether they help bring about the pursuit or encourage flight. A passenger who seeks to recover for injuries allegedly caused by a negligent police pursuit bears the burden of proving personal innocence as a precondition to establishing the duty element of a cause of action. Because the record does not allow us to conclude as a matter of law whether plaintiffs were innocent as a matter of law,1 we are required to address additional grounds on which defendants assert they are entitled to prevail.

Second, we hold that the city of Detroit is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because one cannot reasonably conclude under a narrow reading of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, M.C.L. § 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), that plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the operation of the police vehicles. We agree with Fiser v. Ann Arbor, 417 Mich. 461, 339 N.W.2d 413 (1983), that an officer's physical handling of a motor vehicle during a police chase, can constitute "negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle" within the motor vehicle exception. However, plaintiffs' injuries did not, as a matter of law, result from the operation of the police cars where the police cars did not hit the fleeing car or physically cause another vehicle or object to hit the vehicle that was being chased or physically force the vehicle off the road or into another vehicle or object.2 Thus, we overrule Fiser and Rogers v. Detroit, 457 Mich. 125, 579 N.W.2d 840 (1998). Contrary to Rogers, we also hold that an officer's decision to pursue does not constitute the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

Third, we conclude the individual police officers are immune from liability because their actions were not "the proximate cause" of the plaintiffs' injuries. Thus, we overrule Dedes v. Asch, 446 Mich. 99, 521 N.W.2d 488 (1994), and hold that the phrase "the proximate cause" as used in the employee provision of the governmental immunity act, M.C.L. § 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2), means the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury, not "a proximate cause." Because the conduct of the individual police officers in these cases were not "the proximate cause," i.e., the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause, of the passengers' injuries, the officers are entitled to governmental immunity.

I. Review of our case law

Our first opinion addressing police chase liability was Fiser, supra, where this Court considered a lawsuit filed by a plaintiff who was injured when his car was hit by a car driven by someone who was fleeing the police. The plaintiff sued the city of Ann Arbor and the police officers involved in the chase. The trial court granted summary disposition to the city and the police officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed.3 This Court reversed with respect to the city and two of the police officers, holding that the excessive speed of the fleeing vehicle could be said to have resulted from the fact that the driver was being pursued by the police and that it was this high speed that caused the fleeing driver to lose control. Id. at 475, 339 N.W.2d 413. The Court further held that the issues of negligence and proximate causation of his injuries was for the jury. Id.

More recently in Rogers, supra, we considered two consolidated police chase cases. Both cases involved car chases in which the fleeing vehicle crashed into vehicles occupied by innocent parties. The defendants argued that the conduct of the police officers could not be a proximate cause of the injuries. The majority held that it was for the factfinder to determine whether the actions of the police officers in operating the pursuing vehicles were causes in fact of the plaintiff's injuries, i.e., the jury could effectively conclude that the police were causing the flight. Id. at 129, 579 N.W.2d 840. The Rogers majority reaffirmed Fiser and expanded on it by holding that the municipal defendants could be held liable for their officer's decision to commence pursuit or to continue the pursuit. Id. at 143-145, 579 N.W.2d 840.

Thus, pursuant to Fiser, police officers face a conundrum wherein they have a sworn duty to apprehend suspected lawbreakers yet simultaneously face legal liability if anyone but the fleeing driver is injured when they give chase. Under Fiser this liability is imposed even where the police car does not hit the fleeing car or physically cause another vehicle or object to hit the fleeing car or physically force the fleeing car off the road or into another vehicle or object. Pursuant to Rogers, even more remarkably, liability may attach for the mere decision to give chase to a suspected lawbreaker.

II. Facts and lower court proceedings

In Cooper, plaintiffs Marlon Cooper and Martell Morris, both fourteen years of age, were passengers in a stolen Jeep Cherokee driven by Damian Collins, who was also fourteen years old. The Detroit police initially noticed that Damian Collins appeared too young to drive and that the Jeep's steering column was broken. The officers, who were in a partially marked police car, attempted to stop Collins by turning on their car's lights, briefly using the siren, showing Collins a police badge, and instructing him to pull over. Instead of stopping, Collins sped away. The police pursued him. After a chase through a residential neighborhood, Collins crashed the Jeep he was driving into a house. Collins was killed, while Cooper and Morris were seriously injured.

The parents of Cooper and Morris filed a lawsuit4 against the individual officers and the city of Detroit. The defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). After argument, the trial court granted summary disposition for both the officers and the city. The trial court held that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in avoidance of the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. The trial court also concluded the officers owed no duty to plaintiffs. The trial court further held that the city was entitled to governmental immunity because the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim within the motor vehicle exception.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs' claims avoided the employee provision of the governmental immunity act and also that the officers owed a duty to plaintiffs.5 The Court of Appeals also held that the city was not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiffs' claims fell within the motor vehicle exception.

In Robinson, Courtney Henderson, age fifteen, was walking to his summer job when neighbor Marcelle Blakeney offered him a ride. Henderson sat in the back seat; Marlon Smith, age eighteen, was in the front passenger seat. The Detroit police observed Blakeney weaving from lane to lane. When the police activated the lights on their police car, Blakeney began to flee rather than stop. The police turned on the siren and began to pursue the vehicle. This pursuit ended when Blakeney's car collided with a non police vehicle. Henderson died in the accident.

Plaintiff, as personal representative for Henderson's estate, filed a lawsuit against the city of Detroit and the police officers involved in the pursuit. Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. The trial court ruled that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiff had failed to state a claim in avoidance of the employee provision of the governmental immunity act. The trial court also held the officers owed no duty to Henderson. The trial court ruled that the city was not entitled to governmental immunity because plaintiff's claim fell within the motor vehicle exception. The trial court nevertheless concluded that summary...

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