Robinson v. City of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 23 May 1960
• Citation: 400 Pa. 80,161 A.2d 1
• Parties: Charles H. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Department of Public Health and Board of Trustees of Philadelphia General Hospital.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

161 A.2d 1

400 Pa. 80

Charles H. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Department of Public Health and Board of Trustees of Philadelphia General Hospital.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 23, 1960.

Ochman & Greenberg, Philadelphia, for appellant.

David Berger, City Sol., Alan Miles Ruben, James L. Stern, Deputy City Sols., Yale B. Bernstein, Asst. City Sol Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

Plaintiff brought a taxpayer's suit in equity to enjoin the defendants, the City of Philadelphia, its Department of Public Health, and the Board of Trustees of Philadelphia General Hospital, from carrying out a certain contract dated April 24, 1959. This contract was made on behalf of the 'City of Philadelphia' by the Board of Trustees Philadelphia General Hospital with two private institutions the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University, and related to the operation, management and control of the Philadelphia General Hospital.

Plaintiff appealed from the Order of the Court below which sustained defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint.

In Fawcett v. Monongaheal Railway Co., 391 Pa. 134, 137 A.2d 768, we quoted with approval the well settled principle reiterated in Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491, where the Court said (391 Pa. at page 136, 137 A.2d at page 770): 'Defendants by their 'preliminary objections admit as true all facts which are averred in the bill of complaint but not the pleaders' conclusions or averments of law': Narehood v. Pearson, 374 Pa. 299, 302, 96 A.2d 895, 896. Moreover, when the sustaining of defendants' preliminary objections will result in a denial of plaintiffs' claim, or a dismissal of plaintiffs' suit, preliminary objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear and free from doubt. London v. Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 81 A.2d 870; Waldman v. Shoemaker, 367 Pa. 587, 80 A.2d 776.'

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the above mentioned contract made by the City with the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University is illegal, improper and unconstitutional. Plaintiff also alleges that the initial cost of $200,000 for 6 months, which was appropriated by City Ordinance No. 2696, was for an illegal purpose and the expenditure of this sum 'may and probably will result in additional burdens to the taxpayers of Philadelphia caused by wasteful and unwarranted disbursements.'

Plaintiff further alleged that the operation of the Philadelphia General Hospital has resulted in adequate care for patients so that there is no need for the proposed contract and the new operation; and that 'The contract and proposed operation of the hospital is a violation of Section 5 B 3 of the Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Act in that same will result in discrimination of employees of the hospital because of race, color, religion or national origin.'

No facts were given by plaintiff to support the averment of discrimination.

The gist of plaintiff's complaint is that the City has turned over and delegated to the University of Pennsylvania and to Temple University 'almost completely without standards,' the operation, direction and control of the Philadelphia General Hospital, in violation of the City Charter, Section 5-300(e) and Section 5-303, and in violation of Article III, Section 20 of the State Constitution, P.S.

Section 5-300(e) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, adopted April 17, 1951, provides:

'that the Department of Public Health shall have the power and its duty shall be to perform the following functions:

'* * * (e) City Hospitals. The Department shall have general supervision ^[1] over all City hospitals now or hereafter owned or operated by the City. It shall determine the capacity of City hospitals and shall determine and designate the type of persons and the proportion of each to be received therein. The Department shall recommend and bring to the attention of the officers and Board's of Trustees of hospitals standards and methods of such hospitals and for the betterment of the condition of their patients.'

Section 5-303 of the Charter establishes the Board of Trustees. It reads as follows:

'The Board of trustees of each City hospital shall have direction and control of its management. Each board shall select a hospital director or superintendent who shall, subject to the authority of the board, administer the hospital in all its departments. On nomination by the director or superintendent, each such board shall from time to time appoint such assistants and employees as may be necessary.'

Article III, Section 20 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides:

'Special municipal commissions prohibited The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association , any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.'

The Constitutional prohibition set forth in Section 20 extends to municipal governments as well as to the General Assembly. Lighton v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609. In the Lighton case the Court said (336 Pa. at page 353, 9 A.2d at page 612):

'We think the township, as the governmental agent of the state, is subject to the same prohibition to which the state is subject. Counsel for defendants contend that the challenged statute 'does not delegate to a private corporation any power' but that 'it does authorize a municipality voluntarily to enter into an agreement with a private corporation, such as a bank or trust company, representing, as a trustee, the bondholders.' As the constitution specifically deprives the state of the power to delegate the management of the municipal property to private corporation, certainly the agent, the township, cannot make such a delegation; the effect of the limitation on the principal would be destroyed if the agent could do what was prohibited.'

The Board of Trustees of PGH attempted in and by the contract in question to improve and broaden the medical and related hospital services which it has been furnishing its patients, as well as to enlarge and improve its medical staff.

Plaintiff argues that a worthy objective does not justify the contract of a City Council or any public body unless such a contract is authorized by the Constitution or by an Act of the Legislature or by a valid ordinance, or otherwise by law. With this contention, we agree. Barth v. Philadelphia School District, 393 Pa. 557, 561, 143 A.2d 909.

We agree with much of the law which plaintiff relies upon, but not with its application to the facts in the instant case. The preamble to the City's agreement recites: 'Whereas, the City finds it increasingly difficult to provide medical care and service to the patients at Philadelphia General Hospital on the basis heretofore maintained of a medical staff consisting largely of unpaid volunteers, with a limited number of paid medical personnel;'

The contract by its terms provides inter alia that the duty and responsibility of the Universities is to provide 'all medical and related services not provided directly by PGH for the proper and efficient operation of the division assigned to each University, including medical care and supervision in accordance with standards established by the Board of Trustees of PGH and under the general supervision of the Executive Director of PGH * * * [and to] provide the services of such paid or volunteer medical and other personnel as, when added to the personnel presently provided by PGH, may reasonably be required to operate [the] respective divisions [of Pennsylvania and Temple] and all common departments in a manner satisfactory to the Board of Trustees of PGH.' (Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 of the contract.) The contract further recited that the division to be operated by Pennsylvania and the division to be operated by Temple, and the departments of each and both shall be determined by the Rules of the Board of Trustees of PGH relating to the Medical Staff of PGH.

We do not deem it necessary to recite in greater detail the various powers, provisions, duties and limitations set forth in the contract. It will suffice to say that our study of the contract convinces us that neither the City of Philadelphia nor the Department of Public Health nor the Board of Trustees of Philadelphia General Hospital has unlawfully delegated their powers and responsibilities in and by the above mentioned contract. ^[2]

Plaintiff averred that the expenditure of $200,000 and upwards by the City 'may and probably will result in * * * wasteful and unwarranted disbursements.' No facts were given by plaintiff to support the averment of waste.

Public officials are presumed to have acted lawfully and in good faith until facts showing the contrary are averred, or in a proper case are averred and proved. Parker v. City of Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 242, 249-250, 137 A.2d 343; Hughes v. Chaplin, 389 Pa. 93, 132 A.2d 200. With respect to the allegation of waste, the case is ruled adversely to the plaintiff by Parker v. City of Philadelphia, supra; ...