Robinson v. Clarke

Decision Date30 August 2016
Docket Number1:16cv298 (AJT/IDD)
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesMichael Alonzo Robinson, Jr., Petitioner, v. Harold W. Clarke, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael Alonzo Robinson, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his convictions entered in the City of Richmond Circuit Court, Virginia. On May 9, 2015, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Rule 5 Answer, with a supporting brief and exhibits. Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 9, 10. Petitioner was given the opportunity to file responsive materials, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), and he filed a response. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, petitioner's claim must be dismissed.

I. Background

Petitioner is detained pursuant to a judgment of the City of Richmond Circuit Court entered on January 10, 2013. A jury convicted petitioner of first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony (four counts), abduction for pecuniary benefit (two counts), and robbery. Case Nos. CR12F2199, CR12F2200, CR12F3149-CR12F3154, and CR12F2765; see also Robinson v. Commonwealth, 762 S.E.2d 806, 807 (Va. Ct. App. 2014). The trial court imposed the jury's sentence of life plus 63 years of imprisonment. Dkt. No. 1 at 1.

The Virginia Court of Appeals' opinion dated September 16, 2014 and the record reflect the following facts:

The evidence established that on March 16, 2012, Jerrod Oliver was shot and killed in his house in the City of Richmond. [Petitioner], armed with a firearm, entered Oliver's house and threatened Oliver and a friend, Chaquetta Bowles, demanding money and a gun from Oliver. On March 21, 2012, the Richmond Metropolitan Multi-Jurisdictional Grand Jury returned indictments against [petitioner] for the first-degree murder of Oliver in violation of Code § 18.2-32 and the use of a firearm in the commission of that murder in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. On May 3, 2012, [petitioner] moved to review the multi-jurisdictional grand jury evidence pursuant to Code § 19.2-215.9,1 or in the alternative, to dismiss the indictments if a transcript was unavailable.
The trial court held a hearing on [petitioner]'s motion to dismiss the multi-jurisdictional grand jury indictments on May 11, 2012. The Commonwealth proffered to the trial court that a court reporter did not attend or record evidence presented during the proceedings before the multi-jurisdictional grand jury. The Commonwealth further represented that only Detective Goldman presented evidence at the hearing before the multi-jurisdictional grand jury and that "Detective Goldman's presentation of that evidence is not the same as a witness being called in to testify, thus not requiring a transcript." The trial court denied [petitioner]'s motion stating in part that the "remedy of dismissal of the charge is [not] part of [Virginia's] statute, and the [c]ourt would have to find some prejudice to the defense, and have to find that it was some act of the Commonwealth that was not generally by malfeasance or something." The trial court did, however, order a bill of particulars concerning the charges certified by the multi-jurisdictional grand jury against [petitioner].
On June 4, 2012, a City of Richmond grand jury indicted [petitioner] on two counts of abduction for pecuniary benefit in violation of Code § 18.2-48, one count of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. The indictments from both grand juries were consolidated for trial and a jury trial on all of the charges was held on October 9, 2012.
At trial, Chaquetta Bowles testified that around 9:30-10:00 p.m. on March 16, 2012, Oliver brought her to his home on the south side of the City of Richmond. Bowles testified that while she was upstairs, Oliver asked her if she was hungry and offered to get her food. A few minutes later, Oliver backed into the bedroom, in which Bowles was sitting, with his hands in the air saying "don't shoot." Bowles testified that she then saw [petitioner] holding a gun and [petitioner] told her "bitch, drop the phone and walk over to me." [Petitioner] then demanded money and a "chopper" from Oliver.2 Oliver retrieved money from his closet and gave it to [petitioner] and told him that the "chopper" was downstairs in the oven. [Petitioner] grabbed Bowles by the back of her hair and put the gun to her head as he walked her and Oliver downstairs where Bowles reached into the oven and handed him the "chopper."
At that point, Bowles testified that Oliver said to [petitioner] "I can't believe you're doing this to me. I take care of you and your family." [Petitioner] replied "I'm hurtin. I'm hurtin" and then shot Oliver twice. [Petitioner] then turned and pointed the gun at Bowles. Oliver dove on top of [petitioner] in an effort to shield Bowles from [petitioner] while Bowles ran upstairs and locked herself in a closet. She then heard multiple gunshots. Bowles then heard Oliver call her name. At that point, Bowles ran downstairs and saw Oliver going out the front door. Bowles ran to a neighbor's house and yelled at them to call 911. Later that day, Bowles looked at photographs and identified [petitioner] as the person who shot Oliver.
Officer Burdette also testified and stated that he responded to the scene and observed Oliver holding the handrails on his porch, covered in blood. Officer Burdette testified that he asked Oliver what happened and Oliver responded that "Mikey. Rock's brother [shot him and took his gun]." Officer Burdette asked Mikey's last name and Oliver responded "Robinson." Shortly thereafter, Oliver died from his gunshot wounds.

Robinson, 762 S.E.2d at 807-09. The appellate court also noted that the evidence presented at trial established "that the bullets recovered from the victim's body came from one gun," and "that [petitioner] was wearing a disguise when he was arrested." Id. at 812.

Petitioner appealed, and the Virginia Court of Appeals granted the appeal on the one following issue:

[Petitioner] allege[d] that the trial court "erred in failing to dismiss the multi-jurisdictional grand jury indictments for murder and use of a firearm due to the violation of . . . Code § 19.2-215.9, which violated [petitioner]'s rights to due process and to prepare his best defense."

Id. On September 16, 2014, the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions and found that petitioner "was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to comply with the requirements set forth in Code § 19.2-215.9 and, thus, his constitutional right to due process was not violated." Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused petitioner's petition for further appeal on March 12, 2015. Rec. No. 141489.

Petitioner never filed a state habeas petition; however, on March 16, 2016, he filed the instant, timely writ for a petition of federal habeas corpus. See Dkt. No. 1. In his petition, he raises only one claim: "Violation Sixth (6) Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grand jury indictment." Id. at 6. In support of this claim, petitioner attached a handwritten memorandum, wherein he specifies that he believes his "Sixth Amendment right to put forth his best defense" and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process were violated by the lack of a court reporter in the multi-jurisdictional grand jury that indicted him for murder and one of the four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime. Dkt. No. 1, Memo. at 1-3. He further states that,"The regular grand jury indictments [for robbery, two counts abduction, and three counts use of a firearm in commission of a felony] are not relevant not addressed in this petition." Id. at 3.

Respondent does not contest that petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) by presenting his claim to the Supreme Court of Virginia in his direct appeal.

II. Standard of Review

When a state court has addressed the merits of a claim raised in a federal habeas corpus petition, a federal court may not grant the petition on that particular claim unless the state court's adjudications were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented at the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). This test erects a "formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for claims adjudicated on the merits. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). Under this standard, for a state prisoner to obtain habeas relief, he "must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

The evaluation of whether a state court decision is "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of federal law is based on an independent review of each standard. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court determination violates the "contrary to" standard if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413. When reviewing the state court's findings, the federal court is limited to the record before the state court at the time of the decision. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).

Under the "unreasonable application" clause, the writ should be granted if the federal court finds that the state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle...

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