Robinson v. Coppala

Decision Date27 November 2002
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
Syllabus by the Court

1. “A circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syllabus point 1, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L. H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995)

.

2. [A] circuit court may not substitute its own findings of fact for those of a family law master merely because it disagrees with those findings.” Syllabus point 4, in part, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995)

.

3. A child support obligor may be required to maintain or acquire a life insurance policy, with the obligor's child as beneficiary, when unusual facts of a particular case make it necessary or appropriate in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of child support.

4. When a child support obligor has been required to maintain or acquire a life insurance policy with the obligor's child[ren] as the beneficiary, generally the duration of the life insurance policy imposed upon the obligor may not be required to extend beyond the child[ren]'s age of majority.

Nelson R. Bickley, Bickley & Jacobs, Charleston, for Appellant. R. Joseph Zak, Charleston, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Chief Justice:

Lynne E. Coppala, appellant/defendant below (hereinafter referred to as “Ms. Coppala”), appeals from a divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Ms. Coppala assigns error to the circuit court's decision to deny her alimony, and a determination that her former spouse, Stephen A. Robinson, appellee/plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Robinson”), is not required to maintain a life insurance policy for the parties four year old daughter.

Based upon the parties' arguments on appeal, the record designated for appellate review, and the pertinent authorities, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married in Tennessee on February 7, 1997. One child was born of the marriage. Throughout the marriage, Ms. Coppala was employed as a law clerk with the circuit court of Kanawha County.1 Mr. Robinson was employed by a furniture company in Tennessee. The parties maintained two households during the marriage. Ms. Coppala's primary residence was in West Virginia, while Mr. Robinson's primary residence was in Tennessee.2

On October 12, 1999, Mr. Robinson filed a divorce petition in West Virginia. He alleged irreconcilable differences as grounds for the divorce. Ms. Coppala filed an answer admitting irreconcilable differences. Hearings were held and evidence was taken before a family law master.3 On February 22, 2001, the family law master filed a recommended decision with the circuit court. The two relevant recommendations made by the family law master were: (1) that Ms. Coppala receive alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for 36 months; and (2) that Mr. Robinson maintain life insurance on himself under a policy that made his daughter an irrevocable beneficiary of $250,000.00. 4

Mr. Robinson filed exceptions to both the alimony award as well as the requirement that he was to maintain his daughter as an irrevocable beneficiary of $250,000.00 from an existing life insurance policy.5 The circuit court held a hearing on the matters and by order entered June 28, 2001, the circuit court adopted the recommendations of the family law master, except for the alimony and life insurance recommendations. The circuit court ruled that Mr. Robinson was required to pay no alimony, nor was he required to maintain any amount of life insurance listing his daughter as a beneficiary. From the circuit court's ruling, Ms. Coppala appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We are called upon to review two recommendations by the family law master that were rejected by the circuit court. We pointed out in syllabus point 1 of Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995)

, that [a] circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard.” We also made the following observations in Stephen L.H.:

The standards of review ... applying to the circuit court are the same standards for this Court. A court should review the record for errors of law; ensure the decision is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in the whole record; and ensure the findings and ultimate decision of a family law master are not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. In reviewing the decisions of the circuit court, the scope of this Court's review is relatively narrow. Our role is limited to considering errors of law and making certain that the circuit court adhered to its statutory standard of review of factual determinations, that is, whether the family law master's findings are supported by substantial evidence and consistent with the law.

Where there is disagreement between the circuit court and the family law master, however, the substantial nature of the evidence supporting the circuit court's findings is further called into question, and this Court must examine the record with greater care. This is so even when that circuit court does not disagree with the family law master's factual findings, as such, but draws different inferences from the facts.

Stephen L.H., 195 W.Va. at 393 n. 11, 465 S.E.2d at 850 n. 11.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Alimony

Ms. Coppala first asserts that the circuit court committed error in rejecting the family law master's recommendation to award alimony payable at the rate of $1,000.00 per month for a period of thirty-six months. Under the statute applicable at the time of the proceedings in this matter, W. Va.Code § 48-2-15(I) (1999) (Repl.Vol.1999), a party was barred from receiving alimony in only three instances: (1) where the person has committed adultery; (2) where subsequent to the marriage the person has been convicted of a felony which is final; and (3) where a person has actually abandoned or deserted his or her spouse for six months.6 In the present case, the parties were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Nothing in the record suggests Ms. Coppala committed adultery, that she was convicted of a felony, or that she had actually abandoned or deserted Mr. Robinson for six months. Thus, we can quickly conclude that there is no statutory bar to an award of alimony.

As a general proposition, [a]bsent a finding of a statutory bar to alimony or a finding of substantial fault or misconduct on the part of the spouse seeking alimony, the determination of awarding alimony is to be based on ‘the financial position of the parties.’ Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 541, 474 S.E.2d 465, 471 (1996)

(quoting Hickman v. Earnest, 191 W.Va. 725, 726, 448 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1994)). In determining that alimony was appropriate in this case, the family law master turned to the 20 factors listed under W. Va.Code § 48-2-16(b) (1999) (Repl.Vol.1999), which was in effect at the time of the hearings in the present case. Although there were 20 factors under the statute, it is not necessary for a family law master to make specific findings as to each factor, but only as to those factors which are applicable and appropriate to the case. See Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 275 n. 30, 460 S.E.2d 264, 276 n. 30 (1995). Here, the family law master provided the following three statutory grounds for determining alimony at the rate of $1,000.00 per month for 36 months: (1) the disparity in the income of the parties; 7 (2) Ms. Coppala's custodial responsibilities for her daughter restricted her ability to increase her income by entering the private practice of law; and (3) the disproportionate use of Ms. Coppala's income to provide a domicile for the parties and their child before the divorce.

The circuit court concluded that [t]he record ... sets forth sufficient evidence to support the Family Law Master's factor # 1 and factor # 3.” However, the circuit court disagreed with the finding as to Ms. Coppala's ability to increase her income. The circuit court gave the following reasons for denying alimony: (1) Ms. Coppala “is a young, healthy attorney with an advanced Juris Doctor degree”; (2) Ms. Coppala's “past employment history does not indicate that [she] has a desire to enter into private practice”; (3) the marriage was short; (4) the parties lived separately most of the time; and (5) for six months while Ms. Coppala was pregnant Mr. Robinson supported the family.

Contrarily, Ms. Coppala contends that the circuit court created facts that were never litigated to support its ruling. That is, there was no evidence submitted regarding Ms. Coppala's health or her reasons for not entering the private practice of law. As such, it appears that the circuit court relied upon facts outside the record to support its decision. Based upon the record before us, the family law master's findings were not clearly erroneous. Our cases clearly hold that “a circuit court may not substitute its own findings of fact for those of a family law master merely because it disagrees with those findings.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Stephen L.H. See also State ex rel. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Res. v. Carl Lee H., 196 W.Va. 369, 472 S.E.2d 815 (1996)

; Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996). In conclusion, we do not believe that a sufficient basis existed for the circuit court to disturb the family law master's findings in support of alimony. We therefore reverse the circuit court's ruling on alimony.

B. Life Insurance

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    • United States
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    • June 24, 2013
    ...set forth the standard of review for family court orders pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-2A-14(c) and Robinson v. Coppala, 212 W.Va. 632, 636, 575 S.E.2d 242, 246 (2002). The circuit court stated that the only ground for appeal is that the family court erred by failing to grant any cust......
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    ...and that the family court did not abuse its discretion in applying the law to its findings of facts. See Syl. Pt. 1, Robinson v. Coppala, 212 W.Va. 632, 575 S.E.2d 242 (2002) (requiring that circuit court review findings of fact made by family court judge under clearly erroneous standard an......

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