Robinson v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA, Civ. A. No. 92-7273.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-7273.
• Citation: 827 F. Supp. 1210
• Parties: Carl Steven ROBINSON v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY and Philadelphia Municipal Court.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

827 F. Supp. 1210

Carl Steven ROBINSON v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY and Philadelphia Municipal Court.

Civ. A. No. 92-7273.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 30, 1993.

Alan B. Epstein, Jablon, Epstein and Wolf, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Howard M. Holmes, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

LUDWIG, District Judge.

Defendants Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and Philadelphia Municipal Court move for summary judgment on the ground that they are state entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.¹ Jurisdiction is federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

In February, 1988 plaintiff Carl Steven Robinson began working for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and the Philadelphia Municipal Court in their Pretrial Services Division.² The complaint alleges that he was discharged in June, 1992 for lodging a complaint with a city agency concerning an asbestos removal project at his work site. This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserts a violation of plaintiff's First Amendment rights together with supplemental claims under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and the Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act and for wrongful and retaliatory discharge. It requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state entity may not be sued in federal court without its consent.³ Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir.1981). On the other hand, cities and counties, albeit political subdivisions of the state, do not enjoy constitutional immunity. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Here, defendants claim to be "arms" or "alter egos" of the State of Pennsylvania and entitled, as such, to Eleventh Amendment protection.⁴ Plaintiff counters that defendants, while perhaps hybrid in nature, are more akin to counties and municipalities and are, therefore, not state entities for Eleventh Amendment purposes. In various contexts, this issue has received considerable analysis. As one commentator has observed:

It is not always easy to distinguish between state and local agencies at first glance. The courts will resolve the question by determining whether the agency is an "alter ego" of the state entitled to the protection of state immunity or a separate entity not so protected.

1 Jeremy C. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.602.-2, at 616-17 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted).

There is no doubt that a state's highest court is an Eleventh Amendment state entity. See, e.g., Russillo v. Scarborough, 727 F.Supp. 1402, 1409 (D.N.M.1989); Rothstein v. Montana State Supreme Court, 638 F.Supp. 1311, 1312 (D.Mont.1986); Mattas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 576 F.Supp. 1178, 1181-82 (W.D.Pa.1983); Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada, 490 F.Supp. 1174, 1180 (D.Nev.1980). The few decisions to have resolved the issue have consistently held that lower courts are state entities as well. See, e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.1987) (trial court); Oliver v. Superior Court of Plymouth County, 799 F.Supp. 1273, 1273 (D.Mass.1992) (trial court); Russillo v. Scarborough, 727 F.Supp. 1402, 1409 (D.N.M.1989) (metropolitan court); Mathis v. Clerk of First Dept., Appellate Div., 631 F.Supp. 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (intermediate appellate); N.A.A.C.P. v. California, 511 F.Supp. 1244, 1257-58 (E.D.Cal.1981) (trial court), aff'd, 711 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.1983).

In our District, two decisions have held that courts of common pleas are state entities. See Clark v. Court of Common Pleas, 1992 WL 30551, *2, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 1834, at *5-6 (E.D.Pa. February 13, 1992) (Court of Common Pleas of Chester County); Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F.Supp. 758, 764 (E.D.Pa.1991) (Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County). Another has held that the Pennsylvania Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court, is an arm of the state. See Holt v. Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1992 WL 212428, *1, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13053, at *3 (E.D.Pa. August 28, 1992). Another has reached the same conclusion as to the Philadelphia Traffic Court. See In re Colon, 114 Bankr. 890, 893 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.1990).

As further support, defendants cite Article V, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which, in 1968, established a "Unified Judicial System":

The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, ...

Pa. Const. Art. 5, § 1 (1992). Commenting on the significance of a state judicial system, the Ninth Circuit noted:

The fact that the defendant courts herein are the courts of entry into the state judicial system, rather than the courts of last resort, does not make them any less an integral part of the judicial branch of the state ...

N.A.A.C.P. v. California, 511 F.Supp. at 1257-58.

Despite this considerable authority, plaintiff's position should not be characterized as frivolous. Plaintiff's contention is that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to bar private suits in federal court that would result in imposition of a liability payable from a state's treasury — and that this is not such a case. See Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 814 (3d Cir.1991) (in banc) (citing Hafer v. Melo, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (3d Cir.1991)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2281, 119 L.Ed.2d (1992); SEPTA v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com., 802 F.Supp. 1273, 1285 n. 21 (E.D.Pa.1992) ("Generally speaking, a state organization will not be regarded as the alter ego of the state unless payment of a judgment will have to be made out of the state treasury."); see generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).⁵

If liability were imposed, it is undisputed that the judgment would be paid from the general funds appropriated to the First Judicial District by the City of Philadelphia and non-tax revenues raised by the Courts. Stipulation, at ¶ 13. As an example, in a recent age discrimination action against the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the $38,000 settlement was funded from the City of Philadelphia's budget appropriation to the First Judicial District. See deposition of Geoffrey Gallas, at pp. 5-7.⁶ The essence of plaintiff's argument is that despite the constitutional designation of trial courts as part of the state's judicial system, the source of the funds available to satisfy a judgment is the relevant municipality. Consequently, plaintiff contends, Eleventh Amendment immunity, which enures to the state, should not be extended to include a locally funded court.

While our Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue, the Ninth Circuit has squarely decided in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity despite local funding. In Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.1987), the district court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect the Superior Court of Los Angeles County inasmuch as that court received most of its funding from the county, not the state. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:

Although the County does pay most of the Superior Court's bills, state case law and constitutional provisions make clear that the Court is a State agency. See Cal. Const. art. 6 §§ 1, 5 (West Supp.1986); Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 414, 432, 238 P. 687, 694 (1925). The official name of the court is the Superior Court of the State of California; its geographical location within any particular county cannot change the fact that the court derives its power from the State and is ultimately regulated by the State.

Id., at 1110.

Moreover, much guidance from our Circuit is provided by analyses applied over two decades to determine whether agencies or semi-public entities are entities of the state. See Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir.1991); Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 148, 107 L.Ed.2d 107 (1989); Kovats v. Rutgers, State University, 822 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir.1987); Port Authority Police Benev. Association v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953, 108 S.Ct. 344, 98 L.Ed.2d 370 (1987); Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1980); SEPTA v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com., 802 F.Supp. 1273 (E.D.Pa.1992).

The seminal case, Urbano v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948, 90 S.Ct. 967, 25 L.Ed.2d 129 (1970), was reaffirmed in Fitchik in 1989, utilizing a simplified formulation. In Fitchik, the New Jersey Transit Corporation, an agency created by New Jersey statute, was held not to be an alter ego of New Jersey. The court set forth a three-factor test (enveloping eight of Urbano's nine factors) to determine whether Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to an entity:

(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the state (this includes three of the Urbano factors — whether payment will come from the state's treasury, whether the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's debts);

(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes four factors — how state law treats the agency generally, whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune from state

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