Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation, 5194.

Citation267 A.2d 833
Decision Date20 July 1970
Docket NumberNo. 5194.,5194.
PartiesLena ROBINSON, Appellant, v. DIAMOND HOUSING CORPORATION, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District

C. Christopher Brown, Washington, D. C., with whom Richard B. Wolf, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Herman Miller, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KELLY and FICKLING, Associate Judges.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

Appellee (Diamond Housing Corporation) has been seeking to recover possession of its property from appellant (Lena Robinson) since July of 1968 when it filed an action for possession for nonpayment of rent in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the trial court. In that action, Mrs. Robinson defended on the ground that the lease was void and unenforceable under the principle set forth in Brown v. Southall Realty Co., D.C.App., 237 A.2d 834 (1968), and we affirmed the judgment in her favor. Diamond Housing Corporation v. Robinson, D.C.App., 257 A.2d 492 (1969).

Thereafter, in December 1969, the instant action for possession was filed against Mrs. Robinson by Diamond Housing Corporation, based on a thirty days' notice to quit. Mrs. Robinson answered and demanded a jury trial, claiming that this action was retaliatory and therefore illegal1 since she had prevailed in the prior action filed by Diamond Housing and none of the housing violations had yet been corrected.

Diamond Housing moved for summary judgment, supporting the motion with an affidavit of its vice president stating that she, Mrs. Robinson, had been personally served with a thirty days' notice to quit; that it was unwilling to make any repairs to the property; and that it was not presently desirous of continuing to rent the premises. No affidavits in opposition were filed by Mrs. Robinson. She appeals from the trial court's order granting the motion.

Mrs. Robinson's main contention2 on appeal is that, by the granting of the motion for summary judgment, she was precluded from inquiring into Diamond Housing's good faith in its attempt to evict her. In other words, her Edwards v. Habib defense was barred by the granting of the motion.

In Diamond Housing, supra, we stated that

[w]hen it is established that a lease is void and unenforceable under the Brown v. Southall ruling, the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance and the tenancy, like any other tenancy at sufferance, may be terminated on thirty days' notice. * * * Where, as here, it has been determined that the property when rented was not habitable, that is, not safe and sanitary, and should not have been rented, and if the landlord is unwilling or unable to put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should promptly terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from the rental market, because the Regulations forbid both the rental and the occupancy of such premises.

257 A.2d at 495 (footnote omitted).

Diamond Housing, pursuant to our observation in Diamond Housing Corporation v. Robinson, supra, served a thirty days' notice upon Mrs. Robinson and then brought this action upon her failure to quit. After Mrs. Robinson answered, the landlord filed its motion for summary judgment accompanied by supporting affidavits. No opposing affidavits were filed by the tenant. On this state of the record, we think that no material issue of fact existed as to the landlord's motive and it was proper to grant the motion. GS Civ.Rule 56(e) (f).

This procedure for recovering possession of one's property held by a tenant at sufferance is certainly in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 3 Abril 1972
    ...because of her complaints to the housing authorities and it should be, we think, limited to its facts." Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., D. C.App., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (1970). We can find nothing about the Edwards principle which necessitates such a drastic limitation on its applicability. ......
  • William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 3 Diciembre 1970
    ...(1961). 7. Restatement of Contracts § 604 (1932). 8. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1536 (1962). 9. § 2301. 10. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., D.C.App., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (1970). 11. Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 140, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016, 89 S.Ct. ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT