Robinson v. Durham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 07 August 2014
• Docket Number: 1:13CV652
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: HAMPTON ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION Defendant.

HAMPTON ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARDOF EDUCATION Defendant.

1:13CV652

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

August 7, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BEATY, District Judge.

This case is brought by Plaintiff Hampton Robinson ("Plaintiff") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") and under North Carolina state law for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of North Carolina Public Policy, Assault and Battery, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ("NIED"). The matter currently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #9] filed by Defendant Durham Public Schools Board of Education ("Defendant") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Plaintiff has requested that the Court dismiss his NIED claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil of Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #9]. Furthermore, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request to dismiss his NIED claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint are taken as true for purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff is an African-American male and is currentlyemployed by the Durham County Sherriff's Department ("DCSD") and he has been employed by DCSD since 1991. (Compl. [Doc. #4], ¶¶ 1, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant employs off-duty police officers as security officers pursuant to an agreement between Defendant and DCSD. (Id. at ¶ 7.) In August 2009, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant as a "School Resource Officer/Security Officer" ("security officer"). (Id. at ¶ 8.) On January 29, 2013, Plaintiff was assigned to work at Neal Middle School, a school within Defendant's school system. (See id. at ¶¶ 9, 19.) On that same day, between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Plaintiff was in the school's front office, advising two students when Jacqueline Valachovic ("Valachovic"), a Caucasian female and the school's Guidance Counselor, entered the officer, "smacked . . . Plaintiff in the face with her open hand" while stating "you lying son of a b*tch," and then she quickly left the front office. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that at the time Valachovic smacked him, M. Jill Hall, the school Principal, ("Principal Hall") and Calvin Freeman, the Assistant Principal,¹ and two other employees were present in the front office. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not physically or verbally react to Valachovic after she smacked him. (Id. at ¶ 14.) At the time of Plaintiff's encounter with Valachovic, Plaintiff was wearing his DCDS uniform, which he alleges that he was required to wear while working for Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 11.) At approximately 9:00 a.m. on the same day, Tina Ingram ("Ingram"), Defendant's Head of Security and a Caucasian female, contacted DCSD and asked how she could get Plaintiff removed from working at Neal Middle School. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Ingram contacted DCSD a second time that morning and told DCSD that she "heard that Plaintiff had been datingValachovic and was caught cheating with another Neal Middle School staff member" and that Plaintiff caused a disruption in the school. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18.) Plaintiff alleges that DCSD told Ingram that it appeared that Plaintiff was the victim, based on what Ingram told DCSD. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that Ingram requested that Principal Hall recommend that Plaintiff "not be re-employed at any school within [Defendant's] school system." (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff has not been re-assigned and has not worked for Defendant since January 29, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff alleges that "immediately prior" to his above-described encounter with Valachovic, Valachovic "confronted an African-American female employee of Neal Middle School, Tina Ingram² and inquired of the relationship she had with Plaintiff." (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that the female employee that Valachovic confronted told Valachovic that she and Plaintiff were friends and that she has not pursued Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that Valachovic became "extremely agitated" and informed the female employee that Plaintiff "had only one option" and that Valachovic was going to request that Principal Hall reassign Plaintiff to another school. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that the confrontations between Valachovic and the female employee and between Plaintiff and Valachovic were videotaped. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that despite the above encounters, Valachovic is still employed with Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has treated him and other African-American employees employed as security officers differently than Caucasian co-workers. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to terminate a Caucasian security officer after Defendant discovered that the officer was "caught in a city park" with a teenage student from the high school for which the Caucasian officer was employed. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant, "by and through Principal Hall, had a prior African-American [security officer] removed from Neal Middle School, without appropriate investigation" and without justification. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

On February 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. at ¶ 31; see EEOC Charge [Doc. #10-2].) The EEOC Charge complains of race-based discrimination. (Compl. at ¶ 32; EEOC Charge [Doc. #10-2].) The EEOC mailed its Notice of Right-to-Sue on or around March 12, 2013 and Plaintiff received the Notice on March 16, 2013. (Compl. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in the Durham County Superior Court and Defendant removed the action to this Court on August 9, 2013. (See Notice of Removal [Doc. #1].)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #9] is filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) " 'does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.' " Id. at 243-44 (quoting Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),the Fourth Circuit has directed that courts " 'take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,' but '[they] need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts,' and '[they] need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.' " Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." ' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955) (citations omitted)). Thus, dismissal of a complaint is proper only where plaintiff's factual allegations fail to "produce an inference of liability strong enough to nudge the plaintiff's claims 'across the line from conceivable to plausible.' " Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683, 129 S. Ct. 1937).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII

Plaintiff has alleged a disparate treatment claim against Defendant, asserting that he was terminated from working within Defendant's school system because of his race. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in disparate treatment cases, Plaintiff must plead: "(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] has satisfactory job performance; (3) [he] was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside [his] class received more favorable treatment." Prince-Garrison v. Md. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 317 F. App'x 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, —U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 995, 169 L. Ed. 2d 734 (2008)). It does not appear that the first two elements of Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim are at issue. Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged that he is an African American (Compl. at ¶ 5) and that he "continuously and satisfactorily maintained [his] employment" with Defendant until January 29, 2013, the day he was terminated (id. at ¶ 8). Additionally, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff's termination from his position with Defendant was not an adverse employment action. However, Defendant does argue that it did not have the authority to terminate Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's Title VII claim fails because "the facts alleged in the Complaint and the documents referenced therein demonstrate that [Defendant]...