Robinson v. Eichler

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Citation: Robinson v. Eichler, 795 F.Supp. 1253 (D. Conn. 1992)
• Decision Date: 11 June 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 3:92CV00269 (TFGD).
• Parties: Duncan ROBINSON and Elizabeth Robinson, Plaintiffs, v. Marjorie EICHLER and There's No Place Like Home, Inc., Defendants.

795 F. Supp. 1253

Duncan ROBINSON and Elizabeth Robinson, Plaintiffs, v. Marjorie EICHLER and There's No Place Like Home, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. No. 3:92CV00269 (TFGD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

June 11, 1992.

Joseph D. Garrison, Janet Arterton, Garrison & Arterton, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiffs.

Judith D. Meyer, William R. Breetz, Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

Lawrence Berliner, Office of Protection & Advocacy, Hartford, Conn., for Eliot Dober, intervenor-defendant.

Eileen Penner, William Barr, Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae.

RULING ON MOTION TO REMAND

DALY, District Judge.

Following the defendants' removal of this case from Connecticut Superior Court, the plaintiffs have moved to remand the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The defendants object to the motion, arguing that removal was proper pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiffs' motion to remand is granted, the Court lacking jurisdiction on the present record.

BACKGROUND

Duncan and Elizabeth Robinson ("the Robinsons" or "the plaintiffs") commenced this action in Superior Court in New Haven seeking to enjoin Marjorie Eichler and There's No Place Like Home, Inc.¹ (collectively "the defendants") from taking possession of property located at 150 Huntington Street, New Haven, Connecticut. The property and the twenty-one room building thereon (collectively "the property") are currently owned by Albertus Magnus College ("the college"), which utilized the building as a student dormitory until 1991 under a use variance issued by the City of New Haven. The defendants have contracted to purchase the property to house Ms. Eichler and her family. Ms. Eichler's family consists of her adult son, his wife and ten minor children. Six of the children are adopted, the remaining four are foster children awaiting adoption; all ten children are handicapped and members of a minority group.

The Robinsons own a home adjacent to the property and contend that the defendants' intended use of the property as a permanent residence for Ms. Eichler and her family would violate the applicable New Haven zoning ordinance. Both the Robinsons' home and the property are zoned in a so-called "RS 1 District," which limits use of property therein to single-family homes. New Haven Zoning Ordinance, Art. I, § 11. The City of New Haven has defined the term "family" as "one or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption ...; or a group of not more than four persons who need not be so related, ... who are living together in a single dwelling unit and maintaining a common household." New Haven Zoning Ordinance, Art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).

Based on their contention that the defendants' intended use would violate the ordinance, the Robinsons applied for injunctive relief in Superior Court, alleging that, in the absence of a zoning variance, this use of the property by Ms. Eichler will cause the plaintiffs to suffer immediate and irreparable harm for which they have no adequate remedy at law. Compl. at ¶ 16.

The case was assigned to the Honorable William J. Sullivan, Superior Court Judge, who is assigned to the New Haven Judicial District. On May 18, 1992, the parties appeared before Judge Sullivan on plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from occupying the residence.² At this initial appearance, Judge Sullivan ordered the parties to maintain the status quo until the hearing on the application was completed, stating that "nobody is going to go behind my back and move those people in while I'm waiting to hear this case." May 18, 1992 Tr. at 15. When Judge Sullivan recessed for the day, he reiterated his order that the parties maintain the status quo. "I don't know what the situation with that home is right today, but whatever it is right at this moment that's the way it's to remain until this matter is heard by the Court." Id. at 26.

The hearing continued on May 26, 1992. Prior to taking evidence, Judge Sullivan first heard the parties on several pending motions, including motions to intervene filed by the Ronan-Edgewood Neighborhood Association ("the Neighborhood Association")³ and Eliot Dober.⁴ Judge Sullivan permitted these two parties to intervene.

Defendants next raised their concern regarding Judge Sullivan's order to maintain the status quo.

MR. BREETZ: This Court has an existing order that was entered on the record when we were before your Honor last week in which you enjoined or ordered that the parties not occupy the premises during the pendency of the hearing.

THE COURT: I think I said the status quo would remain until the matter is resolved.

MR. BREETZ: I believe that's right your Honor. And I believe the effect of that, if we chose to occupy, is to prevent us from occupying the premises and to make them unavailable to us. Since the plaintiffs in their own complaint have alleged, and we have agreed, that there are four foster children residing with Mrs. Eichler, the effect of the Court's order is to make unavailable to Mrs. Eichler and her adopted children and the four foster children housing solely because of the familiar sic status of those children. So we're going to at this time ask the Court to lift its restraining order —

* * * * * *

I just want to complete for the record, your Honor, the fact that the temporary restraining order in our judgment is in violation of federal law today.

THE COURT: First of all, there's no temporary restraining order.

MR. BREETZ: Well, I don't know what you call it, your Honor, when you tell me that the status quo has to remain —

THE COURT: The status quo shall remain, right.

MR. BREETZ: Well, that means we can't occupy the premises unless we have some other interpretation of that. If the Court's view is that we may occupy, then I have no objection.

THE COURT: No, that's not the Court's view at all.

* * * * * *

MR. BREETZ: I would ask the Court to rule on it at this time, if it would, on the question of lifting the temporary injunction.

THE COURT: The Court reserves decision. Otherwise the status quo remains, unless it's changed.

May 26, 1992 Tr. at 20-23. Later in the hearing Judge Sullivan clarified the scope of his order.

THE COURT: My order has nothing to do with the sale of this property. I'm not ordering the State not to buy this property. I'm ordering the property remain in status quo as far as who lives there until we get this issue the motion of temporary restraining order resolved. But you can buy it. My order doesn't preclude anybody from buying this property. That's what I want to be sure that that's clear on the record.

MR. BREETZ: I'd like the record to be clear, your Honor, that nobody is going to buy the property that they can't use for it's sic intended purpose.

THE COURT: That may be but —

MR. BREETZ: What the Court has done by prohibiting the purchaser from using the property for its intended purposes is effectively prevent the sale from going forward. The State is certainly not going to provide funds to purchase a permanent family residence if it cannot be used as a permanent family residence. And that is certainly the effect of the Court's order.

THE COURT: My order does not preclude the sale of that house. That's all I'm saying.

Id. at 42-44.

Judge Sullivan also heard argument on defendants' motion to dismiss. The sole basis for the motion, as the Court can glean from the record, is the plaintiffs' alleged failure to exhaust their administrative remedies by applying to the City of New Haven Zoning Board for an advisory ruling. The defendants thus contended that Judge Sullivan lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action. Id. at 28. Judge Sullivan denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewal at the close of the hearing. Id. at 45.

Judge Sullivan next inquired into the disabilities of the children who would be moving onto the property with Ms. Eichler. Defendants' counsel refused to divulge this information claiming that a state statute prohibited him from disclosing publicly the nature of the children's handicapped conditions. Id. at 46.

THE COURT: to Mr. Breetz I'm going to tell you right now, I want to know what that disability is. This hearing is going to be very short if I don't find out what it is.

MR. BREETZ: Your Honor, I cannot tell you because I would be in violation of state law if I —

THE COURT: You'll be in violation of a court order if you don't tell me.

MR. BREETZ: Your Honor, I cannot tell you.

* * * * * *

MR. BERLINER counsel for Mr. Dober: As Attorney Breetz has pointed out, there may be statutes on confidentiality, which we hope to cure upon reconvening, hopefully after lunch.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: Okay. And you're saying that at 2:00 o'clock you think you will have a case that will cure this problem, is that what you're saying?

MR. BERLINER: I will confer with Mr. Breetz, and I would hope that we would have an answer for the Court.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: I'll wait for you at 2:00 o'clock.

* * * * * *

MR. BREETZ: Your Honor, I ask you to recognize that I'm not one who lightly ignores a court order. This is a very serious matter.

THE COURT: What's your citation, what's your authority for not divulging this?

MR. BREETZ: Your Honor, I would prefer to discuss at least that aspect in chambers.

THE COURT: I'm asking you, do you have authority?

MR. BREETZ: I believe I have authority, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, What is it? What's the statutory cite or the case cite? That's all I'm asking you. I have a law clerk right over there that's going to go check these out, that why I'm asking you.

Id. at 46-47, 57-58, 75-76. Judge Sullivan then recessed for lunch.

On returning from the lunch recess, rather than providing the legal authority for preserving the confidentiality of the disabilities, defendants informed Judge Sullivan that they had removed the case to this Court, divesting...