Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd.

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CHAPMAN, Justice.
• Citation: Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 194 So. 269, 141 Fla. 899 (Fla. 1940)
• Decision Date: 23 February 1940
• Parties: ROBINSON v. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING & LAUNDRY BOARD.

194 So. 269

141 Fla. 899

ROBINSON v. FLORIDA DRY CLEANING & LAUNDRY BOARD.

Florida Supreme Court

February 23, 1940

En Banc.

Suit by Harold N. Robinson, doing business as the Seminole Laundry against the Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, a political body existing under chapter 17894, Laws of Florida challenging the constitutional validity of the act designed to regulate the cleaning, dying, pressing, and laundry industries. From decree upholding the validity of the act the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis, judge.

COUNSEL

J. Tom Watson, of Tampa, for appellant.

Rogers, Towers & Bailey, C. C. Bailey, and Taylor Jones, all of Jacksonville, for appellee.

OPINION

CHAPMAN Justice.

This case presents for determination certain questions challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 17894, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937. Many constitutional questions concerning Chapter 17894, supra, have been considered and settled by this court. See Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759, 119 A.L.R. 956; Economy Cash & Carry Laundry, Inc. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 136 Fla. 243, 186 So. 422; Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380; State ex rel. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board v. Atkinson, 136 Fla. 528, 188 So. 834; Economy Cash & Carry Cleaners v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, Fla., 190 So. 31; Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board v. Everglades Laundry, Fla., 190 So. 33. It is contended on this record that the grounds of reasons assigned for the unconstitutionality of Chapter 17894, supra, were not presented and were not considered or determined by court when the act was before the court as shown by the cases supra. Counsel contends that additional constitutional questions, not previously considered, can be presented and relies upon Jordan v. State ex rel. Davis, 100 Fla. 493, 128 So. 35; DiLustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898; State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394, and other cited authorities.

It is contended that certain grants of power to the Laundry Board on the part of the Legislature render Chapter 17894, supra, invalid and that same is a local measure and contravenes Sections 20 and 21 of Article 3 of the Constitution of Florida, and the provisions are, viz:

'(a) To supervise and regulate the entire cleaning, dyeing, pressing and laundry industry of the State of Florida;

'(b) To classify and establish definite trade areas, and provided definite rules, regulations and charges therefor;

'(c) To establish health and sanitary requirements;

'(d) To fix minimum and maximum prices, or either, for services in separate trade areas in connection with the industry thereby regulated;

'(e) To establish rules and regulations;

'(f) To fix rules and regulations for the conduct of the Board's business, and for the regulation of its employees;

'(g) To issue, assess and collect County and State licenses; and to define and establish definitions and classifications for licenses and services, and types of services for the business, and for employees reasonably connected therewith;

'(h) To require examination of license applicants to test their general fitness to engage in such businesses;

'(i) To revoke, suspend, issue or refuse to issue the license of any person, firm or corporation there under, under given circumstances;

'(j) To issue and collect for licenses;

'(k) To regulate all other matters reasonably incidental to the general or specific powers therein recited;

'(l) To establish rules and regulations for holding hearings in keeping with the procedure thereby authorized;

'(m) To issue subpoenas requiring persons to appear before the Board for the purpose of giving testimony and producing evidence;

'(n) To require the production of books, papers or accounts at Board hearings;

'(o) To establish rules and regulations for the issuance and service of such subpoenas;

'(p) To administer oaths, make investigations, conduct hearings and take testimony in connection with the investigation of complaints, or in the exercise of the main functions of said Board;

'(q) The said Board is also authorized and empowered to classify certain types of business, to-wit: new laundrymen, itinerant laundrymen, temporary or transient laundrymen, or dry cleaners, and all other laundrymen and dry cleaners embraced within the terms of said Act into 'reasonable classifications and require higher or different license fees from such type or proprietors than other licensed proprietors'; and to issue and collect for such licenses.

'(r) Said Board is also clothed with power to prescribe rules and regulations for the assessing and collecting of license fees, for the classification and defining of various services and those engaged in the business attempted to be regulated by the Act, and to provide all necessary machinery for prompt collection of any and all license fees assessed, and may take all steps reasonable and necessary as authorized in said law to prevent any person performing any service within the purview of said law without first taking out or paying the license fees prescribed and required, including the alleged right and power to seek an injunction without notice against persons, firms or corporations liable for such license;

'(s) Said Board is also authorized to classify licenses, and to issue licenses limited to particular trade area or areas in the State, and to make each or several Counties embraced within its purview a separate and distinct trade area; and said Board has made a trade area or each of such counties, except Pinellas, which has been made into three trade areas, as will be more definitely described hereinafter.'

It is first contended that the act offends Section 20 of Article 3 of the Constitution in that it is limited in its operation to counties in Florida containing 17,500 population or more, and that the act allows the Laundry Board to create an area within the City of Jacksonville, Miami or Tampa, including a part or either of these cities; or areas, may be made of several counties or several areas may be created in one county. It is pointed out that the Laundry Board administering the act has created three areas in Pinellas County. The answer to the contention that the act is unreasonable because the basis of classification is by counties where the population is 17,500 or more, is fully expressed by this court in Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, text page 13, 183 So. 759, text page 764, 119 A.L.R. 956, where this court said:

'The fact that the act assaulted is limited in its application to counties of more than 17,500 population goes to the question of classification and is not deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 141 So. 153; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 109 Fla. 477, 147 So. 463, 149 So. 8; State et al. v. Minge et al., 119 Fla. 515, 160 So. 670.'

The bill of complaint alleges that the plaintiff, Harold N. Robinson, doing business as The Seminole Laundry, for many years has been engaged in the laundry and dry cleaning business in the City of Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. The plaintiff here challenges the administration of Chapter 17894 by the Laundry Board in the Pinellas County areas, while his place of business is situated in Hillsborough County. There is no allegation, or allegations, in the bill of complaint to the effect that he will be affected by or is prejudiced in some manner by the enforcement of the act in Pinellas County. It is settled law that the constitutionality of an act cannot be questioned by a party whose rights are not affected. It has not been shown or made to appear that the rights of the plaintiff will be affected while operating his laundry in Hillsborough County and his trade, in whole or in part, is not drawn from one of the areas in Pinellas County. The plaintiff failed to show that his interests were adversely affected and therefore is not in a position to be heard in this court on the question. See In re DeWoody, 94 Fla. 96, 113 So. 677; Ex parte Smith, 100 Fla. 1, 128 So. 864; County Com'rs v. State, 24 Fla. 55, 3 So. 471, 12 Am.St.Rep. 183; Boyd v. State, 33 Fla. 316, 14 So. 836; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann.Cas.1918A, 138; Stinson v. State, 63 Fla. 42, 58 So. 722; Gill v. Wilder, 95 Fla. 901, 116 So. 870; Land v. State 77 Fla. 212, 81 So. 159; State v. Johnson, 102 Fla. 19, 135 So. 816; Sebring v. Wolf, 105 Fla. 516, 141 So. 736.

Counsel for appellant contends that Chapter 17894 confers on the Laundry Board an unconstitutional licensing power and thereby offends Section 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution of Florida, relating to uniformity of taxation, and Section 17 of Article 5, making it the duty of the County Judge to issue all licenses required by law to be issued in the county. Section 7 of Chapter 17894 provides that in order to regulate the industry and to provide funds for the administration of the act the Laundry Board shall have authority to collect from all those engaged in the service and industry as defined in the act license fees in the amount named. It will be observed that the authority to impose license fees on those engaged in the business is for the purpose of regulation and the expense of administration of the act by the Board. It is not an act to raise money for governmental purposes, and uniformity of taxation is not required, neither does this contention have any application to an excise or license tax as imposed by this act. We are not here considering an ad valorem tax upon property which may require uniformity under Section 1 of Article 9...