Robinson v. Gen. Motors LLC

• Decision Date: 19 July 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-663-RGA-SRF
• Parties: CRYSTAL ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

CRYSTAL ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiff,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-663-RGA-SRF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

July 19, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the court in this product liability putative class action is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by defendant, General Motors LLC ("GM"). (D.I. 31) For the following reasons, I recommend that the court GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART GM's motion to dismiss.¹

II. BACKGROUND²

On May 15, 2020, nineteen plaintiffs, Crystal Robinson ("Robinson"), Richard Schellhammer ("Schellhammer"), William Braden ("Braden"), Earl Kladke ("Kladke"), Joseph Palopoli, Jr. ("Palopoli"), Lana Savage ("Savage"), April Bradley ("Bradley"), John Toda ("Toda"), Maxine Glenn ("Glenn"), Nicole Blanchard ("Blanchard"), Gladys Tubbs ("Tubbs"),

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Tonya Gruchacz ("Gruchacz"), Robert Tyson ("Tyson"), Katrina Howard ("Howard"), Sheila Cauthen ("Cauthen"), Mariano Lorenzo Macaisa ("Macaisa"), Gini Michelle Cox ("Cox"), Kendra Piazza ("Piazza"), and David Conroe ("Conroe") (collectively, but excluding Braden,³ "Plaintiffs"), filed a putative class action complaint against GM.⁴ (D.I. 1) Plaintiffs are citizens of Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia who purchased new, used, or certified pre-owned model year 2013 through 2017 Cadillac ATS, SRX, or XTS vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-38)

In 2011, GM began advertising the "Cadillac User Experience" (the "CUE"), a proprietary "infotainment"⁵ system. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-51) The CUE was installed on Cadillac ATS, SRX, and XTS models from 2013 to 2017 and Cadillac ELR and Escalade models from 2014 to 2017 (collectively, the "Class Vehicles"). (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 62) The CUE controls the vehicle's climate, navigation system, audio (radio, CD player, etc.), and backup camera. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-61) Users can also pair their cellular phones to the CUE through Bluetooth and use the CUE's voice recognition⁶ function to initiate and answer calls without using their hands. (Id. at ¶¶ 56, 58) Except for the backup camera, most of the systems controlled by the CUE require use of the CUE's touch screen interface, which "is built into the top of the vehicle's central instrument panel." (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 62) However, the backup camera does not require a user to touch an icon

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on the touch screen. (Id. at ¶ 62) "[W]henever the vehicle is placed in Reverse" the CUE's touch screen "converts into a video-type panel" and shows "the area behind the vehicle." (Id.)

The CUE's touch screen is comprised of two major components: (1) a "projected capacitance touch screen," which is a "glass sheet with electrode patterns on both sides," and (2) "a plastic cover with channels" that "sits in front of the projected capacitance touch screen and is the physical screen a user touches." (Id. at ¶¶ 67-69) Between these two components is a "silicone-like material." (Id. at ¶ 70) Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is defective because "the plastic cover is prone to delaminating or separating from the touch screen glass" as a result of the mechanical or thermal stress "commonly experienced during normal operation of a vehicle." (Id. at ¶¶ 71-72) When this delamination occurs, "the silicone-like material coalesces and forms a spider-web-like pattern on the display," preventing "a user's touch from being registered."⁷ (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that design of the CUE system is defective in various ways: First, the configuration of the screws fastening the plastic cover to the touch screen—six placed at the top of the screen and two at the bottom—causes the bottom portion of the plastic cover to "flex and move when pressure is applied" and "allows too much movement to occur," which eventually leads to spider-webbing and failure. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-77) Second, the cut of the rubber gasket on the plastic cover "allows for a gap between the touch screen and the plastic cover." (Id. at ¶ 77) The gap "prevents a user's inputs from being registered by the touch screen" and "allows for more flexibility in the plastic cover, which leads to the spider-webbing defect." (Id.) Third, and last, the plastic cover delaminates or separates as a result of temperature fluctuations because the

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materials comprising the touch screen assembly have different "thermal expansion coefficients." (Id. at ¶¶ 78-83)

Plaintiffs claim that the Defect creates a safety risk and causes an unsafe driving distraction. (Id. at ¶¶ 84-89) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert when drivers try to use the CUE they arc unable to read or see it clearly, become frustrated with and focused on the malfunctioning display, and are required to remove their hands from the wheel more often for longer periods. (Id. at ¶¶ 88-89) Plaintiffs also assert that the Defect "distorts or masks the backup camera's images, rendering the camera unusable." (Id. at ¶¶ 86-87) Plaintiffs note that backup cameras are a required safety feature in all cars. (Id. at ¶ 87)

Plaintiffs allege that "GM knew, or should have known, about the Defect" before it sold the Class Vehicles through various sources, including the following:

pre-release testing data; early consumer complaints about the Defect to GM's dealers who are their agents for vehicle repairs; warranty claim data related to the Defect; aggregate data from GM's dealers; consumer complaints to the NHTSA and resulting notice from NHTSA; dealership repair orders; testing conducted in response to owner or lessee complaints; GM service bulletins applicable to the Class Vehicles; and other internal sources of aggregate information about the problem.

(Id. at ¶ 90) Plaintiffs cite four "Technical Service Bulletins" ("TSBs") that GM issued to its dealers, but not its customers, which acknowledge the existence of the Defect as early as December of 2014 as follows: "[s]ome customers may report that their radio screen appears bubbled, cracked, or is delaminating." (Id. at ¶¶ 97-98) That same TSB directed technicians to "replace the . . . Integrated Center Stack" when confronted with the Defect and "included a 'Warranty Information' section with a specific Labor Operation code for technicians to use" when performing such work. (Id. at ¶ 98) Plaintiffs also cite customer complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), with whom "GM maintains an

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open dialogue," as further evidence that GM had knowledge of the Defect. (Id. at ¶¶ 105-08) Plaintiffs also cite specific posts on Internet forums by customers who complained about experiencing the Defect, to which GM customer care representatives responded. (Id. at ¶¶ 109-11) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that GM was aware of the Defect "based on the large number of repairs performed to the CUE System's exhibiting delamination and spider-webbing at its network of dealerships." (Id. at ¶ 115)

This case was filed following the dismissal of the non-California plaintiffs in Goldstein v. Gen. Motors LLC, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1000 (S.D. Cal. 2020) due to lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs allege thirty causes of action arising from six types of claims: breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), breach of express and implied warranties under various state laws, violations of various state consumer protection laws, fraudulent concealment, and unjust enrichment. (Id. at ¶¶ 362-775) Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated as members of the "proposed Classes" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (Id. at ¶ 347) The "proposed Classes" include: the Nationwide Class (also referred to as the "Class"), the Alabama Sub-Class, the Florida Sub-Class, the Indiana Sub-Class, the Kansas Sub-Class, the Maryland Sub-Class, the Michigan Sub-Class, the New Jersey Sub-Class, the New Jersey TCCWNA Sub-Class,⁸ the New York Sub-Class, the North Carolina Sub-Class, the Texas Sub-Class, the Texas DTPA Sub-Class,⁹ and the West Virginia Sub-Class. (Id.

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at ¶ 348) In each state sub-class, Plaintiffs seek to represent "[a]ll persons and entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle" in that state.¹⁰ (Id.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Umland v. Planco Fin. Servs. Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.

The court's determination is not whether the non-moving party "will ultimately prevail," but whether that party is "entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). This "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage," but instead "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the necessary element]."

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