Robinson v. Greystone Alliance, LLC

• Decision Date: 28 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. BPG-10-3658
• Parties: PIPER ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. GREYSTONE ALLIANCE, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

PIPER ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. GREYSTONE ALLIANCE, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. BPG-10-3658

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Dated: June 28, 2011

MEMORANDUM

The above-referenced case was referred to the undersigned for all proceedings with the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 301.4. (ECF No. 11.) Currently pending is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum (ECF Nos. 15 & 15-1), to which no opposition has been filed.¹ No hearing is deemed necessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons discussed herein, defendant's motion (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in the District Court of Maryland for Washington County on November 30, 2010, alleging that Greystone Alliance, LLC ("Greystone"), a collection agency based in Getzville, NY, "illegally and maliciously accessedthe personal credit bureau record of Plaintiff on Trans Union, a consumer-reporting agency, and caused an injury." (ECF No. 2 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further alleges that since he "does not have a business relationship with Defendant, has not applied for employment, credit terms, nor does [he] have a collection account with Defendant," Greystone did not have a "permissible purpose" for accessing his personal credit history. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff claims that he sent Greystone letters stating that the inquiry on his credit report was fraudulent, but no action was taken. (Civil Continuation Sheet, Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Greystone violated: (1) the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),15 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq.; (2) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; (3) the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq.;² (4) the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301 et seq.; and the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act ("MCALA"), Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 7-101 et seq.³ (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff also seeks damages for loss of opportunity,⁴ defamation, and negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 15-31.) Defendant removed to this Court on December 30, 2010. (ECF No. 1.)

In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Greystone asserts that it was referred plaintiff's delinquent account for collection by Arrow Financial Services,LLC ("Arrow"). (ECF No. 15-1 at 2 (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶ 3).) Greystone claims that it "requested information from Trans Union to assist [it] in locating Robinson" and that "Trans Union provided an address and telephone number for Robinson." (Id. (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶ 5).) Greystone sent a letter to plaintiff, which was "not returned to Greystone as undeliverable," and attempted to contact plaintiff by telephone, but was unable to reach him. (Id. (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶¶ 6, 7).) Greystone further claims that it "never received any written communication from Robinson via mail, email or facsimile." (Id. (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶ 8).) Greystone asserts that it "did not furnish information concerning Plaintiff's Arrow account to any credit reporting agency." (Id. (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶ 9).) After Greystone was unable to reach plaintiff, Arrow recalled his account, and Greystone took no further action. (Id. (citing Frisicaro Aff. ¶ 10).)

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).⁵ A genuine dispute remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The only facts that are properly considered "material" are those that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views all facts and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec.Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The non-moving party, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must show that specific, material facts exist to create a genuine, triable issue. Id.; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). On those issues for which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to oppose the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other admissible evidence specified in the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993). If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

Where, as here, the nonmoving party fails to respond, the court may not automatically grant summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). While the party's failure to respond "may leave uncontroverted those facts established by the motion," the court must nonetheless "review the motion . . . and determine from what it has before it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's FCRA Claims

1. § 1681b

Plaintiff alleges that Greystone violated the FCRA because it did not have a "permissible purpose" for accessing his personal credit record. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 7.) The FCRA was enacted to protect consumers from inaccurate or arbitrary credit reporting. Korotki v. Attorney Servs. Corp. Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D. Md. 1996). Section 1681b of the FCRA limits the purposes for and circumstances under which a consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report.15 U.S.C. § 1681b.

Greystone argues that it is not subject to liability under this provision because it is not a "consumer reporting agency," and only "consumer reporting agencies" are regulated by § 1681b. (ECF No. 15-1 at 5-6.) The Fourth Circuit, however, has interpreted § 1681b to apply broadly to users of consumer credit information, including debt collectors. Yohay v. Alexandria Emps. Credit Union, Inc., 827 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Korotki, 931 F. Supp at 1275-76 ("[T]he Fourth Circuit has concluded that users of consumer reports also must comply with § 1681b. . . . Thus, whether defendants are users or consumer reporting agencies, they could only obtain Korotki's credit report if they had a permissible purpose."). Accordingly, this argument fails.

Alternatively, Greystone argues that it had a "permissible purpose" for obtaining plaintiff's contact information from Trans Union because it was attempting to collect plaintiff's delinquent account. (ECF No. 15-1 at 4-5 (citing § 1681b(a)(3)(A)).) Section 1681b(a)(3)(A) of the FCRA states that a consumer credit report is furnished for a "permissible purpose" where the party requesting the report "intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).

Debt collection is a permissible purpose for obtaining a consumer credit report under the FCRA. See Korotki, 931 F. Supp. at 1276 (use of a credit report to obtain an address at which to serve consumer to collect a debt was a "permissible purpose" under the FCRA); Robinson v. TSYS Total Debt Mgmt, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (D. Md. 2006); Shah v. Collecto, Inc., 2005 WL 2216242, at *12 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2005) (collection agency permissibly obtainedcredit report to pursue debt collection against plaintiff). As long as the debt collector has "reason to believe" that the consumer owes the debt, the debt collector may permissibly obtain the consumer's credit report without violating the FCRA. Korotki, 931 F. Supp. at 1276 ("reason to believe" standard applies in evaluating whether user had permissible purpose). Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that Greystone obtained his credit information for some purpose other than collection of Plaintiff's debt or that Greystone did not have "reason to believe" that plaintiff's debt was valid. Accordingly, Greystone is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

2. § 1681s-2(a)

Plaintiff alleges that he sent Greystone four letters notifying it that its inquiry into his credit record was fraudulent and that Greystone received the letters but failed to act on them. (ECF No. 2 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that Greystone's conduct gives rise to a violation of FCRA § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A), which provides that "[a] person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate." (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Greystone violated § 1681s-2(a)(1)(B), which prohibits a person from furnishing "information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if (i) the person has been notified by the consumer . . . that specific information is inaccurate; and (ii) the information is, in fact, inaccurate." (Id.)

Plaintiff has no cause of action for alleged violations of § 1681s-2(a), as the FCRA expressly reserves the enforcement of § 1681s-2(a) to federal and state officers. ⁶ See 15 U.S.C.§ 1681s-2(c) & (d). Section 1681s-2(c) states that the FCRA sections establishing a private right of action for noncompliance, §§ 1681n and 1681o, do not apply to violations of § 1681s-2(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c). Further, § 1681s-2(d) provides that "[[s]ubsection (a)] of this section . . . shall be enforced exclusively as provided under ...