Robinson v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 29 June 1911
• Citation: 56 So. 124,173 Ala. 372
• Parties: ROBINSON v. GRIFFIN ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

56 So. 124

173 Ala. 372

ROBINSON v. GRIFFIN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 29, 1911

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Mobile County; Saffold Berney Judge.

Suit by William Griffin and others against Allen Robinson. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Webb &amp McAlpine, for appellant.

Boyles & Kohn, for appellees.

MAYFIELD J.

Appellee filed this bill, individually and as administrator of the estate of Carrie Woods, alias Carrie Robinson, deceased against the appellant; and seeks the cancellation of two deeds by Carrie Woods to the respondent, and the surrender and delivery, by the respondent, of $1,500 belonging to the estate of complainant's intestate, which sum, the bill alleges, was fraudulently appropriated by the respondent to his own use. The bill further alleges that the intestate, Carrie Woods, died on March 9, 1908, leaving complainant, appellee, as her sole heir and next of kin--he being her half-brother, and having been appointed administrator of her estate. The bill then alleges that in the lifetime of the intestate she was seised and possessed of considerable money and real estate; that cómplainant as such administrator had taken possession of said real estate, but had been unable to obtain possession of either the money in question or the lands conveyed by the deeds sought to be canceled, because of the wrongs of the respondent complained of in the bill. The bill then alleges, in substance, that the respondent, through fraud and deceit, procured the conveyance to himself, from Carrie Woods, of the money in question, which belonged to the estate, and converted it to his own use. Demurrer having been sustained to the original bill, it was amended by adding the paragraph numbered 8, alleging that if the deeds were executed by Carrie Woods, the grantor and grantee, at the time of their execution, were living together in an unlawful state or relationship, and that her signature to such deeds was procured by fraud and undue influence on the part of the respondent. A demurrer being sustained to the bill as last amended, it was further amended by adding that the complainant and his two children were the only blood relations of Carrie Woods; that complainant had been reared, from childhood, by Carrie Woods, who was his half-sister. The bill then alleges that notwithstanding this blood relationship between complainant and decedent, there existed at the time of her death, and had existed for many years prior thereto, a much closer relationship--that of illicit intimacy--between decedent and the respondent; that during that time she assumed the name of Robinson, instead of her own name, Woods; that the deeds sought to be canceled were made without any consideration and constituted a gift by the intestate to the respondent; that her signature to the deeds was not of her own free act and volition, but was procured and superinduced by undue influence on the part of the respondent. If this bill had been filed merely to recover the $1,500, or to compel its payment, or to recover that amount from the respondent, it would be without equity and subject to demurrer, for the reason that it would affirmatively show that the complainant had a complete and adequate remedy at law; but the restoration of the money is sought, for that it was obtained in furtherance, and as a part, of the alleged fraudulent scheme and purpose of the respondent to procure the property of the intestate; and this feature of the bill is sought to be maintained only upon the ground that the court, having acquired jurisdiction for one purpose, should proceed to do complete justice between the parties in one suit.

The bill does allege some connection or relation between the acts of the respondent in procuring the deeds, and those in procuring the money; and while, of course, they are separated by a considerable lapse of time (the one culmmating during the lifetime of the intestate, and the other, after her death), yet the relation or connection shown between the two wrongs complained of, is sufficient to authorize relief as to the taking of the money, provided the main equity of the bill is made out as for the cancellation of the deeds. Moreover, the demurrer did not go to this part of the bill only, but went to the entire bill, to the effect that it showed that the complainant had a complete and adequate remedy at law. Had the demurrer been directed to that part of the bill only which seeks the recovery of the $1,500, we are not prepared to say that it should not have been sustained. If the fourth ground of demurrer could be said to go to that part of the bill only, which seeks to recover the money, it is sufficient to say that it is not insisted upon. The only grounds insisted upon by counsel are the first and sixth. The entire demurrer to the original and the amended bills, however, was addressed to the bills as a whole, and not to any particular part.

The address of each of the demurrers was as follows: First demurrer: "Comes now the respondent and demurs to the original bill." Second: Comes the respondent and demurs to the amended bill heretofore filed." Third: "Comes the complainant and demurs to the amended bill heretofore filed."

The word complainant is here used evidently as meaning "respondent," and we treat it as a clerical error.

Each of the demurrers was addressed to the bill as a whole, and not to any part of it and the bill as a whole was clearly not subject to any one of the grounds of demurrer insisted upon in the argument of counsel for appellant. The court therefore committed no error in overruling the demurrer to the bill as last amended. After the demurrers were overruled, the respondent answered, denying the equity of the bill, paragraph by paragraph, and set up few if any affirmative facts as a defense--thereby placing the burden of proof upon complainant.

A great many witnesses were examined on behalf of each party; and the case was submitted for final decree, upon the bill, the answer, and the proof as noted by the register. The chancellor rendered a decree granting the relief prayed in the bill; and from that final decree the respondent prosecutes this appeal. After a careful reading of all the evidence shown in this record, we are unable to concur in the conclusion reached by the chancellor that the complainant was entitled to the relief prayed in his bill and awarded in the chancellor's decree.

The burden was on the complainant, of course, to prove the material averments of his bill, but we do not think that he has discharged that burden, either as to all the material facts alleged, or as to those which would be necessary to support the relief sought and awarded.

It is true that after complainant proved the confidential relation between the grantor and the grantee, the burden of proof as to undue influence was shifted; but the evidence of respon...