Robinson v. Harford County Com'rs

• Decision Date: 17 June 1858
• Citation: 12 Md. 132
• Parties: MARY ROBINSON, AND OTHERS, v. THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR HARFORD COUNTY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

12 Md. 132

MARY ROBINSON, AND OTHERS, v. THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR HARFORD COUNTY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jun. 17, 1858

A valuation of a convicted slave was made by the judge on the same day of the sentence, and nine days thereafter, and during the same term, the county commissioners filed a petition asking the judge to correct the valuation, upon the ground that it was erroneously made too high, for reasons stated, and the court passed an order setting the petition down for hearing, with liberty to the owners and the commissioners to take testimony. Under this order affidavits were taken and filed by both parties, and upon them, the successor of the judge who tried the case, two years after the sentence, revised the valuation and fixed it at a less sum. HELD:

That the county commissioners had the right to file the petition and there was no error in the proceeding in reference to the second valuation, there being nothing to show that the delay was occasioned more by the fault of the commissioners than of the owners, and the succeeding judge having the same authority over the case as his predecessor.

The amount of the valuation, under the act of 1809, ch 138, sec. 21, of a slave convicted of a felony, is a matter within the discretion of the court in which the case is tried, and, therefore, is not the subject of an appeal or of revision by the Court of Appeals.

The owners of such slave have no right to appeal from any action of the court in reference to the sentence of the negro, the State and the negro being the only parties who can ask the appellate court to review such action.

The fact that a rule of court purports to be set out in one of the reasons filed with a motion to dismiss a petition, is not sufficient proof to the appellate court of the existence of such a rule.

As a general rule, the judgment of a court of record is, during the entire term at which it is rendered, under the control of the court, and liable to be stricken out, altered, or amended.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Harford county.

This appeal was taken by the owners from an order of the court below, (PRICE, J.,) in reference to the valuation of a negro slave, convicted of a larceny. All the proceedings and facts in the case are fully stated in the opinion of this court.

The cause was argued before LE GRAND, C. J., ECCLESTON, TUCK and BARTOL, J.

Otho Scott for the appellants:

The questions in this case are not to be settled by precedents. This is the first attempt, that I am aware of, to set aside the valuation of a convicted slave. The act of 1809, ch. 138 sec. 21, requires the court, immediately after conviction, to value the slave, and the law makes this valuation conclusive. There is no mode of revision. Whether a judge, if he ascertains his valuation was grossly wrong either way, that is, too high or too low, might not immediately correct it, is not discussed. This is not such a case. Here the application for revision was not made till a month afterwards, nor until the court had risen, and the second valuation was not made until two years after the conviction. If Judge Constable had revised his own valuation, there would have been more of plausibility in it, though it would seem that he would have had no more right to do so than a jury of inquest would have to alter their verdict a month after. But for another judge, two years afterwards, to modify the valuation, and sentence the negro anew, seems to be without precedent or principle. The judge who tries the case has the negro before him, values him from personal inspection and inquiry made at the time. This furnishes a much better opportunity for forming a correct judgment than an inspection after two years' imprisonment. The law intends the negro to be valued at the time of the sentence, and necessarily by the same judge; it says immediately. Suppose a special judge to try, would another judge have, two years after, a right to rescind the sentence and valuation? Judge Constable, by his order of the 2nd of December, did not rescind the sentence. The negro was sentenced on the 23rd of November 1853, and Judge Price set aside the sentence two years after. He had no power to disturb the judgment, and could not make a valuation immediately thereafter.

In favor of the first valuation we have the opinion of Judge Constable, the affidavits of Hays, Campbell, Burke, and others. Campbell, who deals in negroes, and knows more of their value than any other witness, says the negro was worth, in his then condition, $750. Dallam, the sheriff, was offered $500; so that it will be seen, by the proof, that the valuation was not too high. A convicted negro is valued as if his morals were good. If it were otherwise, as some of the witnesses evidently suppose, then a murderer, or other atrocious offender, would not be valued at any thing. Convicted negroes are always valued at the " price the traders give for negroes of similar qualities which have not been convicted." But few, if any, of the States allow convicts to be introduced. Hence conviction injures the sale, though it does not affect the valuation. If a negro is to be hung, he is valued as if he were a slave in the market, free from crime. The amount a convict sells for, therefore, is no test of value; it is common for them to sell for less than half what they are valued at. Reference to the affidavits will show that the valuation ought to have been $750; the negro was one of uncommon value. Besides, in this case, the owner lost two years' services, worth, according to the uncontradicted testimony, $100 per year, and this after the negro was convicted.

Again, as every one has notice of what is done in court, if such a proceeding as this could be had, it ought to be done within the time in which, according to the rule of court, motions in arrest of judgment, or for new trials, are allowed to be made. The valuation must be made at the time of the sentence, nor can the sentence be long delayed. The negro might die, escape from jail, and many accidents might happen which would deprive the owner of the value of his negro. As soon as the slave is found guilty of felony, his master loses him, and is entitled to his value. He is like property taken for public purposes. The law requires an immediate valuation, and its whole object would be defeated, if such revisions as that made in this case were allowed. The motion to dismiss the petition ought to have prevailed; that the overruling of that motion was error; and the new sentence and valuation is erroneous; and it is therefore insisted, on the part of the appellants:

1st. That the judge who passes the sentence must value the slave, and no other judge, at a subsequent period, can alter the valuation.

2nd. That the order of Judge Price was erroneous, because it professes to sentence the negro, when he had been sentenced two years before.

3rd. That the negro could not be valued two years after his conviction and sentence.

4th. That the petition to revise the valuation of the negro was not made in time.

5th. That the petition to revise ought to have been dismissed, for the reasons stated in the appellants' motion to dismiss it.

6th. That the valuation was not so excessive as to justify setting it aside.

7th. That the appellees, not being parties to the suit, had no right to file the petition.

Henry W. Archer for the appellees:

The appellants contend that our petition was not filed in time. Their counsel, in his argument, says it was filed one month after the judgment. The record, after reciting the judgment, says: " And thereupon" (which, if it means any thing, means immediately after the judgment) the appellees filed their petition. The order suspending the judgment, was passed on the 2nd of December 1853, so that the petition or motion to suspend must have been filed before that date. It was, in fact, filed immediately after the commissioners had notice, and although the court had adjourned, it was only from day to day, and was open on the 2nd of December for the transaction of business. The petition was certainly filed during the term, which is sufficient; for nothing is better settled than that the court has full power over its own judgments during the entire term at which they are passed, and that the term extends to the first day of the next succeeding term. It is the universal practice, on the first day of each term, to call the preceding term, for the purpose of hearing such motions.

But it is said, the time for making such motions is restricted by a rule of court. To this we might say, there is no such rule. We have the appellants' statement of what purports to be a rule, but it does not appear authoritatively by the record that there is any such rule of court as they have quoted. There was such a rule of the old county court but we are not aware that it has been adopted by the circuit court, and nothing short of a distinct, positive, formally adopted rule, can, we think, deprive the court of power over its judgments during the entire term. But ours was not a motion in arrest of judgment, and the rule relied on has no application to it. A motion in arrest of judgment is in the nature of a general demurrer, and is applicable only to intrinsic defects apparent upon the face of the record. It is a motion that no judgment be entered. Evans' Practice, 331. 2 Tidd's Practice, 948. But here we admit the regularity and correctness of the whole proceeding up to the judgment, and only asked the suspension and modification of it. The motion was based upon matter extrinsic. The allegation of the petition is, that an imposition had been practised upon the court, a suppressio veri as to the true condition of the slave, which materially affected his valuation, and we...