Robinson v. Horton
| Decision Date | 28 April 1941 |
| Docket Number | 35981 and 35982. |
| Citation | 2 So.2d 647,197 La. 919 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | ROBINSON v. HORTON et al. SAME v. SCHNITT et al. |
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1941.
Goff, Goff & Caskey, of Arcadia, for plaintiff and appellant.
Seals & Atkins, of Homer, and T. H. McEachern of Homer, for defendants and appellees.
Mrs. Flora S Robinson instituted two jactitation or slander of title suits, one against A. Schnitt, H. L. Lasker, Sofia Theo, J K. Theo, and E. D. Rhea, the other against W. H. Horton, M D. Harris, E. H. Fortson, E. D. Rhea, Mrs. Dollie Kirby Rhea, A. J. Hodges, and L. M. Moffitt, to have the two instruments by which she transferred mineral rights affecting property woned by her in fee to J. A. Watson and to C. G. Watson, from whom the defendants in these two suits deraign their respective titles, and the mesne conveyances thereunder ordered cancelled from the conveyance records of the Parish of Claiborne, because of the non-use of the servitudes transferred thereunder for a period of ten years.
The first mentioned suit was dismissed as to E. D. Rhea and the second was dismissed as to M. D. Harris, E. D. Rhea, and Mrs. Dollie Kirby Rhea. Both suits were converted into petitory actions, the defendants in each case asserting that their rights under the mineral grants sought to be declared extinguished were preserved by virtue of a joint lease or pooling agreement executed on January 4, 1935, by the plaintiff and all of the then mineral owners, including the defendants (or their predecessors in title) in both suits, under the provisions of which contract oil was being produced in paying quantities at the time of the institution of the suits from a well drilled on a portion of the land covered by the lease.
The cases were consolidated for the purposes of trial and were submitted after the introduction of documentary evidence on agreed statements of facts. The trial judge rendered judgments in favor of the defendants, rejecting the plaintiff's demands in both instances, and she has appealed.
Plaintiff, who was the owner in fee of a tract of land situated in Claiborne Parish, comprising 355.33 acres, conveyed to J. A. Watson (from whom the defendants in the first mentioned suit deraign their title) by instrument dated February 3, 1930, 'One-Fourth (1/4) of the oil, gas and other minerals, in and under and that may be produced from' the NW1/4 of the SE1/4 of Section 33, Township 20 North, Range 5 West, and to C. G. Watson (from whom the defendants in the second suit deraign their title) by instrument dated February 24, 1930, a like mineral interest in the SE1/4 of the SW1/4 and the SW1/4 of the SE1/4 of the same section. On January 4, 1935, she (plaintiff), joined by the then owners of the said mineral interests, including the defendants in both suits or their predecessors in title, executed a lease contract with the United Gas Public Service Company, the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, and the Sugar Creek Syndicate, Inc., for the development of the 355.33 acre tract of land owned by her. Subsequently, by instrument dated September 2, 1937, the plaintiff confirmed and reaffirmed the lease of January 4, 1935, in all of its terms and conditions.
It is admitted that the lease was kept alive during its primary term by the payment of delay rentals. It is also admitted that on December 29, 1939, the Sugar Creek Syndicate, Inc., A. H. Southern, trustee, and the Triangle Drilling Company, having acquired the lease, began the drilling of an oil well on a portion of plaintiff's land covered by the lease on January 4, 1935. This well was not located on any portion of the property on which rests either of the two servitudes in controversy, but it was located on land covered by the lease, i. e., the land lying in the NE1/4 of the SE1/4 of Section 32, Township 20 North, Range 5 West. This well was completed on February 8, 1940, as a producer of in excess of 300 barrels of oil a day, which amount was being produced at the time these suits were filed.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in holding that the drilling of a well under the terms of the lease 'constituted such a use of the servitudes on all parts of the tract so as to interrupt the running of liberative prescription.' He argued both orally and in brief that 'In order to use a servitude so as to interrupt prescription it is necessary to use it in a manner contemplated by the grant or reservation whereby it was created.'
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that since the plaintiff entered into a joint lease with them, pooling her mineral interests with theirs and specifically agreeing that each should receive a pro rata share of the royalty that might be due from any portion of the land, irrespective of where the oil or gas was found, they are entitled to their share of the royalty due out of the oil produced from plaintiff's property under the terms of the lease, i. e., according to their interest as it appears in proportion to the entire mineral acreage, regardless of whether or not the well is on the property affected by their servitudes.
Under the express provisions of the Revised Civil Code and the jurisprudence thereunder, the rights of parties to a contract are to be governed by the intention of the parties thereto, as reflected by the terms thereof, and subject only to the law that controls the subject matter of the contract. Revised Civil Code, Articles 1945-1962; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 170 So. 785; Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439, 116 A.L.R. 1260; Cox v. Acme Land & Investment Co., 192 La. 688, 188 So. 742; and Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583.
In the Heyd case the question was whether or not the plaintiff had any royalty interest in the oil extracted from defendant's tract of land, no well having been drilled on its (plaintiff's) tract. It was argued that '* * * since there was no community, pooling or proportionate sharing clause in the lease, neither party is entitled to any royalty interest in oil produced from the land of the other.' In disposing of that issue we said [189 La. 903, 181 So. 442, 116 A.L.R. 1260]: * * *' (Italics ours.)
In the Acme Land & Investment Company case it was urged...
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