Robinson v. Horton

• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-1979,18-1979
• Parties: Lamarr ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Connie HORTON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

950 F.3d 337

Lamarr ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Connie HORTON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-1979

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 13, 2019

Decided and Filed: February 13, 2020

ARGUED: Steven D. Jaeger, THE JAEGER FIRM PLLC, Erlanger, Kentucky, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Berels, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Steven D. Jaeger, THE JAEGER FIRM PLLC, Erlanger, Kentucky, for Appellant. Linus Banghart-Linn, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. Lamarr Robinson, Kincheloe, Michigan, pro se.

Before: GILMAN, KETHLEDGE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case presents an unfortunate situation in which, despite the fact that the habeas petitioner has an unquestionably valid claim on the merits, procedural grounds preclude our ability to grant him relief. That petitioner, Lamarr Robinson, was convicted of various offenses by a Michigan trial court in 2011 and sentenced under Michigan’s then-existing sentencing scheme. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear his case. Robinson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court denied.

On appeal to this court, Robinson’s sole claim is that a series of judicial decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The state of Michigan does not contest that conclusion, but it does persuasively argue that Robinson is not entitled to habeas relief because he failed to exhaust his sentencing claim in state court. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the portion of the district court’s decision dealing with Robinson’s sentencing claim and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

"The facts as recited by the Michigan Court of Appeals are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)." Shimel v. Warren , 838 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2016). That court summarized the facts of Robinson’s case as follows:

A jury convicted the 39-year-old defendant of shooting 20-year-old Jamel Chubb at a Detroit gas station on May 13, 2010. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant and Chubb were both dating 19-year-old Jessica Taylor, whom defendant had been dating for a couple of years. Defendant learned about the relationship between Taylor and Chubb, and thereafter followed them on multiple occasions and sent several text messages to both Taylor and Chubb. On the day of the shooting, the men had a brief encounter at Taylor’s mother’s Livonia residence. Upon leaving, defendant told Taylor, "Don’t let me catch y’all in the hood." Later that day, Chubb, Taylor, Jasmine Miller, and Kayana Davies were all at Miller’s Detroit residence, and ultimately went to a local gas station. The gas station surveillance video captured an individual wearing a hoodie and riding a bike approach Chubb and shoot him as he was pumping gas. Taylor, who was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, identified defendant as the shooter. Cellular phone tracking evidence also placed defendant in the area of the gas station at the time of the shooting. The defense theory at trial was misidentification, and the defense argued, inter alia, that Taylor’s identification was not credible and the cell phone tracking evidence was not reliable.

People v. Robinson , No. 321841, 2015 WL 6438239, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2015) (per curiam).

B. Proceedings in state court

Robinson’s trial took place in January 2011, and he was sentenced the following month. A jury convicted Robinson of assault with intent to commit murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Id. At the time, Michigan had a complex sentencing regime in place, which this court has summarized as follows:

Michigan’s sentencing regime operated through the use of offense categories, dual axis scoring grids, minimum ranges, and a holistic focus on offender and offense characteristics. Generally speaking, the guidelines operate by "scoring" offense-related variables (OVs) and offender-related, prior-record variables (PRVs). These OV and PRV point totals are then inputted into the applicable sentencing grid to yield the guidelines range, within which judges choose a minimum sentence.

Loren Robinson v. Woods , 901 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations and footnotes omitted). In other words, Michigan trial judges found facts in order to "score" the OVs and PRVs, which in turn determined the minimum sentencing range for each offense.

The trial judge in Robinson’s case assessed points for a number of the relevant OVs. Robinson , 2015 WL 6438239, at *13. Robinson received a total of 181 OV points, placing him at OV Level VI on the applicable sentencing grid. Id. On this basis, the trial judge sentenced Robinson as a fourth habitual offender to "concurrent terms of 47-1/2 to 120 years’ imprisonment for the assault and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction." Id. at *1.

Robinson then appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising a variety of claims. In a supplemental brief before that court, he argued that he was entitled to resentencing on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). The Supreme Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by an impartial jury, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, "requires that each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 104, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (citing United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), and In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ). In Alleyne , the Court concluded that any fact that increases the mandatory-minimum sentence for an offense is an element of that offense that must be submitted to a jury for consideration. Id. at 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151.

While Robinson’s case was pending on appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), in which the Court held that the rule set forth in Alleyne "applie[d] to Michigan’s sentencing guidelines and render[ed] them constitutionally deficient." Id. at 506. The Michigan Supreme Court determined that the guidelines were deficient to the extent that they required "judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury to score [OVs] that mandatorily increase the floor of the guidelines minimum sentence range." Id. (emphasis in original). As a remedy, the Lockridge Court decided to sever the relevant statute "to the extent that it makes the sentencing guidelines range as scored on the basis of facts beyond those admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt mandatory." Id.

In reviewing Robinson’s case in light of Alleyne and Lockridge , the Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with Robinson that three of the variables that were found to apply to his case were "scored based on impermissible judicial fact-finding." Robinson , 2015 WL 6438239, at *13. The court concluded, however, that Robinson was not entitled to resentencing because the other variables "were based on facts admitted by defendant or found by the jury verdict, and were sufficient to sustain the minimum number of OV points necessary for defendant’s score to fall in the cell of the sentencing grid under which he was sentenced." Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed Robinson’s sentence, along with his conviction.

Robinson then proceeded to file an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. He later filed a motion to supplement the application. The Michigan Supreme Court granted the motion to supplement the application, but then denied the application for leave to appeal. It simply noted that it was "not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." People v. Robinson , 499 Mich. 916, 877 N.W.2d 729, 730 (2016) (mem.).

C. Proceedings in federal court

Robinson next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. He raised a range of claims, including that the state trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury "by using factors that had not been submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted to by petitioner" in assessing his sentence. The district court rejected this claim, concluding that " Alleyne is inapplicable to petitioner’s case." It noted that the Michigan Supreme Court in Lockridge had previously come to a different result, but concluded that the applicable standard of habeas review "prohibits the use of lower court decisions in determining whether the state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." The district court also determined that Lockridge did not render the principle that Robinson was relying on "clearly established" for the purposes of habeas review, and so it denied Robinson relief on this claim. After rejecting all of Robinson’s other claims, the court denied his habeas petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (COA).

Robinson responded by filing a notice of appeal and a motion in this court seeking a COA. Just four days after Robinson filed his notice of appeal, another panel of this court issued its decision in Loren Robinson v. Woods , 901 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2018). In Loren Robinson , this court came to essentially the same conclusion that the Michigan Supreme Court had reached in Lockridge . The Loren Robinson court held that " Alleyne clearly...