Robinson v. Human Relations Com'n of City of Sioux Falls

• Decision Date: 26 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 15436,15436
• Citation: 45 Empl.Prac.Dec.P 37,416 N.W.2d 864
• Parties: 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,712 Eugene R. ROBINSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION OF the CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, and the Public Hearing Panel Thereof in the Matter of Brenda Pfister vs. Eugene R. Robinson, Said Public Hearing Panel Consisting of Carol Knudtson-Eddy, Chairperson, and Betty Ordal and Dennis Studer, Defendants and Appellants. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 864

416 N.W.2d 864

45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,712

Eugene R. ROBINSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION OF the CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, South

Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, and the Public Hearing

Panel Thereof in the Matter of Brenda Pfister vs. Eugene R.

Robinson, Said Public Hearing Panel Consisting of Carol

Knudtson-Eddy, Chairperson, and Betty Ordal and Dennis

Studer, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 15436.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs March 26, 1987.

Decided Dec. 9, 1987.

Thomas H. Muilenburg, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellee.

Richard Braithwaite, Sioux Falls, for defendants and appellants.

SABERS, Justice (on reassignment).

This is an appeal from an order issuing a writ of prohibition preventing the Sioux Falls Human Relations Commission "from considering, awarding, or ordering monetary restitution, awards or damages in the matter of Brenda Pfister v. Eugene R. Robinson." The writ did not prevent the commission from proceeding with its hearing if these requirements were met. We reverse and remand.

SDCL 20-12-4 grants municipalities the power to investigate various forms of discrimination. To do so, they may establish a commission on human relations with the authority, among other things, to "hear complaints alleging discrimination with such investigation and inquiry as may reasonably appear necessary." SDCL 20-12-5. In hearing complaints the commission has the "power and authority" "to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of such commission will effectuate its purposes." SDCL 20-12-6. Commission decisions are subject to appeal under The Administrative Procedures Act, SDCL 1-26-30 through 1-26-37. SDCL 20-12-7.

Brenda Pfister (Pfister) filed a complaint with the Human Relations Commission (commission) of Sioux Falls alleging sexual discrimination on the part of her employer Eugene R. Robinson (Robinson). When the commission's hearing panel began allowing testimony about Pfister's monetary damages Robinson applied for an alternative writ of prohibition to arrest the commission's proceedings. The circuit court issued a writ prohibiting the commission from considering, awarding or ordering monetary restitution, but allowing the commission to proceed with its hearing if these conditions were complied with.

The commission raises five separate issues which we condense into two: 1) whether a writ of prohibition to prevent the panel from taking evidence on the issue of monetary damages was an appropriate remedy, and 2) whether the commission's panel had the power to award money damages.

Judicial interference of administrative proceedings is justified only where the plaintiff has presented an extraordinary factual situation or on appeal. Mordhorst v. Egert, 88 S.D. 527, 223 N.W.2d 501 (1974). This is because in the first instance, under the doctrine of separation of powers, an administrative agency is empowered to determine its own jurisdiction. Rapid City Area School District No. 51-4 v. de Hueck, 324 N.W.2d 421 (S.D.1982).

In cases where no extraordinary factual situation exists, this court has required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, citing its preference for the use of appropriate statutory machinery. Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 228 N.W.2d 640 (1975). It is a settled rule of judicial administration that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 376 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D.1985) quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638, 644 (1938). The reason for the rule is obvious, administrative resolution of the issue may make judicial involvement unnecessary. Zar, supra; Gottschalk, supra.

Furthermore, a writ of prohibition may be only issued where the ordinary course of law does not offer a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. SDCL 21-30-2. In those cases where no extraordinary situation exists, the appellate process satisfies this requirement, "otherwise, all administrative appeals would be subject to injunctive interference." de Hueck, supra at 423.

In this case, no extraordinary situation exists to justify judicial interference with the administrative process. It is not enough to complain about a possible adverse decision from the commission which had neither decided if discrimination existed nor if monetary damages were appropriate. The commission has the jurisdiction to make a wrong decision as well as a right one. Should that decision be adverse to Robinson, judicial review rather than initial judicial interference is the appropriate remedy. Indeed, as indicated above, the administrative resolution of the discrimination and money damage issues may make judicial involvement completely unnecessary. Zar, supra; Gottschalk, supra.

The remaining issue on appeal, whether the commission's panel had the power to award money damages, is premature and not properly before us until the commission has acted. de Hueck, supra; State ex rel. Harris v. Common Pleas Ct., Div. of P. & J., 25 Ohio App.2d 78, 266 N.E.2d 589 (1970).

We remand with instructions to dissolve the writ of prohibition.

WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, and MILLER, JJ., concur.

HENDERSON, J., dissents.

HENDERSON, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. This case should be affirmed.

A public hearing panel for the Sioux Falls Human Relations Commission conducted a hearing on Brenda Pfister's complaint for alleged sexual harassment (supposedly in November and December 1984). Although a transcript of this hearing is not a part of the record, Pfister does not dispute Robinson's statement that the hearing panel allowed testimony about Pfister's monetary damages over Robinson's objections. ¹ In the course of this hearing, Robinson applied to the circuit court for an alternative writ of prohibition to arrest the proceedings. He chose to not have his fate in damages decided by a conglomerate of citizens, in an informal manner.

The circuit court's first order and alternative writ of prohibition ordered the Commission to refrain from any further proceedings regarding Pfister's complaint, and ordered the Commission to make a return to the writ at a scheduled hearing. After the scheduled hearing before the circuit court, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based upon these findings and conclusions, the trial court entered a second order and writ prohibiting the Commission's panel from "considering, awarding, or ordering monetary restitution, awards or damages...." The court's order provided that, as long as these requirements were met, the panel was permitted to proceed with its hearing. Caution with the restrictive nature of a writ of prohibition was apparently quite paramount in the trial court's mind.

Two issues are addressed: (1) whether the Commission's panel ² had the power to award money damages, and (2) whether a writ of prohibition to prevent the panel from taking evidence on the issue of monetary damages was an appropriate remedy.

FIRST ISSUE

First, as men and women of the law, let us consider the issue of the Commission's power to award money damages; I will then be able to dispose of the question of the propriety of the writ of prohibition. The statutes empowering municipalities to establish human rights commissions, SDCL ch. 20-12, do not explicitly grant such commissions the power to award monetary damages. Although other courts have found some state human rights commissions have the authority to award damages, these decisions have been based on much broader statutory schemes explicitly granting the power to apply a variety of remedies to eliminate discrimination. These remedies include issuing cease and desist orders, awarding back pay, and reinstatement. A.P. Green Servs. Div. of Bigelow-Liptak Corp. v. State F.E.P.C., 19 Ill.App.3d 875, 312 N.E.2d 314 (1974); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 69 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973); Bournewood Hosp. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E.2d 235 (1976); State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 212 S.E.2d 77 (1975); see generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 340 (1978). These authorities, which Robinson relies on, apply a much differently worded expression of the commissions' authority in those states. Consequently, they are not persuasive on the question of whether commissions created pursuant to SDCL ch. 20-12 possess the authority to award damages. Therefore, in this dissent, I do not rely upon them.

Conversely, other courts have held that, under their states' statutory schemes, their human rights or civil rights commissions did not have the authority to award damages. Mendota Apartments v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 315 A.2d 832 (D.C.1974); Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1971); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974); Zamantakis v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa.Commw. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973); Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974). ³ Interestingly, the courts in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland reached their results under statutory provisions nearly identical to those construed by the courts in New Jersey and Massachusetts, in which the courts hold the commissions had the power to award damages. Some courts denying the power to award damages, have said this power was not required by the purposes to be served by the creation of the commissions, which was to eliminate discrimination but not to provide a complete remedy for damages from the effects of discrimination. See Mendota, 315 A.2d 832; Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 313 N.E.2d 3; Gutwein, 325 A.2d 740.

In contrast to the explicit and broad powers granted to the commissions in some states, municipal human relations commissions, as authorized by SDCL ch. 20-12, are chiefly investigative and educational bodies....