Robinson v. Human Rights Com'n, 1-88-2479

Decision Date27 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 1-88-2479,1-88-2479
Parties, 147 Ill.Dec. 229, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,402 Edwin ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION and Evanston Hospital Corporation, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen. (Jennifer A. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for Illinois Human Rights Com'n.

Robert J. Mignin, Joan E. Gale, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, for appellee Evanston Hosp.

Elizabeth Dale, Kenneth N. Flaxman, Chicago, for petitioner-appellant.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

This matter comes to us pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335 (107 Ill.2d R. 335) for direct review of an order of the respondent, Illinois Human Rights Commission (hereinafter "Human Rights Commission" or "Commission"), dismissing the Charge of petitioner, Edwin Robinson, that respondent, Evanston Hospital Corporation (hereinafter "Evanston Hospital" or "Hospital"), terminated his employment in retaliation for his opposition to the Hospital's alleged discriminatory practices. Petitioner contends that the Commission improperly dismissed the Charge based on its finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the Charge because it was not filed within 180 days of the date of his termination. We affirm.

On March 14, 1983, Evanston Hospital fired petitioner, an African American, from his position as Associate Director of Housekeeping for the stated reason that he had falsified his employment application by not informing the Hospital that he had been previously convicted of a crime. Petitioner testified that on July 6, he told an intake person at the Illinois Department of Human Rights (hereinafter "Human Rights Department" or "Department") that he believed that he had been terminated on the basis of his race and his help for other minorities at the Hospital. Thereafter, the intake person prepared a Charge of Discrimination form which stated in two separate places that petitioner believed he was fired solely because of his race. The form stated as particulars:

"A. The charge (conviction) which the hospital refers to is 76 MCI 140443, was disposed of by Judge John Reynolds, pursuant to a one year conditional discharge and both the court and my attorney advised me that the disposition was not considered a conviction.

B. I believe Respondent's reason for my termination were [sic] pretextual because Respondent stated the Department of Immigration investigation provided this information on me and no other non- black were [sic] investigated by Respondent."

Petitioner signed this form.

On March 9, 1984, 360 days after the filing of petitioner's initial Charge, the Department prepared an "amendment" to that Charge, adding retaliation for opposing Evanston Hospital's alleged discriminatory policies as a cause for petitioner's termination. The amendment added as particulars that:

"C. During my employment at Respondent I assisted Roosevelt Floyd, Troy Hodges, Eddie Drummond, Andrea Daye, Kevin House, and other minority employees in fighting Respondent's discriminatory actions by meeting with Respondent's managers to discuss these cases and urging retraction of discriminatory actions.

D. I believe Respondent's decision to terminate me was in retaliation for my active role in opposing discriminatory practices at Respondent and that Respondent's reasons for my termination were pretextual."

Petitioner also signed this form.

On November 14, 1985, the Human Rights Department issued a two-count complaint against Evanston Hospital, alleging that petitioner's termination was based on race discrimination and retaliation. About a year later, a hearing was conducted on both Charges by an Administrative Law Judge who, at the close of petitioner's case, granted Evanston Hospital's motion to dismiss the race Charge on grounds that petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case. The administrative judge, however, denied defendant's motion to dismiss the retaliation Charge. The Human Rights Commission subsequently reversed that ruling on the basis of the second district's decision in Pickering v. Human Rights Comm'n (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 340, 99 Ill.Dec. 885, 496 N.E.2d 746, finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the retaliation Charge because it was not filed within 180 days of petitioner's termination, as required by section 7-102(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (hereinafter "Human Rights Act" or "Act"). Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 68, par. 7-102(A)(1).

Petitioner contends that the Human Rights Commission improperly decided that section 7-102(A)(1) was a jurisdictional time limit. He argues that section 7-102(A)(1) is merely a statute of limitations and, as such, is subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. He further argues that had the Commission properly treated section 7-102(A)(1) as a statute of limitations, it would have found that the 180 day filing period would have been tolled because the late filing was solely due to the intake officer's failure to include the retaliation Charge as part of the initial Charge of discrimination. We disagree with petitioner's contention that section 7-102(A)(1) is not jurisdictional.

The concept of jurisdiction generally deals with the power of a court to hear and determine a class of cases and the power to grant the requested relief. (People ex rel. Illinois Department of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp. (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 517, 521, 77 Ill.Dec. 882, 885, 461 N.E.2d 505, 508.) Jurisdiction is conferred on courts by either the Constitution or legislation. (Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill.2d 202, 210, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 362, 486 N.E.2d 893, 895.) A lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, either directly or collaterally. (Fredman, 109 Ill.2d at 215, 93 Ill.Dec. at 365, 486 N.E.2d at 898.) When jurisdiction is found lacking in a case, parties may not waive jurisdiction nor by their conduct be estopped from objecting to jurisdiction (Caldwell v. Nolan (1988), 167 Ill.App.3d 1057, 1066, 118 Ill.Dec. 720, 727, 522 N.E.2d 175, 182) and the case is properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Fredman, 109 Ill.2d at 215, 93 Ill.Dec. at 365, 486 N.E.2d at 898.

Although the concept of jurisdiction may not be strictly applicable to an administrative agency, it is appropriately used to designate the agency's authority to act. (Spray v. Illinois Civil Service Comm'n (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 569, 573, 70 Ill.Dec. 302, 306, 449 N.E.2d 176, 180.) An administrative agency obtains its power to act from the legislation creating it and has no power to act beyond that granted by the legislation. (See Pickering v. Human Rights Comm'n (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 340, 352, 99 Ill.Dec. 885, 894, 496 N.E.2d 746, 754.) Section 7-102(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, the source of the Human Rights Commission's power, states the following regarding a charge of a civil rights violation:

"Within 180 days after the date that a civil rights violation allegedly has been committed, a charge in writing under oath or affirmation may be filed with the Department by an aggrieved party or issued by the Department itself under the signature of the Director." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 68, par. 7-102(A)(1).)

Several districts of the appellate court have found this provision to be a jurisdictional time limit. (Pickering (second district); Larrance v. Human Rights Comm'n (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 224, 117 Ill.Dec. 36, 519 N.E.2d 1203 (fourth district); and Lee v. Human Rights Comm'n (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 666, 81 Ill.Dec. 821, 467 N.E.2d 943 (first district). But cf. Gonzalez v. Human Rights Comm'n (1989), 179 Ill.App.3d 362, 369-70, 128 Ill.Dec. 362, 365-66, 534 N.E.2d 544, 547-48 (first district) (declining to decide whether this provision is jurisdictional but suggesting that it was like a statute of limitations).) Though there is some language in case law to the contrary, equitable concepts of waiver, estoppel, and tolling generally will not be available to extend this jurisdictional time limit. (See Pickering, 146 Ill.App.3d at 347-48, 99 Ill.Dec. at 890-91, 496 N.E.2d at 751-52; Larrance, 166 Ill.App.3d at 231-32, 117 Ill.Dec. at 41-42, 519 N.E.2d at 1208-09.) Consequently, where charges have not been filed within the 180 day period, they have been dismissed by the Commission. Pickering; Larrance.

The Human Rights Commission's dismissal of petitioner's retaliation Charge was based on the decision of the second district court in Pickering v. Human Rights Comm'n (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 340, 99 Ill.Dec. 885, 496 N.E.2d 746. The Pickering court specifically found that section 7-102(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act was jurisdictional. (Pickering, 146 Ill.App.3d at 347, 99 Ill.Dec. at 890, 496 N.E.2d at 751.) Relying upon Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill.2d 202, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893, where our supreme court found the Administrative Review Act's 35 day filing period (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 3-103) to be jurisdictional because it was an inherent element of a statutorily created right unknown to common law, the Pickering court found section 7-102(A)(1) to be jurisdictional because it was an inherent element of the right to be protected from terminations based on age or handicap which was a right specifically created by the Human Rights Act. (Pickering, 146 Ill.App.3d at 346, 99 Ill.Dec. at 889-90, 496 N.E.2d at 750-51.) The Pickering court further found that since the Human Rights Commission could only act pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Human Rights Act, it had no authority to even consider charges filed outside the 180 day time period specified by section 7-102(A)(1). Pickering, 146 Ill.App.3d at 352, 99 Ill.Dec. at 893, 496 N.E.2d at 754.

Though Pickering dealt with...

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