Robinson v. IL STATE CORR. CTR.(STATEVILLE), 94 C 1688.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94 C 1688.,94 C 1688.
• Citation: Robinson v. IL STATE CORR. CTR.(STATEVILLE), 890 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
• Parties: Willie ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS STATE CORRECTIONAL CENTER (STATEVILLE) WARDEN; Salvador A. Godinez, Superintendent; Anthony Ramos, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

890 F. Supp. 715

Willie ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v.ILLINOIS STATE CORRECTIONAL CENTER (STATEVILLE)WARDEN; Salvador A. Godinez, Superintendent; Anthony Ramos, Defendants.

No. 94 C 1688.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 29, 1995.

Willie Robinson, Joliet, IL, pro se.

Susan Takata O'Leary, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, Chicago, IL, for Ill. State Correctional Center, (Stateville) Warden.

Edward B Glicken, Ill. Atty. General's Office, Chicago, IL, Susan Takata O'Leary, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, Chicago, IL, for Salvador A. Godinez, Anthony Ramos.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ASPEN, District Judge:

PlaintiffWillie Robinson brings this three count complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendantsSalvador A. Godinez, Warden of the Stateville Correctional Center, and Anthony Ramos, Superintendent of Segregation Unit II at Stateville.Presently before us is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.Background

Plaintiff is one of the many inmates housed at the Stateville Correctional Center.He currently resides in Segregation Unit II, a portion of the prison where inmates are separated from each other for most of the day.Robinson complains that defendant Ramos prohibits inmates in Segregation Unit II from purchasing certain items at the commissary, such as canned goods and "anything else they want."Complaint, at 4.Apparently this prohibition applies only to inmates in segregation, and plaintiff contends that such a rule violates his federal and state rights, although he does not specifically indicate which ones.

Robinson's second claim involves the reduction of his visitation time from two hours to only one hour.Plaintiff claims that this reduction in visitation time occurred upon his being assigned to segregation for a term of one year.Robinson contends that he complained to Godinez and Ramos about his visitation time in writing, but that neither of them have rectified the matter.

Finally, plaintiff claims that the conditions in Segregation Unit II fall below the minimal standards set by the Eighth Amendment.In particular, plaintiff contends that there are problems with "Heat Ventalation sic; Cooling Ventalation sic; Unsanitation sic Toilet Area; Roaches; Unclean Bedding: because no supply is being passed out on a Weekly Basis; Unsanitation sic Food Preparation Area; Bed Bugs; Subfezzing sic Weather: because Broken Windows...."Complaintat 4-5.Although plaintiff does not explain how he has been injured by these conditions, he does allege that they pose a dangerous risk to his health and well being.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing (1) that plaintiff's official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, (2) that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by them in the alleged deprivations, and (3) that his complaints do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.Plaintiff has filed a "Motion of Disposition" in response, asking us not to dismiss the complaint.As plaintiff's "Motion" is more akin to a response brief, we will consider it as such and deny his "Motion of Disposition" as moot.

II.Discussion

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief."Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957);Johnson v. Martin,943 F.2d 15, 16(7th Cir.1991).At this stage in the litigation, we take plaintiff's version of the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, and construe all reasonable inferences in his favor.Bane v. Ferguson,890 F.2d 11, 13(7th Cir.1989).Although unsupported conclusions of fact and conclusions of law are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, Cushing v. City of Chicago,3 F.3d 1156, 1160-61 n. 5(7th Cir.1993), pro se complaints such as this one are held to a lesser standard than are those written by practicing attorneys.Kelley v. McGinnis,899 F.2d 612, 616 n. 8(7th Cir.1990).¹

A.Restrictions on Commissary Purchases

Plaintiff contends that defendants' restriction on the types of commissary items that may be purchased by inmates in segregation violates federal and state law.As plaintiff does not articulate what "law"he is referring to, we will examine his claim under the three most obvious possibilities.First, if plaintiff is raising a due process argument, he must demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest in commissary privileges that arose out of state law or the federal constitution.SeeKentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson,490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506(1989).Although Illinois prison regulations permit the establishment of commissaries, Ill.Admin.Code tit. 20, § 210.20(a), neither prison regulations nor state statutes establish a right to commissary privileges.See730 ILCS 5/3-7-2a(regulating commissary prices);Ill.Admin.Code tit. 20, § 504.20(c)(prohibiting certain types of punishment, but not mentioning the restriction of commissary access).Nor can plaintiff reasonably contend that the Constitution embodies some right of a prisoner to purchase anything he wants from the commissary while in the custody of the state.SeeCampbell v. Miller,787 F.2d 217, 222(7th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 673, 93 L.Ed.2d 724(1986).Thus, plaintiff cannot prevail on a due process claim.

Second, plaintiff's claim appears to raise an equal protection argument, since he alleges that the commissary privileges of segregation inmates were restricted, while the privileges of inmates in the general population were not affected.Although prison officials cannot base the allocation of jobs or resources on impermissible factors such as an inmate's race, seeBlack v. Lane,824 F.2d 561, 562(7th Cir.1987), there is no indication that any such motivation was present in the instant case.Consequently, plaintiff cannot state an equal protection claim.SeeBeck v. Lynaugh,842 F.2d 759, 762(5th Cir.1988)(segregation inmate failed to state a claim based on commissary restrictions).

Finally, we analyze whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment stricture against cruel and unusual punishment.In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment inmates must allege that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to their health or safety, such that they were exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm.SeeFarmer v. Brennan,___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811(1994).We need not address whether Robinson has alleged the requisite state of mind required by the Eighth Amendment, as his contention that he was denied commissary privileges does not implicate the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."Rhodes v. Chapman,452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59(1981).Accordingly, count one of plaintiffs complaint is dismissed.

B.Visitation Rights

As with his first claim, plaintiff does not indicate what federal constitutional right he is claiming was violated by restricting his visitation time to only one hour.Robinson does not appear to be stating an equal protection violation, as he does not contend that he is being treated differently from other inmates in segregation.²If he is alleging a procedural due process claim, he must satisfy two pleading requirements: (1)he must allege an interference with a protected liberty or property interest, and (2)he must establish that the procedures accompanying the deprivation were constitutionally infirm.Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson,490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506(1989).As we have stated, a protected liberty interest can only arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause or state law.Hewitt v. Helms,459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 74 L.Ed.2d 675(1983).Plaintiff cannot claim that the Due Process Clause itself protects his visitation rights, seeThompson,490 U.S. at 460-61, 109 S.Ct. at 1908-09, and therefore must rely on state law to create a liberty interest in visitation.In order for protected liberty interests to arise from state law, the statestatute or regulation must place "substantive limitations on official discretion," such that a particular outcome is mandated "upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met."Id. at 462, 109 S.Ct. at 1909;seePardo v. Hosier,946 F.2d 1278, 1281(7th Cir.1991).

Although plaintiff does not enumerate the sources of state law upon which he relies, it is at least arguable that 730 ILCS 5/3-7-2(f)³ grants prisoners a protected liberty interest in receiving visitors.SeeGavin v. McGinnis,866 F.Supp. 1107, 1111(N.D.Ill.1994);United States ex rel. Adams v. O'Leary,659 F.Supp. 736, 739(N.D.Ill.1987).However, Robinson does not claim that he was denied the right to see particular visitors, as was the case in Gavin and O'Leary.Nor does he claim that the restrictions placed upon his visitation time effectively prevented him from receiving any visitors at all.Indeed, the regulation Robinson complains of appears to be a reasonable means by which Stateville tries to "preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."Bell v. Wolfish,441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447(1979).Accordingly, as plaintiff has failed to state a claim based on the reduction of his visitation time, defendants' motion to dismiss count two is granted.

C.Conditions of Confinement

The conditions of a prisoner's confinement in a state facility implicate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment only if the "prisoner is deprived of the `minimal...