Robinson v. Jackson

Decision Date14 May 1936
Docket NumberNo. 86.,86.
Citation184 A. 811
PartiesROBINSON v. JACKSON.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Selina Robinson, employee, opposed by Gerald B. Jackson, employer. From a judgment of the Supreme Court (181 A. 704, 13 N.J.Misc. 858), affirming a judgment of the common pleas reducing an award granted by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau, the employee appeals.

Judgment of the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

See, also, 174 A. 227, 12 N.J.Misc. 613.

Nathan Rabinowitz and Milton C. Kitay, both of Paterson (Isadore Rabinowitz, of Paterson, of counsel), for prosecutor.

Herbert C. Dolan, of Newark, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

The question presented for decision is the meaning of paragraph 20 (e) of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 (Pamph.L. p. 134), incorporated therein by chapter 93 of the Laws of 1919 (Pamph. L. pp. 201, 209 [Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § **236—22]), in terms following: "Whenever it shall appear that an employer is being prejudiced by virtue of the refusal of an injured employee to accept proffered medical and surgical treatment deemed necessary by the physician selected by the employer, or his failure or neglect to comply with the instructions of the physician in charge of the case, such employer is hereby authorized to file a petition with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau, which is hereby empowered to order proper medical and surgical treatment at the expense of the employer, and in event of refusal or neglect by the employee to comply with this order the bureau shall make such modification in the award contained in the schedule as the evidence produced shall justify."

The injury was sustained on August 25, 1933; and the petition for compensation was filed with the bureau on April 2, 1934. The employer, while conceding that prosccutor suffered a permanent disability of the left foot to the extent of 66 2/3 per cent. of normal function and use, nevertheless insists that proffered medical and surgical aid, refused by prosecutor, would in all human likelihood have effected a "cure," or materially reduced the disability, and that, in these circumstances, the Bergen county court of common pleas correctly found a compensable disability to the extent only of 25 per cent. loss of use of the injured foot. The rejected offer of medical aid was made on September 27, 1933, but the bureau concluded that in as much as the employer did not, by appropriate petition, invoke the provisions of the statute under review, he was precluded from showing in defense that any part of the disability under which prosecutor labors is traceable to her unreasonable rejection of the proposed medical and surgical aid. The pleas, on the other hand, ruled that the statute in question is "permissive and not mandatory," and that the employer's failure "to comply strictly with the provisions of the act does not preclude him from proving her refusal to accept the medical treatment in diminution of the award." The Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed the judgment of that tribunal.

We hold to the view that the latter interpretation of the statute does not effectuate the legislative purpose. The right of the employer to impose medical or surgical treatment upon the injured employee is not, of course, an absolute one. Compulsion in such matters must needs be cautiously exercised. The employer's right in this regard is necessarily circumscribed by the correlative right of the employee to avoid, if he chooses, peril to life, however slight, and undue risks to health, and anguish that goes beyond the bounds of reason. The employee's refusal to submit to the tendered treatment, whether medical or operative, is not unreasonable, and therefore unjustifiable in the legal sense, unless it is free from danger to life and health and extraordinary suffering, and, according to the best medical or surgical opinion, offers a reasonable prospect of restoration or relief from the disability. And the reasonableness of the refusal, tested by this standard, is one of fact. McNally v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co., 87 N.J.Law, 455, 95 A. 122, affirmed 88 N.J. Law, 729, 96 A. 293.

Viewing the statute in the light of this principle, rooted in reason and justice, the legislative design palpably was to provide for a judicial determination of such an issue at the time it arises, when the proposed remedy, if it satisfies the legal standard, can be effectively applied, and not at the final hearing of the cause, when, in the event of a determination adverse to the employee, it may not, due to the changes worked by time, be efficacious or practicable. The considerations underlying this policy are obvious. It is ordinarily a...

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19 cases
  • Baby M., Matter of
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • March 31, 1987
    ...being allowed to determine inability to carry without risk of harm. anguish that go beyond the bounds of reason. Robinson v. Jackson, 116 N.J.L. 476, 184 A. 811 (E. & A.1936); Budden v. Goldstein, 43 N.J.Super. 340, 128 A.2d 730 Reference must be made to the information supplied to Mrs. Whi......
  • Walsh v. Kotler
    • United States
    • New Jersey County Court
    • December 10, 1956
    ...employer, but it was immaterial under the issues before the deputy, and should not have been permitted. Robinson v. Jackson, 116 N.J.L. 476, 184 A. 811, 105 A.L.R. 1466 (E. & A.1936). What then is the extent of petitioner's disability? The deputy described it objectively as 'The petitioner ......
  • Acquarulo v. Botwinik Bros., Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1953
    ...Coal Co. v. Lee, 289 Ky. 821, 823, 158 S.W.2d 385. Often the decisions are based on local statutes. In Robinson v. Jackson, 116 N.J.L. 476, 480, 184 A. 811, 105 A.L.R. 1466, the employer failed to comply with an express statutory provision. Courts are less willing to require submission to a......
  • Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1962
    ...rule applicable in New Jersey with respect to the duty to submit to an operation was set forth in Robinson v. Jackson, 116 N.J.L. 476, 478, 184 A. 811, 812, 105 A.L.R. 1466 (E. & A. 1936), as 'The right of the employer to impose medical or surgical treatment upon the injured employee is not......
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