Robinson v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 08 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-1979.,00-1979. |
| Citation | 283 F.3d 582 |
| Parties | Eric ROBINSON, Appellant, v. Philip L. JOHNSON; The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania, Mike Fisher. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Paul Rosenzweig, Esq. (Argued) Suite 300 516 C Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20002, Counsel for Appellant.
David C. Glebe, Esq. (Argued) Office of the District Attorney 1421 Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Appellees.
BEFORE: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
This case arises out of a federal habeas corpus action brought by a prisoner in state custody. The Commonwealth1 originally argued that the prisoner's petition was successive and should therefore be dismissed. The District Court dismissed the petition as successive, and the prisoner appealed. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the petition actually was not successive, but offered no alternative legal grounds upon which we could have affirmed the District Court's decision. Thus, we remanded. On remand, the Commonwealth argued for the first time that the prisoner's petition was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The prisoner objected to the untimeliness of the Commonwealth's assertion of its limitations defense, but the District Court dismissed the habeas petition as time-barred.
On appeal, the prisoner argues (1) that the Commonwealth waived its limitations defense, or in the alternative, (2) that if the Commonwealth did not waive its limitations defense, then he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because the Commonwealth allegedly deprived him of the legal papers necessary to file his petition in a timely fashion. Because we find that the Commonwealth did not raise its affirmative defense at the earliest practicable moment, we hold that the Commonwealth waived its limitations defense.2 We will therefore reverse and remand.
Appellant, Eric Robinson, was convicted in a bench trial before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia of first degree murder, conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a concurrent aggregate sentence of twenty to thirty-five years imprisonment on the remaining counts.
Robinson filed a direct appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 481 A.2d 1376 (Pa.Super. 1984) (table). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Robinson's request for discretionary review. This ended the direct review of Robinson's case.
Robinson then filed a pro se petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"),3 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 et seq. (1984), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court appointed counsel to represent Robinson, and it subsequently denied his petition for relief. This denial of collateral relief was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 563 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 1989) (table). Robinson did not petition for allocatur with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On August 29, 1991, Robinson filed his first federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, insufficiency of evidence, and violation of the Fourth Amendment. A Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation which concluded that Robinson's failure to pursue discretionary review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim constituted a procedural default. The District Court adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, concluding that the ineffectiveness claim had been procedurally defaulted. See Order, Robinson v. Vaughn, No. 91-5422 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 17, 1991).
Robinson appealed that decision, and we denied Robinson's request for issuance of a certificate of probable cause because of Robinson's failure to exhaust his state remedies. See Order, Robinson v. Vaughn, No. 91-2107 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 1992). Thus, as to the ineffectiveness claim, Robinson's first federal habeas petition was dismissed so that he could exhaust his remedies in the Commonwealth.
Robinson returned to the Commonwealth courts and filed a second petition under the PCRA, again alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and now also alleging the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel. This application was denied, and Robinson did not appeal.
Robinson filed a third state application for post-conviction relief. That petition was denied by the Court of Common Pleas. Robinson then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the denial. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. 03093 Phila. 1994, 679 A.2d 257 (Pa.Super. 1996) (table). Robinson petitioned for, and was denied, allocatur by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 683 A.2d 880 (Pa. 1996) (table).
Robinson filed his second federal habeas petition, which is the one at issue in this appeal, on September 5, 1998, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for habeas relief. His petition also reasserts as grounds for habeas relief the insufficiency of the evidence against him and the allegedly unlawful seizure of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Robinson's petition was referred to a Magistrate Judge who ordered a responsive pleading including "specific and detailed answers and a brief or memorandum of law in support thereof" from the Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia on November 10, 1998. On January 27, 1999, the District Attorney filed a letter pleading which argued that Robinson's petition should be transferred to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit because it was a successive petition. The District Attorney contended that the denial of Robinson's first federal habeas petition in 1991 precluded relief because he had not received permission for a successive petition from this Court as is required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Robinson's second federal habeas petition, and on April 26, 1999, the District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and denied the petition.
Robinson appealed that decision, and we ordered the District Attorney to show cause why the order dismissing the petition should not be summarily reversed in light of our decision in Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir.1997), where we held that when a federal habeas petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner, after exhausting his state remedies, need not apply to the court of appeals for authorization to file a federal habeas action, but may file his petition in the district court as if it were his first such filing. On December 23, 1999, the District Attorney filed a letter brief conceding that Robinson's second federal habeas petition indeed was not successive. The District Attorney did not present any alternative legal grounds for affirming the District Court's conclusion. Thus, we accepted the Commonwealth's concession and summarily reversed and remanded.
On remand, Robinson filed a motion to strike his original petition and for permission to file an amended petition which the Magistrate Judge granted. The District Attorney moved for reconsideration of the order permitting Robinson to amend his petition. Then on March 30, 2000, the District Attorney asserted that Robinson's second federal habeas petition was time-barred by the limitations provision of the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Robinson, in return, argued that the Commonwealth's statute of limitations defense was untimely.
The Magistrate Judge vacated his initial order granting Robinson leave to amend his petition, and instead substituted a Report and Recommendation adopting the District Attorney's argument that Robinson's second federal habeas petition should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. In particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that (1) Robinson's third state petition had not been "properly filed" because it involved claims subject to a state procedural default rule and did not toll the period of limitations; (2) therefore, Robinson's second federal habeas petition was required to be filed on or before April 23, 1997; (3) alternatively, if the third state habeas petition had been "properly filed," then Robinson's second federal habeas petition should have been filed on or before September 25, 1997; and (4) finally, because Robinson had access to his legal papers for eleven of the twelve months prior to the expiration of the September 1997 limitations period, the period of limitations should not be equitably tolled.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation over Robinson's renewed objection that the Commonwealth had waived its limitations defense and Robinson's further proffer regarding the efforts he had made to acquire his legal papers. Robinson noted a timely appeal, and the District Court granted his request for a certificate of appealability.4 Robinson was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and we appointed counsel to represent him.
Our first question is whether it is even possible for a State to waive its AEDPA limitations defense, an issue which we have not yet specifically addressed. The statute of limitations provision of the AEDPA provides, in pertinent part:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of ... the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
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Woods v. Kearney
...Third Circuit panel's opinion in Robinson has been vacated by the court en banc, and remanded for a panel rehearing. See Robinson v. Johnson, 283 F.3d 582 (3d Cir.2002)(vacating March 11, 2002 opinion, and remanding for panel rehearing). The Court thus concludes that Petitioner's waiver arg......
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Ray v. Gillis, Civil Action No. 00-4257 (E.D. Pa. 7/31/2003), Civil Action No. 00-4257.
... ... DISCUSSION ... 1. Waiver of Statute of Limitations ... In his written objection, Adams relies on Robinson v. Johnson , 283 F.3d 581, vacated, reh'g en banc granted , Robinson v. Johnson , 283 F.3d 582, vacated, reh'g by original panel granted , ... ...