Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 150

• Decision Date: 14 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12593,12593
• Citation: 100 Idaho 263,596 P.2d 436
• Parties: JoAnn ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 150, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 436

596 P.2d 436

100 Idaho 263

JoAnn ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 150, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 12593.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 14, 1979.

Byron J. Johnson, Boise, Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr., Pocatello, for plaintiff-appellant.

Wallace M. Transtrum, Soda Springs, for defendant-respondent.

BISTLINE, Justice.

The underlying issue here is the extent to which the statutory provisions affecting teachers' contracts become integrated into the contract itself. The ultimate question which we decide is whether JoAnn Robinson, a grade school teacher in Soda Springs, Idaho, for almost seven years and by I.C. § 33-1212 thus vested with the right to an "automatic renewal of contract," was entitled to go to a trial because of the manner in which she was terminated from her teacher's position.

On December 10, 1974, she received a letter from her principal stating that in view of certain observed problems he had no alternative but to place her on probation until April 15, 1975. "At that time," the letter continued, "we will review your progress and make a decision as to your continuing employment." The letter suggested several persons that Mrs. Robinson could consult for advice on how to become a more effective teacher. The principal apparently met with her once during the Christmas vacation. The district superintendent visited her classroom once in January of 1975, and the principal visited on March 13. Six days later, on March 19, 1975, the superintendent notified her that the board of trustees would not renew her contract for the coming year. The reasons given for nonrenewal were: (1) an inability to communicate with parents; (2) parents did not want their children in her classroom; and (3) recurring pressure on the board. Mrs. Robinson requested and received a hearing before the board on May 13. The board affirmed the decision and she was not rehired.

Thereafter, on August 11th, Mrs. Robinson brought suit in district court against the district. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim on April 26, 1976. She amended, seeking reinstatement for the ensuing 1976-77 school term, back pay for the 1975-76 school term, and reasonable attorneys' fees. She alleged that by declining to renew her contract the board violated her rights because, among other reasons: (1) the board failed to comply with statutory provisions; and (2) the board did not have adequate and sufficient evidence to find "just and reasonable cause not to renew the contract" as required by I.C. § 33-1215.

The School District moved for dismissal of the amended complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, and alternatively for summary judgment. At the time of the hearing on this motion the court had before it two affidavits of Mrs. Robinson, the official School District file on Mrs. Robinson which included pertinent correspondence concerning this matter, the tape and transcript of the hearing before the board, and the district's policy handbook. In a memorandum decision the district court dismissed the action for failure to state an actionable claim. It is apparent, however, that the court may have considered that he was granting summary judgment on the basis of lack of triable issues of fact, and the applicable law favoring the School District. His decision stated that "The Record adequately demonstrates that the School Board Proceeded in accordance with the particular statutes involved, namely, . . . Sec. 33-1212, etc." Having thus decided against plaintiff's claims of statutory procedural violations, the remainder of the complaint was dismissed on this rationale:

A School Board is by statute vested with certain powers and duties and obviously certain matters are discretionary with the Board. Neither counsel could furnish the Court with any citation of authority which authorizes the District Court to review the discretionary conduct of the School Board, and certainly in the absence of allegations of arbitrary or capricious conduct, it would seem the Court has no such authority. It is noted that plaintiff's attorney asked leave to amend by alleging arbitrary or capricious conduct which said Motion was denied as being untimely.

In district court proceedings the plaintiff stated, as she does here, that she was not seeking either mandamus or injunctive relief, but proceeding on a breach of contract theory. The district court found no actionable claim stated or presented, so ruling on the premise that her contract had simply "expired" at the end of the school year. Regardless of whether her claim alleged, and her affidavit demonstrated, "arbitrary and capricious" action by the board, we hold that the amended complaint stated an actionable claim for a breach of her contract and there were triable issues of fact.

The School District in its brief filed in this Court concedes that a teacher who has been employed for over three years is statutorily entitled to renewal of her contract. The School District further agrees that this right is a property interest, and one which can be terminated only by compliance with the prescribed statutory procedures. The School District contends that the right is not also contractual. There we must disagree.

This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and made a part of every written contract." Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137, 237 P.2d 1058 (1951). See also Long v. Owen, 21 Idaho 243, 121 P. 99 (1912). It appears to be the law in almost every state, if not all, that existing law becomes part of a contract, just as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect (unless a contrary intent is disclosed). 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 257 (1964).

A number of courts have expressly applied this rule to contracts involving teachers. Heckley v. Board of Education of Oakland Unified School District, 53 Cal.2d 218, 1 Cal.Rptr. 4, 347 P.2d 4 (1959); Rible v. Hughes, 24 Cal.2d 437, 150 P.2d 455 (1944); Fry v. Board of Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229 (1941); Board of Education of Richmond School District v. Mathews, 149 Cal.App. 265, 308 P.2d 449 (1957); Sawin v. Town of Winslow, 253 A.2d 694 (Me.1969); Cords v. Window Rock School District No. 8, Apache Co., 22 Ariz.App. 233, 526 P.2d 757 (1974); Carlson v. School District No. 6 of Maricopa Co., 12 Ariz.App. 179, 468 P.2d 944 (1970); Heifner v. Board of Education of Morris Community High School District No. 101, 32 Ill.App.3d 83, 335 N.E.2d 600 (1975); County School Board of Spotsylvania v. McConnell, 215 Va. 603, 212 S.E.2d 264 (1975).

Other courts have applied the rule specifically to renewable contract or tenure cases, holding that such statutory rights are embodied and implicitly included in a teacher's contract. Madison County Board of Education v. Wigley, 288 Ala. 202, 259 So.2d 233 (1972); Board of School Commissioners v. Hahn, 246 Ala. 662, 22 So.2d 91 (1945); Julesburg School District No. RE-1 v. Ebke, 562 P.2d 419 (Colo.1977); Maxey v. Jefferson County School District No. R-1, 158 Colo. 583, 408 P.2d 970 (1965); Perry v. Independent School District No. 696, 297 Minn. 197, 210 N.W.2d 283 (1973); Minnesota Association of Public Schools v. Hanson, 287 Minn. 415, 178 N.W.2d 846 (1970); Birdwell v. Hazelwood School District, 352 F.Supp. 613 (E.D.Mo.1972), aff'd 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Ward, 374 F.Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C.1974). See also Redman v. Department of Education, 519 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1974), and Kacsur v. Board of Trustees of South Whittier Elementary School District, 18 Cal.2d 586, 116 P.2d 593 (1941). ¹ It is true that Mrs. Robinson's last contract by its provisions covered a definite term, and in a sense, except for the statutory renewal provisions, would expire at the termination date. In actuality, however, by application of the statutory law, the contract together with the statute is better called a "continuing contract," such being the language used in Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, 550 P.2d 1112 (Wyo.1976), where the court there held that such contracts can only be terminated by the school district for cause. We must note that the letter sent Mrs. Robinson by the principal used similar terminology, "continuing employment."

Under I.C. 33-1212, a qualifying teacher has "the right to automatic renewal of contract by giving notice, in writing, of acceptance of renewal." Mrs. Robinson's service of over three full years of continuous employment by the same school district conferred upon her the right of automatic renewal as part and parcel of her contract. Unless the statutory procedures were properly followed, the failure to renew her contract was a breach of that continuing contract. ²

The determinative issue requires our review of the district court's holding as a matter of law that the board complied with the statutory provisions specifying the manner for terminating a continuing contract teacher. Under the relevant provisions, as they existed at relevant times, ³ a continuing contract teacher could not be terminated without first being afforded a probationary period. The duration of the period was to be set in a written notice from the district board of trustees in which the teacher was to be advised of the reasons for imposing the probation together with "provisions for adequate supervision and evaluation of the person's performance." I.C. § 33-1212. Following probation, if the board determined not to renew the teacher's contract, a further written notice to that effect was required, giving reasons of just and reasonable cause. I.C. § 33-1213. Provisions existed for a hearing at a teacher's request, after which the board would render a written decision which would state the existence of just and reasonable cause not to renew, and the reasons for that determination. I.C. § 33-1215.

Some but not all of these requirements were met. The notice of probation was that of the principal, not that of the board....