Robinson v. Julie L. Jones & Fla. Comm'n On Offender Review
| Decision Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:16cv65/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | SHANNON DOUGLAS ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES and FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and supporting memorandum, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF Nos. 1, 2). Respondent Florida Commission on Offender Review ("FCOR") filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (ECF No. 13). Respondent Jones filed a limited answer deferring to the FCOR's answer (ECF No. 12). Petitioner filed a reply to the FCOR's answer (ECF No. 16). Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) and a "Motion for Judicial Notice of Supplemental Authority" (ECF No. 18).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see ECF No. 13).1 Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Polk County, Florida, Case No. 1989-CF-530, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of one count of burglary stemming from offense conduct that occurred on February 2, 1989 (Ex. A). On July 6, 1989, Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of thirty (30) years in prison, with pre-sentence jail credit of 154 days (id.).
Petitioner reached his tentative release date on April 1, 2012, through the accrual of actual time served and earned gain time, and was released from FDOC custody on conditional release supervision, administered by the FCOR (formerly theFlorida Parole Commission), for the amount of time equal to the gain time he had accrued (approximately eighty-one (81) months), with his supervision to expire on January 26, 2019 (Ex. B). On August 23, 2013, the FCOR issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest for violating the terms of his conditional release (Ex. F). Petitioner was charged with one violation of Condition 4(b), by using and/or possessing marijuana, and three violations of Condition 7, by failing to obey the law (id.). Petitioner waived his right to a violation hearing (id.). On February 26, 2014, the FCOR revoked Petitioner's conditional release supervision effective August 21, 2013, ordered him returned to FDOC custody, denied credit for time Petitioner spent on conditional release, but granted him credit for the period October 3, 2012 to December 6, 2012 (Ex. G).2
On August 14, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Okaloosa County Circuit Court, Case No. 2014-CA-3103, raising the same ex post facto claim he asserts in the instant federal habeas petition (Ex. H1). The state circuit court denied the petition on November 19, 2014 (Ex. H4). Petitioner sought review by the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA") by filing a petition for writof certiorari, Case No. 1D14-5810 (Ex. I1). On July 21, 2015, the First DCA denied the petition on the merits (Ex. I4). See Robinson v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review, 171 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Table). The mandate issued August 18, 2015 (id.). On October 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. SC15-1964 (Ex. J1). The state supreme court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on October 27, 2015 (Ex. J2). See Robinson v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review, 181 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 2015) (Table).
On October 19, 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the First DCA, again raising the same ex post facto claim he asserts in the instant federal habeas petition (Ex. K1). The First DCA transferred the petition to the Okaloosa County Circuit Court, Case No. 2015-CA-4160 (see Ex. K2). The circuit court denied the petition on December 8, 2015 (id.). Petitioner sought review by the First DCA by filing a petition for writ of certiorari, Case No. 1D16-0159 (Ex. L1). On April 20, 2016, the First DCA denied the petition on the merits (Ex. L4). See Robinson v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review, No. 1D16-0159, 2016 WL 1579299 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Table).
Petitioner filed the instant habeas action on February 25, 2016, while the state habeas proceeding was pending (see ECF No. 1 at 1). In the instant petition, Petitioner challenges his placement on conditional release supervision, on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the conditional release statute, upon which the FCOR relied in imposing Petitioner's conditional release supervision, violated the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (see ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 2 at 3-7).
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. As the instant petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the more deferential standard for habeas review of state court decisions under § 2254 as brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. In relevant part, section 2254(d) now provides:
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).3 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 147 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2000). In employing this test, the SupremeCourt has instructed that on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal State court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). "Clearly established Federal law, includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions." Woods v. Donald, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015) (citation omitted).
Next, the court must determine whether the State court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law, either because "'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or because 'the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). The Supreme Court has clarified that "[a]voiding these pitfalls does not require citation to our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). If the State court decision is found in either respect to be contrary, the district court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. However, where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to...
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