Robinson v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC
| Decision Date | 13 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cv-1321-LJO-SMS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | LAVERNE ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC, Defendant. |
On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff Laverne Robinson ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County of Tulare against Defendant Lowe's Home Centers, LLC ("Lowe's" or "Defendant"), and Does 1-20, for the injuries she sustained after she slipped and fell in one of Defendant's stores in Tulare, California, in July 2014. Doc. 1, Ex. A, Complaint ("Compl."). Plaintiff used a standardized summons form created by the Judicial Council of California as her complaint. See id. That form provided, among other things, a box that Plaintiff checked to identify whether there were defendants other than Lowe's that "were the agents and employees of the other defendants [i.e., Lowe's] and acted within the scope of the agency." Id. at 2. Plaintiff named those defendants as Does 16 to 20 ("the Doe Defendants"), but did not provide any information about them. See id. at 2-3.
Approximately two months later, Plaintiff amended the complaint only to correct Defendant's name. Doc. 1, Ex. C. Defendant answered the complaint approximately three weeks later. Doc. 1, Ex. D.
The complaint did not state the full amount of damages Plaintiff sought. See Compl. at 2-3. Butin May of 2015, Plaintiff served on Defendant a case management statement ("the CMS"), which reported that Plaintiff had "suffered a Trimalleola ankle fracture dislocation and underwent three open reduction surgeries." Doc. 1, Ex. E at 2. The CMS further reported that her known damages were $13,000 in medical costs and $18,000 in lost wages. Id. And on July 28, 2015, Plaintiff proffered a "Statement of Damages," which indicated that Plaintiff sought approximately $500,000 in damages. See Doc. 1, Ex. F. Defendant removed the case to this Court on August 28, 2015, asserting diversity jurisdiction exists because the parties are completely diverse and Plaintiff seeks more than $75,000 in damages. See Doc. 1 at 3-4; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441.
On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("the FAC") and a motion to remand this case to Superior Court. Docs. 8, 10, First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). In the FAC, Plaintiff substitutes the Doe Defendants for four Lowe's employees working at the store at the time of Plaintiff's accident, all of whom are California citizens See Doc. FAC at 1. Because those Defendants are California citizens, Plaintiff asserts the parties are not completely diverse and therefore the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. See id. at ¶ 1; Doc. 8 at 2. In addition, Plaintiff argues Defendant's removal was untimely and that the Doe Defendants should be joined as necessary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Doc. 8 at 14; Doc. 21 at 2.
Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion to remand and moves to strike the FAC. Docs. 11, 12. Defendant contends its removal was proper and Plaintiff's adding new defendants in the FAC was not. See Doc. 11 at 2.
The Court finds it appropriate to rule on the motions without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to strike (Doc. 12) and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 8.).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove an action to federal court if the district court has original jurisdiction. Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). If atany time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can adjudicate only those cases authorized by the United States Constitution and Congress. Generally, those cases involve diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or where the United States is a party. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the law is clear in the Ninth Circuit that the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand and against removal. Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). Among other things, this means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
In determining the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction in removal cases, the "well-pleaded complaint rule" applies, "which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Federal courts have jurisdiction over any civil action where complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Accordingly, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship requires that no defendant have the same citizenship as any plaintiff." Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001). A defendant removing to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds bears the burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction exists and that an action is removable. Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
The parties agree that the only basis for this Court's jurisdiction over the case is diversity jurisdiction, which requires that the parties be of completely diverse citizenship and that the value of the case exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff does not dispute that removal may have been proper at some point, but argues that Defendant failed to remove this suit within the 30-day deadline mandated under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ("§ 1446(b)"). Doc. 8 at 14. The Court addresses this issue at the outset because, if valid, Plaintiff's objection "will defeat removal." Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980).
Plaintiff's complaint provided no information concerning the amount of damages she sought beyond indicating that the case's value exceeded $25,000 on the case's cover sheet. Because the complaint did not provide grounds for removal, it did not trigger § 1446(b)'s 30-day deadline. See Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) ( ); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) ().
Section 1446(b)(3) provides, however, that "if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days" if the defendant receives "an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." (Emphasis added.) The parties do not dispute that the CMS constitutes "other paper."
Plaintiff asserts that it "was clearly and certainly ascertainable" from the CMS that the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $75,000 because it indicated that she had suffered an ankle fracture,underwent three surgeries, incurred approximately $13,000 in medical costs, and had lost approximately $13,000 in wages. Doc. 8 at 14. Without providing any argument or authority, Plaintiff contends this information was "more than sufficient . . . for defendant Lowe's to ascertain that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds [] $75,000." Id.
The Court disagrees. Plaintiff's description of her damages in her CMS does not indicate that she sought over $75,000 in damages. In fact, a fair reading of her description is that she sought less than $75,000. The CMS required Plaintiff to "specify the injury and damages claimed, including medical expenses to date, estimated future medical expenses, lost earnings to date, and estimated future lost earnings." Doc. 1, Ex. E at 2. Plaintiff stated her injuries, an ankle fracture that required three surgeries, and that, by that point, she had incurred approximately $13,000 in medical expenses and had lost approximately $18,000 in wages. Id. But Plaintiff did not indicate any further damages, which suggests she sought only approximately $31,000 in damages. Because Defendant could not have ascertained from the CMS that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000, the CMS did not trigger § 1446(b)'s 30-day deadline.
Plaintiff's case did not appear to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction in this case—the only basis for federal jurisdiction—until Plaintiff provided Defendant a statement of damages on July 28, 2015, which indicated that Plaintiff seeks approximately $500,000 in damages. See Doc. 1, Ex. 5. As such, Defendant met § 1446(b)'s 30-day deadline for removal when it removed this case on August 28, 2015. See Doc. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Defendant therefore timely removed the case to ...
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