Robinson v. Nelson

Docket NumberCivil Action 5:21-cv-01226-JMC
Decision Date31 March 2022
PartiesMarquis Robinson, Petitioner, v. Kenneth Nelson, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
ORDER AND OPINION

Petitioner Marquis Robinson filed the instant Petition against Respondent Kenneth Nelson seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See ECF No. 1.)

This matter is before the court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 17.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), the matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. On January 19, 2022 the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which she recommended that the court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Petitioner's Habeas Petition. (See ECF No. 24 at 30.) Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, which are presently before the court. (See ECF No. 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's recommendation (ECF No. 24), GRANTS Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) and DISMISSES Petitioner's Habeas Petition (ECF No. 1) with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is an inmate presently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina. See SCDC Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2022). On July 25, 2013, a state court jury found Petitioner guilty of armed robbery; criminal conspiracy; kidnapping; possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime; and assault and battery in the second degree, a lesser included offense of attempted murder. (ECF No. 16-8 at 140-154.) Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to concurrent sentences of thirty (30) years imprisonment for armed robbery; thirty (30) years imprisonment for kidnapping; five (5) years imprisonment for criminal conspiracy; five (5) years imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime; and three (3) years for the assault and battery conviction. (Id.)

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the South Carolina Court of Appeals on November 5, 2014. (ECF No. 16-8 at 56.) He challenged the trial judge's refusal “to grant the motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to Appellant and material to his guilt in violation of Appellant's state and federal constitutional rights to due process.” (Id. at 53.) On October 14, 2015, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (Id. at 58-9.) The South Carolina Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court on November 4, 2015. (Id. at 60.)

On April 13, 2016, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (ECF No. 16-8 at 61.) He asserted in his PCR application that he was unlawfully in custody based on (1) “4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 13th, 14th Amendment and violation of due process”; (2) “Violation and fraud upon the court and subject matter jurisdiction”; and (3) “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and violation of Brady law.” (Id. at 63.) On January 15, 2018, Petitioner amended his PCR application adding the following allegations:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel as to Twana N. Burris-Alcide, Esquire: a. Failed to call Kayla Higgs as an alibi witness. b. Failed to properly cross-examine Ernest Jordan regarding statements made. Had Mr. Jordan been properly cross examined he would have lost all credibility and the Applicant would have been exonerated at trial.
2. Trial Judge abused discretion when he punished the Applicant for exercising his right to trial by giving Applicant an excessive sentence. See Castro v. State, 417 S.C. 77, 789 S.E.2d 44 (2016).
3. Juror Tamara N. Gary knew trial counsel and failed to disclose that information in voir dire. See State v. Woods, 345 S.C. 583, 550 S.E.2d 282 (2001), [w]here a juror, without justification, fails to disclose a relationship to a party, it may be inferred, nothing to the contrary appearing, that the juror is not impartial.”

(ECF No. 16-8 at 74.) The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on January 28, 2018. (Id. at 76.) The PCR judge issued an order of dismissal on April 12, 2018, denying Petitioner's PCR application and dismissing it with prejudice. (Id. at 129, 138-39.)

On October 22, 2018, Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR application to the South Carolina Supreme Court. (ECF No. 16-10 at 1.) In his petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner raised the issue of whether “trial counsel provide[d] ineffective assistance in derogation of Petitioner's rights pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to present an alibi witness from an available witness?” (Id. at 3.) The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the PCR appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals on February 27, 2019. (ECF No. 16-12 at 1.) The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for certiorari on November 25, 2020. (ECF No. 16-13 at 1.) The South Carolina Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court on December 15, 2020. (ECF No. 16-14 at 1.)

On April 24, 2021, Petitioner timely[1] filed the instant Habeas Petition challenging his state court conviction. (See ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Petitioner states in the Petition that he is entitled to relief based on the following grounds:

1) Petitioner's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when she failed to call Kayla Higgs as an alibi witness in violation of his constitutionally protected Sixth Amendment rights.
2) The South Carolina Court of Appeals erred when it denied Petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Petitioner's motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to Petitioner and material to his guilt in violation of Petitioner's state and federal constitutional rights to due process.
3) The evidence in Petitioner's case is insufficient to sustain his conviction (Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).

(ECF No. 1 at 20, 26, 30.) Respondent filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment on August 16, 2021. (See ECF No. 17.) Petitioner filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 30, 2021. (See ECF No. 19.)

On January 19, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report and Recommendation at issue concluding that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, and that Petitioner's Habeas Petition should be denied. (See ECF No. 24 at 30.) On February 2, 2022, Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (See ECF No. 25.)

The court considers the merits of Petitioner's Objections to the Report and Recommendation below.

II. JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides that a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for habeas relief when the petitioner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The recommendation has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. See Id. The court reviews de novo only those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are filed.[2] See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). The court reviews those portions which are not specifically objected to only for clear error. See Id. at 316. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

B. Summary Judgment Generally

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a motion for summary judgment with mere allegations or denial of the movant's pleading, but instead must “set forth specific facts” demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991). All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

C. Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

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