Robinson v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 February 1913
• Citation: 153 S.W. 534
• Parties: ROBINSON et al. v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

153 S.W. 534

ROBINSON et al. v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

February 3, 1913.

1. INSURANCE (§ 587) — LIFE POLICY — CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY.

Though a life policy is made payable to a certain person as beneficiary, the original beneficiary may be divested of his interest therein, if the policy reserves to the insured the right to change the beneficiary.

2. INSURANCE (§ 587) — LIFE POLICY — CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY — RESERVATION.

Rev. St. 1889, § 5854, provides that an insurance policy for the benefit of a married woman shall inure to her separate use and that of her children, if any, independent of her husband and his creditors and representatives, and also independent of any third person effecting the same in her behalf, his creditors and representatives; and, in the event of her death before her husband, the policy shall inure to the children of the marriage, to the exclusion of creditors and executors and administrators of the husband, any technical words or phrases in the policy to the contrary notwithstanding. Held, that such section did not nullify or forbid a reservation in a policy on the life of a husband for the benefit of his wife, authorizing him to change the beneficiary; nor did it nullify changes made by him in her lifetime, first by making the policy payable to his children, and then to his executors, administrators, and assigns.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vernon County; B. G. Thurman, Judge.

Action by Zoula Robinson and others against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

M. T. January and S. A. Wight, both of Nevada, Mo., for appellants. James H. McIntosh and Irving Gordon, both of New York City, and Scott & Bowker, of Nevada, Mo., for respondent.

ELLISON, P. J.

This action is based on a policy of life insurance. The judgment in the trial court was for the defendant.

Plaintiffs are the children of Almond B. Cockerill, and it appears from an agreed statement of facts that the defendant, in January, 1899, issued to him a policy of life insurance for $10,000, payable to his wife, or, in the event of her dying before him, to his executors, administrators, or assigns, "or to such other beneficiary as may be designated by the insured as hereinafter provided, at the home office of the company in the city of New York." The policy contained the further provision that the insured could at any time "change the beneficiary or beneficiaries by written notice to the company at its home office," etc.

On the 7th of March, 1903, Cockerill changed the beneficiary from his wife to these plaintiffs, his children. About two years afterwards, on the 20th of March, 1905, he changed from the latter beneficiaries to his executors, administrators, and assigns.

Cockerill's wife died in July, 1905. In August, 1910, he and the defendant agreed that the policy should become "a paid-up policy for $1,348." In about a year thereafter he died. The defendant then paid the latter sum to his administrator.

Plaintiffs' claim is that Cockerill's wife and children became possessed of a vested interest at the delivery of the policy, and that the changes of beneficiaries were void, being contrary to the statute (section 5854, R. S. 1889) in force at the time the policy was issued. The case depends upon a construction of that section. It reads as follows: "Any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be effected by herself or by her husband, or by any third person in her behalf, shall inure to her separate use and benefit, and that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and of his creditors and representatives, and also independently of such third person effecting the same in her behalf, his creditors and representatives; and a trustee may be appointed by the circuit court for the county in which such married woman resides, to hold and manage the interest of any married woman in such policy, or the proceeds thereof. In the event of the death of such married woman before her husband, the said policy shall inure to the children of such marriage, to the exclusion of creditors and executors and administrators of said husband, any technical words or phrases in the policy to the contrary not-withstanding."

The reasoning in plaintiffs' favor is like this: That the insurance is a Missouri contract, and that the insurance laws of Missouri therefore became a part of it (Cravens v. Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519, 53 L. R. A. 305, 71 Am. St. Rep. 628), and that such Missouri law (the above statute) forbids a change of beneficiary, thus leaving the policy payable to the wife and children, or, in case she died, to the children alone.

Defendant agrees that the policy is a Missouri contract, and that it embraces the Missouri statute. Defendant concedes that if the policy had been payable to the wife, and had not contained a privilege of substituting another beneficiary, her interest would have been vested, and the change from her therefore void. U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 58 L. R. A. 436, 92 Am. St. Rep. 641; Blum v. Insurance Co., 197 Mo. 513, 95 S. W. 317, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923, 7 Ann. Cas. 1021. In other words, the defendant's position is that when a person is named unconditionally as beneficiary such person takes a vested interest, which...