Robinson v. Oliver
| Decision Date | 15 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civ. 19-4771 |
| Parties | MONIQUE ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT LONNIE OLIVER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Petitioner Monique Robinson has filed counseled Objections to Magistrate Judge Strawbridge's Recommendation that I deny her Amended § 2254 Petition. (Doc. Nos. 6, 15, 16); 28 U.S.C. § 2254. I will overrule the Objections, adopt Magistrate Judge Strawbridge's Report and Recommendation and deny relief.
Around midnight on September 14, 2011, Saleem Williams, Stephan Reidler, and Robinson-out on a “mission” to rob someone-approached Selvin Lopez, beat him, robbed him of his backpack, and fled. (Doc. No. 15 at 2 () When Lopez attempted to fight back, Williams shot him once in the stomach. (Id.) Lopez's uncle, Estuardo Lopez-Mauricio, witnessed his nephew's murder. (Id. at 3.)
Williams, Reidler, and Robinson were charged with Lopez's murder. (Id. at 2.) Williams and Reidler entered negotiated guilty pleas. (Id.) Robinson refused the plea offer and went to trial, against her counsel's advice. (Id.)
In April 2013, the Chester County jury convicted Robinson of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, robbery, conspiracy, theft, flight to avoid apprehension, and a weapons offense. (Doc. No. 6 at 5; Doc. No. 9 at 14; Doc. No. 15 at 2-3.) In July 2013, a trial Judge sentenced Robinson to a mandatory life sentence for the murder conviction, plus 106-408 consecutive months' imprisonment on the other charges. (Doc. No. 15 at 3; Doc. No. 6 at 5; Doc. No. 9 at 15.)
At trial, Robinson's co-conspirators testified-pursuant to their plea agreements-about her role in the killing. (Doc. No. 15 at 1.)
Reidler testified that he pled guilty to third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. (Doc. No. 15 at 15.) He acknowledged that he lied to avoid imprisonment by giving a false name at the time of his arrest, but said he would not lie to reduce his period of imprisonment. (Id. at 15-16.) Although he called Robinson a “bitch” in his police statement, and blamed her for taking 20 years of his life, Reidler testified that he was not seeking retribution against her. (Id. at 16.) He told the jury about the Commonwealth's two-part plea offer, which he accepted: (1) a sentence of 20 to 40 years' imprisonment for third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery; and (2) an open guilty plea to the lead charge in a separate burglary case. (Id.)
Williams testified that he pled guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, weapon and drug offenses, and escape for attempting to escape from the Chester County prison, for which he received a consolidated total sentence of 40 to 80 years' imprisonment. (Id. at 16-17.) He told the jury that his plea agreement-offered to him after Reidler pled guilty-was contingent upon his testifying truthfully. (Id. at 17.)
In 2014, the Superior Court dismissed Robinson's direct appeal and the Supreme Court denied allocatur. (Doc. No. 15 at 4-5; Doc. No. 6 at 6; Doc. No. 9 at 15.)
In 2015, Robinson timely filed a counseled collateral relief petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-46; (Doc. No. 15 at 5; Doc. No. 6 at 6; Doc. No. 9 at 15.)
After a May 2016 hearing, the PCRA Court denied Robinson's petition in January 2017. (Doc. No. 15 at 5-6.) Robinson filed a counseled appeal, and the Superior Court affirmed. (Id.) The Supreme Court declined further review. (Id.)
In October 2019 Robinson filed a counseled habeas petition, which she amended in February 2020 and supplemented in May 2022. (Id. at 6; Doc. No. 6; Doc. No. 14); 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She raises the following grounds for relief:
(Doc. No. 15 at 6-7, 11-12, 29, 31, 33, 36.)
Judge Jones-to whom this matter was previously assigned-referred it to Magistrate Judge Perkin for a Report and Recommendation in November 2019. (Doc. No. 4.) In September 2021, the Clerk of Court reassigned the matter to Magistrate Judge Strawbridge. (Doc. No. 12.) Respondents oppose relief and Magistrate Judge Strawbridge recommends denying the Petition. (Doc. Nos. 9, 15.) Robinson filed Objections to the Report, and Respondents filed a response.
(Doc. Nos. 16, 18.) In November 2022, the matter was reassigned to me. (Doc. No. 19.)
I must review de novo those portions of the Report to which Robinson files timely, specific objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). I may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part” Magistrate Judge Strawbridge's findings or recommendations. Id.; Brophy v. Halter, 153 F.Supp.2d 667, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2001). As to those portions to which no objections have been made, I must “satisfy [myself] that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Amendment; see Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) ().
Before seeking federal habeas relief, state prisoners must exhaust their state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Moreover, federal courts usually will not review habeas claims that were not presented to the state court in the manner prescribed by its procedural rules. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977). “[I]f it is clear that [the habeas petitioner's] claims [would] now [be] procedurally barred under [state] law,” the claims are exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996) (). I may not consider a defaulted claim unless the petitioner shows either: (1) cause and prejudice; or (2) that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 409 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Cristin v. Wolfe, 527 U.S. 897 (2002); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) .
I may grant habeas relief only if the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To warrant habeas relief, the state court's decision must be “objectively unreasonable.” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2005). I may not grant relief “merely because [I] conclude[] that the state court applied federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 100; see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (“[A] federal court may not overturn a state court decision . . . simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.”). I must give determinations by the Superior Court considerable deference; I presume factual issues determined by a state court are correct unless a petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Sneed v. Beard, 328 F.Supp.3d 412, 422 (E.D. Pa. 2018) ().
Magistrate Judge Strawbridge found Robinson's first claim “defaulted and unreviewable as a whole.” (Doc. No. 15 at 24.) He then rejected her second and third claims, finding that the state courts neither unreasonably applied nor contradicted Strickland v. Washington, and that their factual findings were reasonable. (Id. at 37, 47); 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Strawbridge recommends that I deny Robinson's Petition and decline to issue a Certificate of Appealability. (Doc. No. 15 at 2.)
Robinson argues that Judge Strawbridge erred by: (1) analyzing her claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), instead of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); (2) finding that the Commonwealth's disclosure of evidence undercut Robinson's argument that cause existed to excuse her default; and (3) concluding that the alleged misconduct was not material. (Doc. No. 16 at 1-5.)
Although Robinson's first claim is procedurally defaulted-she did not present it to the state courts-the default analysis requires some examination of the merits. (Doc. No. 15 at 7, 15.) I will thus first discuss Napue and Brady as to each of her four subclaims.
When the prosecutor knowingly presents or fails to correct false...
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