Robinson v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 08 August 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-1044.
• Citation: 619 F. Supp. 344
• Parties: Ada ROBINSON and Albert Robinson, Plaintiffs, v. James F. PALMER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

619 F. Supp. 344

Ada ROBINSON and Albert Robinson, Plaintiffs, v. James F. PALMER, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-1044.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 8, 1985.

Jeffrey F. Lawrence, Michael G. Roberts, Billig, Sher & Jones, P.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs; Arthur B. Spitzer, Elizabeth Symonds, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of the Nat. Capitol Area, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Beverly A. Lewis, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Dept. of Corrections, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, District Judge:

In this proceeding the wife of a prisoner, and the prisoner who is confined to a District of Columbia penal institution, challenge a decision of the Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("Department") suspending the wife's visiting rights for one year and later permanently suspending those rights. The plaintiffs Ada Robinson and her husband Albert Robinson seek to overturn the actions of the Department's Director. They request injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants are the Director and two officials of the Department, the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia.

The matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment and plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. The matter was fully briefed and following argument on the motions, post hearing memoranda were submitted by the parties. For the reasons set out below the Court determines that Mrs. Robinson is entitled to procedural due process, through a hearing, before the suspension of her visiting rights was increased from a one-year to a permanent suspension.

BACKGROUND

The material and essential facts in this case are uncontroverted. Mr. Robinson is currently incarcerated in a Department facility located in Lorton, Virginia ("Lorton") following a felony conviction and sentence. On March 8, 1983 while visiting her husband, Mrs. Robinson attempted to bring contraband into that facility. The contraband, a quantity of marijuana, was found in a plastic lunch bag secreted in her undergarments.¹ Because of this infraction, Mrs. Robinson was advised in a letter dated March 8, 1983 from Salanda Whitfield, a Department official, that her visiting privileges were suspended for one year.²

This is to advise you that your visiting privileges at all ... Department of Corrections Facilities have been suspended for a period of one year. This action is taken as a result of visiting regulations governing visitor conduct (Introduction of Contraband) during a visit to the institution on March 8, 1983.

You may apply in writing for reinstatement of your visiting privileges after March 8, 1984. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact this office ... at phone 727-4000, x-483.

The one-year suspension sanction was based on a Department contraband policy directive, effective June 28, 1978, which provided that "legal or administrative sanctions are exercised against those who either attempt to introduce or are in possession of contraband."³ On February 15, 1983, the Acting Director of the Department in reaffirming the contraband policy stated in a memorandum to his assistants, that "citizens permanently banned from further visitation privileges may continue to appeal such action to my office."⁴ On February 6, 1984, one month before the end of Mrs. Robinson's one-year suspension, the Department amended the June 28, 1978 policy directive to provide that

Any visitor who introduces contraband or attempts to introduce contraband into a Department of Corrections Institution will be permanently suspended from all Department of Corrections Facilities.⁵ (emphasis added).

The plaintiffs challenge the February 6, 1984 change in the contraband policy. They allege various constitutional violations and also claim that the policy was adopted in violation of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

At the outset, the Court notes that the Robinsons' complaint fails to assert any cognizable claim against either the District of Columbia or the Mayor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Service, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Nor are there any claims or allegations that either was even remotely involved in the underlying facts of this litigation. Accordingly, those defendants are sua sponte dismissed by the Court.

ANALYSIS

The Constitutional Claims

A. First Amendment

Plaintiffs claim that the contraband regulation infringes upon their first amendment right to visitation. "Convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1815, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A prisoner does not shed such basic First Amendment rights at the prison gate").

However, it is not clearly established that prisoners do have a constitutional right to visitation. "When confronted with the question whether inmates have a constitutional right to receive visits from family and friends, courts have reached varying results." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 579 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). See also Martin v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 983, 984 n. 3 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); White v. Keller, 438 F.Supp. 110, 114-15 (D.Md.1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978). The question here is not whether an inmate has a constitutional right to visitation, per se, but whether prison officials may limit that right. In this case, prison officials seek to impose a limitation on visitors caught entering the facility with contraband.

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs do have a constitutional right to visitation founded in the first amendment, the governmental restriction on that right must be closely scrutinized. "Challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (analyzing constitutional interests involving face-to-face interviews between prisoners and the media). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409, 94 S.Ct. at 1809 (analyzing constitutional interests involved with censorship of inmates' mail).

In evaluating the restriction on prisoner visitation through a contraband policy, the Court must determine whether it "is reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives." Block v. Rutherford, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984). It cannot be disputed that there is a legitimate governmental objective in deterring visitors from bringing contraband into the prison. "Prison officials stressed the enormous security risk flowing from the introduction of contraband into the prison population...." Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). In such cases where the activity being regulated, in this case, contraband, is presumptively dangerous, there is a "burden upon prisoners to demonstrate that the restriction is not supported by a reasonable justification." Id. at 1033.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the fact that Mrs. Robinson is appropriately a subject of sanctions for carrying contraband into Lorton. What they do challenge, however, is the reasonableness of a permanent suspension of visiting privileges. Because of the security objectives behind the contraband policy and the dangers posed by the introduction of contraband into Lorton, the Court cannot conclude that it is unreasonable for prison officials to adopt a permanent suspension policy.⁶ "Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. There are legitimate security objectives supporting the contraband policy, and the Court should defer to the reasonable judgment of prison officials as to the details of the policy. Cf. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. at 3234 ("When the District Court found that many factors counseled against contact visits, its inquiry should have ended. The court's further `balancing' resulting in an impermissible substitution of its view on the proper administration of Central Jail for that of the experienced administrators of that facility"). See also Blocker v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 85-0527, Mem. at 2 (D.D.C. June 6, 1985).

Moreover, Mrs. Robinson has other means of communicating with her husband beyond visits. Given the alternate channels available, the limitation posed by the policy is not an unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806. Other restrictions on inmate visitation regulations have similarly been upheld by courts. See, e.g., Ramos, 639 F.2d at 580-81; Morrison v. Lefevre, 592 F.Supp. 1052, 1079 (S.D.N.Y.1984) ("It is reasonable for a prison to deny visiting privileges to someone who is suspected of having attempted to aid a prisoner's escape."); Smith v. Coughlin, 577 F.Supp. 1055, 1061-62 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.1984). Thus, the contraband policy, SO 5010.3C, is not a prima facie unconstitutional violation of plaintiffs' first amendment rights.

B. Eighth Amendment

The plaintiffs argue that Mrs. Robinson's permanent visitation suspension is tantamount to the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishment" for her husband, and thus violates the...