Robinson v. Pfister
| Decision Date | 11 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17 CV 1051 |
| Parties | MAURICE L. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. RANDY PFISTER, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC," ECF No. 83), former Illinois prisoner Maurice L. Robinson ("Robinson") brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., against eight defendants. See SAC 7-14. Three motions to dismiss the SAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are before the court. For the following reasons, the court grants two of the motions and denies the third.
Robinson filed his original complaint pro se. ECF No. 1. The court screened the complaint and dismissed certain claims and defendants. See ECF No. 5 (screening order); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (2). Randy Pfister ("Pfister"), warden of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville"), appeared and moved to dismiss the complaint against them. The court granted his motion by order dated August 18, 2017. ECF No. 24. At a hearing held February 23, 2018, Robinson's lawyer obtained leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 45; see also Am. Compl., ECF No. 46.
Two motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim followed. ECF Nos. 54, 73. Before his deadline to respond to the second motion, Robinson moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 79. The court granted the motion on December 7, 2018, ECF No. 82, and the SAC was filed on December 14, 2018.
When deciding a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, the court assumes that the operative complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations are true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of Chicago, 844 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2016). The SAC alleges as follows:
Robinson has a prosthetic lower left extremity. SAC ¶ 17. Beginning on or about December 10, 2015, he spent five months in the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville") in Joliet, Illinois. SAC ¶ 15. Robinson alleges that he requested a shower chair during his initial medical evaluation and that he subsequently asked "several different staff at Stateville" for a chair. SAC ¶ 20. But Robinson never received a shower chair, and his "needs were continually ignored." SAC ¶¶ 21-23. As a result of not showering for five months, Robinson developed body sores; they were not treated until he was transferred to another IDOC facility. SAC ¶¶ 23-33.
Robinson names eight defendants in the SAC. He sues IDOC and Wexford, a private company which provides healthcare services at Stateville, and Stateville itself as a defendant. See SAC ¶¶ 10-12. The court refers to Will County, Illinois ("Will County") and the City of Crest Hill collectively as the Will County defendants. SAC ¶¶ 13-14. The final threedefendants are individuals: Pfister, Stateville's warden; Mary Schwarz ("Schwarz"), the physician's assistant who conducted Robinson's medical intake procedure; and Ester Martin ("Martin"), a nurse supervisor at Stateville. SAC ¶¶ 7-9, 15. Wexford employs Schwarz; Pfister and Martin work for IDOC. SAC ¶¶ 7-9.
The SAC has four counts. Counts I and IV arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that IDOC, Pfister, Martin, and Schwarz were deliberately indifferent to Robinson's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. SAC ¶¶ 41-47. In Count IV, Robinson pleads that the "de facto" policies and customs of IDOC, Stateville, and the Will County defendants caused the above violations in that the named defendants did not "provide the equipment required to accommodate and provide adequate medical care to detainees with prosthetic limbs." SAC ¶ 68. Counts II and III assert, respectively, ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against Stateville, IDOC, and the Will County defendants for failing to accommodate Robinson's disability by providing a shower chair. SAC ¶¶ 50-66.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion "tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case." McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint need only set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That is, the complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies this standard when its factual allegations "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court takes all facts alleged by the plaintiff astrue and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, although conclusory allegations that merely recite the elements of a claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth. Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011).
The separate motions filed by (1) Wexford; (2) Pfister and IDOC; and (3) the Will County defendants sometimes raise overlapping issues.
Robinson names the Stateville Correctional Institution as a defendant separate from the IDOC, Pfister, and the individual defendants. SAC ¶ 10. Illinois law determines whether Stateville can be sued in its own name. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). District courts in Illinois have held uniformly that "Stateville Correctional Center is not a suable entity." Lee v. Lemke, 1996 WL 166944, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1996) (citing Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991)); accord Taylor v. Stateville Dep't of Corr., 2010 WL 5014185, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2010); see also Williams v. I.D.O.C. Law Library Program, 1997 WL 106174, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1996); cf. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (). Robinson cites no authority interpreting Illinois law differently. See Reply 6-7, ECF No. 120.
Instead, Robinson argues that even if Stateville is not amenable to suit under Illinois law, Title II of the ADA authorizes suit against it as a public entity. Reply 7. Title II of the ADA declares that no qualified person with a disability "shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination" by a state or local unit of government. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 629-30 (7th Cir. 2013).The definition of a covered public entity includes "any State or local government" and "any department, agency . . . or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government[.]" 42 U.S.C. §12131(1)(A)-(B). Robinson appears to argue that even if Stateville is not a department or agency of the Illinois government, it nevertheless qualifies as an "instrumentality" of IDOC. This argument is foreclosed by Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000). Walker holds that the IDOC (or its director sued in his or her official capacity) is the "proper defendant" in a prisoner suit under Title II of the ADA. Id.
Robinson also cites Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2009), to show that Stateville is suable. Reply 7. As explained in Part III.C of this opinion, the Phipps court analyzed whether "showers, toilets, and sinks" are programs or services for ADA purposes. See Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 915. Because Phipps does not purport to decide whether a prison is amenable to suit under Illinois law, it does not support Robinson's inclusion of Stateville as a defendant. Stateville is dismissed.
Wexford and the Will County defendants argue that the SAC does not state plausible claims for imposing liability under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The principles of Monell apply equally to municipalities and to "§ 1983 claims brought against private companies [such as Wexford] that act under color of state law." Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Beard v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 900 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2018). In short, to satisfy Monell the defendant's policy, practice, or custom must be the "moving force of the constitutional violation." Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (applyingrule to private corporation); see also Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010) (using "direct cause" as a synonym for "moving force" (quoting Payne ex rel. Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1043 (7th Cir. 1998)). Furthermore, the policymakers responsible for the challenged decision must have been "deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk that a policy or custom would lead to constitutional violations." J.K.J. v. Polk Cty., 928 F.3d 576, 588 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 410 (1997)).
A custom or policy may be formal or informal. Robinson may satisfy Monell by "demonstrating that [a Wexford formal] policy is itself unconstitutional." Minix, 597 F.3d at 832 (citing Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d...
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