Robinson v. Point One Toyota
| Decision Date | 28 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-11-2482,No. 1-11-2522 cons. NRel,No. 1-11-1889,1-11-1889,1-11-2482,1-11-2522 cons. NRel |
| Parties | 2012 IL App (1st) 111889 EMMA J. ROBINSON and LATANYA KEMP, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. POINT ONE TOYOTA, EVANSTON, Defendant (Toyota Motor Credit Corporation and River Oaks Toyota, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
¶ 1 The plaintiffs, Emma J. Robinson and Latanya Kemp, appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County awarding partial summary judgment to the defendants, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (TMCC) and River Oaks Toyota on the plaintiffs' joint claims under the federal Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C §§1667a, 1667b (1994)) (the CLA). The defendants filed a cross-appeal and a separate appeal challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction.
¶ 2 On appeal, the plaintiffs raise the following issues: (1) the award of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs' joint default penalties claim was error; (2) the circuit court erred when it refused to award the plaintiffs statutory damages on each disclosure violation and failed to award them any statutory damages for nondisclosure violations; (3) the circuit court erred by allowing TMCC to raise a setoff claim for the first time at trial; (4) the circuit court erred when it denied the plaintiffs' request for actual damages; (5) the circuit court erred when it denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel the defendants to answer written discovery and appear for depositions; (6) the circuit court erred by failing to compel the defendants to resolve disagreements with the plaintiffs' attorney's time records and to compel the defendants to disclose their attorneys' time records; and (7) the circuit court erred when it failed to consider the uncontroverted affidavits of the plaintiffs' experts and the case law in determining the award of attorney fees. On cross-appeal, the defendants contend that the circuit court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs' joint lease termination and failure to itemize claims. In a separate appeal, the defendants contend that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to award additional attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' motion for additional fees and costs was filed more than 30 days after the final order was entered in the case.
¶ 5 The factual background of this case is detailed in the prior opinions of this court and our supreme court. See Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403 (2002); Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1086 (2000). Therefore, we need only recite the facts pertinent to the issues raised in this case.
¶ 6 In 1993, each plaintiff entered into a vehicle leasing agreement with a Toyota dealership: Ms. Robinson with River Oaks and Ms. Kemp with Point One. The leasing agreements were assigned to TMCC. In 1995, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants, alleging violations of the CLA and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992)). The case was dismissed based on a pending class action suit against TMCC in California but was later reinstated in the circuit court.
¶ 7 The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint alleging violations of the CLA, the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (815 ILCS 510/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Ms. Kemp's individual claim under the CLA for failure to disclose the actual amount of sales tax owed was also alleged as a breach of contract. The circuit court dismissed the CLA claims on res judicata grounds; the state claims and Ms. Kemp's breach of contract claim were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
¶ 8 On appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of the second amended complaint, this court ruled that res judicata barred the plaintiffs' joint CLA claims. We affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the state claims but reversed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim.
Robinson, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1086. On further review, the supreme court held that the joint CLA claims were not barred by res judicata but agreed that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings on the CLA counts. Robinson, 201 Ill. 2d at 423.1
¶ 10 The circuit court granted in part TMCC's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The plaintiffs then filed a third amended complaint. Pertinent to this appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the following provisions of the leasing agreement violated the CLA's disclosure requirements: default penalties, voluntary termination of the lease, and itemization of other charges to be paid by the plaintiffs.
¶ 11 Both parties moved for partial summary judgment. Initially, the circuit court denied both motions because of disputed factual issues. After the parties stipulated to all the material facts, on reconsideration, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their lease termination and their itemization of other charges claim and Ms. Kemp's individual CLA claim. The defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on those claims was denied. The court then granted the defendants' partial summary judgment motion on the plaintiffs' default provisions claim and denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to that claim.
¶ 12 Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs' request for actual damages, except for the sales tax to be refunded to Ms. Kemp and awarded each plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $1,000, based on the failure to disclose. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1994). On April 8, 2011, the court entered an order awarding Ms. Robinson $1,000 and Ms. Kemp $1,596, based on the setoff of the $500 settlement amount she received from Point One.
¶ 13 On June 10, 2011, the circuit court awarded the plaintiffs $113,280 in attorney fees and costs of $420. The plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from the June 10, 2011, order on July 7, 2011. The defendants filed separate cross-appeals on July 15, 2011. On July 29, 2011, the circuit court entered an order correcting the amount of the award of attorney fees to $150,780 against the defendants and awarding attorney fees of $780 to the plaintiffs against River Oaks. The defendants filed notices of appeal from the July 29, 2011, order. On November 8, 2011, this court entered an order consolidating the appeals.
¶ 15 We first address the jurisdictional issue raised in the defendants' separate appeal.
¶ 17 The defendants contend that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees and costs in its July 29, 2011, order because the plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs was filed on July 25, 2011, which was more than 30 days after the entry of the June 10, 2011, final judgment order. The plaintiffs respond that the circuit court had jurisdiction to correct a miscalculation it made in its determination of attorney fees and costs award.
¶ 18 Absent a timely filed posttrial motion, a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case pendingbefore it 30 days after the entry of a final judgment terminating the litigation. Holwell v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 334 Ill. App. 3d 917, 922 (2002). After the expiration of that 30-day period, the trial court lacks the necessary jurisdiction to amend, modify or vacate its judgment. Holwell, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 922. There are recognized exceptions to that jurisdictional rule; a court may at any time modify its judgment to correct a clerical error or matter of form so that the record conforms to the judgment actually rendered. Holwell, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 922. "This power may not, however, be employed to correct judicial errors or supply omitted judicial action." Holwell, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 922. A judicial error occurs when the judge commits an error in performing a judicial function. In re Marriage of Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d 85, 92 (1999).
¶ 19 The July 29, 2011, order provided in pertinent part as follows:
¶ 20 In Takata, the reviewing court found that the determination of a spouse's net income for the purpose of setting child support was a judicial function; "the judge employs a certain amount of discretion in determining an appropriate and reasonable amount." Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 92. The court held that "a mathematical error in determining a spouse's income is not a clerical error; rather, as it is the product of the judicial function, it is a judicial error." Takata, 304 Ill.App. 3d at 93.
¶ 21 We find the calculation of the amount of the attorney fees award similar to the calculation of a spouse's net income for child support purposes and, therefore, a judicial function. Likewise, the circuit court's "inadvertent omission" of the number of hours in its calculation of the attorney fees was a judicial error. Therefore, the exceptions to the jurisdictional rule do not apply, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on July 29, 2011, to correct its June 10, 2011, order.
¶ 22 The plaintiffs'...
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