Robinson v. Powers

• Decision Date: 07 November 1891
• Parties: Robinson v. Powers.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

129 Ind. 480

28 N.E. 1112

Robinson

v.Powers.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 7, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Pike county; O. M. Welborn, Judge.

Action by Maggie Powers against Columbus Robinson for damages for seduction. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. S. Pritchett, for appellant. E. P. Richardson and A. H. Taylor, for appellee.

OLDS, J.

The appellee brings this action for damages for her own seduction. The case was commenced in the Knox circuit court, and the venue changed to the Pike circuit court, where there was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee for $1,200. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, also made a motion in arrest of judgment, which motions were overruled and exceptions reserved. The errors assigned are on the rulings of the court in overruling of the motion for new trial, the overruling of the motion in arrest of judgment, and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Counsel for appellant first discusses the sufficiency of the complaint.

It is contended that the complaint is insufficient, for the reason that it fails to state with sufficient certainty the methods and means by which the seduction was accomplished. No demurrer was filed to the complaint. It was first questioned after verdict. The rule is that if a complaint is sufficient to bar another action for the same cause, if the defects are such as may be supplied by proof, it is good after verdict, when its sufficiency is questioned by motion in arrest or by an assignment of error in this court. Burkhart v. Gladish, 123 Ind. 337, 24 N. E. Rep. 118; Colchen v. Ninde, 120 Ind. 88, 22 N. E. Rep. 94; Chapell v. Shuee, 117 Ind. 481, 20 N. E. Rep. 417.

We deem it unnecessary to set out the complaint in this case, as we regard it as clearly sufficient. We think a fair construction to be put upon the complaint is that it charges that the appellant accomplished the seduction of the appellee, and induced her to surrender her chastity and virtue to his embraces, by keeping company with her, expressing love for and promising to marry her; and this was the construction placed upon the allegations of the complaint by the judge who tried the cause in his instructions to the jury.

The appellant contends that the court erred in the giving of certain instructions, and in the refusal to give certain other instructions requested by the appellant. The evidence is not in the record. It is insisted that the court erred in giving instruction No. 3, for the reason that it states that “seduction” is defined by the law-books in certain words, and that it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury what seduction is under the law, and not what it is defined to be by the books. The instruction is short, and we here set it out in full: “(3) The term ‘seduction’ is defined in the law-books in these words: ‘The use of some influence, promise, art, or other means on the part of a man, by which he induces a woman to surrender her chastity and virtue to his embraces.’ The particular influence charged in the complaint is that the defendant paid his attention to the plaintiff, and expressed love and affection for her, and promised to marry the plaintiff.” We think the jury were not misled by this instruction. “Seduction” is defined by Bouvier as “the act of a man in inducing a woman to commit unlawful sexual intercourse with him.” The definition given is the same as declared by the supreme court of Oregon in the case of Patterson v. Hayden, 21 Pac. Rep. 129; but no question is raised as to the correctness of the definition, and we think the fact that the court stated it was so defined by the books, instead of stating an independent definition coined by the judgment himself or quoted from a book, is a mere technical objection, and not such error as justifies the reversal of the judgment.

The appellant next complaints of the fourth instruction given to the jury. This instruction reads as follows: “(4) If the jury find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Robinson, was an unmarried man, and the plaintiff an unmarried woman, at the time of the commission of the alleged injury, and that Robinson, by his attentions, expressions of love and affection for her, and promise to marry the plaintiff, thereby gained her affection and confidence, and importuned her to sexual intercourse with him, and she, through her confidence in him and love for him, yielded to his solicitations, it was seduction, for which, under the section of the statute before...